SSM Policies: Please Don’t Oversimplify Part II

SSM Policies: Please Don’t Oversimplify Part II November 25, 2015

Two days ago, I wrote about tendencies to oversimplify the same-sex marriage discussion—including responses from society generally and religions specifically. I indicated that my philosophy students initially lack the ability to construct arguments that indicate they understand the many sides of the same-sex marriage debate. This frequently results in less than thoughtful responses and even pejorative expressions against one side of the debate or the other.

We are a mere five months removed from the SCOTUS ruling. This is “freshly tracked powder.” Therefore, it is interesting that most of my students are initially more adept at arguing for the strengths of same-sex marriage than they are for the strengths of heterosexual marriage. I realize that almost all university students that I teach have friends or family members (or both) that are gay. Hence, deep-seated accommodations, or robust acceptance, are present long before they sit in my ethics class. But the vast majority of my students have been raised in heterosexual parents. Even so, I’ve observed through student comments and writing that they commonly struggle to defend the strengths of heterosexual marriage even though they’ve had a lifetime to observe strengths of the institution. Many factors could explain this but such a discussion exceeds today’s scope. Like my previous post (part I), the principle point is that I am concerned if students cannot defend both sides of the debate—same-sex and heterosexual marriage. A similar onus rests upon all of us.

With this in mind, consider Sharif Girgis (Princeton), Robbie P. George (Princeton), and Ryan T. Anderson (Princeton/Notre Dame). They wrote an article published in the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy entitled “What is Marriage.” They staunchly defend heterosexual marriage on grounds of natural law (sperm produced by male fertilizes egg produced by female and delivery systems and parenting arrangements in these processes should generally mirror nature). The positions they espouse are presented in a dispassionate way—not emotionally charged and follow the rules of logical argumentation. In other words, whether you agree with them or not, their arguments demand a rational and measured response—not a visceral emotional response—if one wants to be taken seriously.

One pressing point of their argumentation is that revising definitions of marriage is problematic because abandoning natural law arguments to embrace post-modern conceptions of marriage will likely leave a vacuum void of explicit definitions of marriage of any kind. Girges, George, and Anderson put it this way:

“There is a tension here. Some revisionists say that marriage is merely a social and legal construct, but their appeals to equality undermine this claim. The principle of equality requires treating like cases alike. So the judgment that same‐sex and opposite‐sex unions are alike with respect to marriage, and should therefore be treated alike by marriage law, presupposes one of two things: Either neither relationship is a real marriage in the above sense, perhaps because there is no such thing, marriage being just a legal fiction (in which case, why not justify apparent inequities by social‐utility considerations?), or both relationships are real marriages, whatever the law says about them. The latter presupposition entails the belief, which most revisionists seem to share with advocates of the conjugal view, that marriage has a nature independent of legal conventions. In this way, the crucial question—the only one that can settle this debate—remains for both sides: What is marriage?”

The authors seem to be asking: If you agree with the SCOTUS ruling that redefined marriage to include same-sex marriage, that’s fine, but precisely what is the new definition of marriage? Does it include Polygamy? Does it include Polyandry? Does it include throuples? Does it include quartets? Does it include marriage leases? Does it include so-called open marriages? And if you oppose these (and other) redefinitions of marriage, upon what grounds do you oppose? Please put forward your new definition. You’re likely troubled by slippery slope arguments but isn’t it possible that the legal trajectory employed to legalize same-sex marriage (3rd, 5th, 13th, and 14th Amendments) could also be employed to uphold human dignity and the right to formally and legally enter into these other conceptions of marriage?”

The questions posed by Girges, George, and Anderson are legitimate and demand credible responses. Many clear-thinking people throughout the world view same-sex marriage questions through the general lens of natural law as described by these authors. Of course, I’m not suggesting there are not credible answers to natural law arguments. In fact, I do ask my philosophy students to provide creidible answers to these questions. Again, I suppose the same onus rests upon us all. When thinking about these questions, perhaps you will conclude with me that, once again, this in not simple terrain to navigate. Therefore, in discussions with friends, family, colleagues, and even strangers, it is advisable to remain open and lead with civility in the dialogue.

 


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