Sendai Anonymous picks apart a critique of Hannah Arendt’s famous analysis of Nazi Adolf Eichmann as embodying the banality of evil:
It is the last paragraph of Sholem’s letter that seems to me most revealing: Sholem remarks that he regrets that she rejected the previous version of her analysis of evil, an analysis that was “eloquent” and “erudite”, adopting instead the “slogan-like” conclusion about the “banality of evil”. This, Sholem says, he cannot accept: however, he does not give any reasons for that other than the previous analysis being “eloquent”. This because there aren’t any: you can’t argue with facts.
And well: I guess when you’re a philosopher of religion, you don’t deal with facts, you deal with ideas. There’s no better way of putting it: in the end you actually write what sounds good, and what’s eloquent; you don’t write about facts, there’s nothing to check, nothing to verify, and also the voice of your god you hear in your head is yourvoice, always your voice(1). When you write about ideas, it’s much prettier to write that evil is radical or demonic or something similarly dramatic.
But when you write about facts, you can’t make them pretty; or at least you shouldn’t. And (some of) the facts are:
There was a man in court, his name was Eichmann, he was an SS-man
He did horrid things
He didn’t feel guilty
He wasn’t very smart
He had trouble expressing himself
He portrayed himself as an unlucky person, a victim of circumstances
He lied to the judges, he lied to himself, he lied to everyone, his lies were typically thoughtless self-contradictory denier lies
There was nothing radical or demonic about him
In the end, there can be no doubt that the final conclusion about the banality of evil stands, that there are facts supporting it; even if they aren’t “eloquent”. You could write something prettier and more erudite about it, but why would you, when there’s no need? The facts are more than enough.