Qualia Soup on Morality Part 3: Of Objectivity and Oughts

Qualia Soup makes the case for a J.L. Mackie sort of subjectivism in ethics against William Lane Craig. I think more can be said for objectivity than he allows. As I summarized last week, in my own objections to Craig’s positions: I, for one, am convinced atheists can have a perfectly fine naturalistic ontology of objective goodness, which allows us [Read More...]

Against Moral Intuitionism

In the series of posts I began on Sunday and which has continued through this morning, I have developed and defended my naturalistic approach to understanding value as a realist.  James Gray, despite being a moral realist, has balked at much in my attempts to do this and it has become increasingly clear that the [Read More...]

A Question For My Readers About “Moral Facts”

In metaethics debates, there are disputes between various forms of cognitivists and non-cognitivists.  Cognitivists claim that when we make a claim that “x is wrong” or “x is right” we mean to say that “it is a fact that x is wrong” or that “it is a fact that x is right.” Whether it turns [Read More...]