Philosophical Ethics: Does Calling Someone Evil Explain Anything About Them?

In a series of posts this semester, I am going to blog all (or almost all) the lecture topics for the two Philosophical Ethics classes I am teaching this semester. Each of these posts will primarily explicate the reading or a theme that dominated class discussion in a way that should be accessible to novices [Read More...]

Philosophical Ethics: J.L. Mackie’s Error Theory And Jonathan Harrison’s Critique Thereof

In a series of posts this semester, I am going to blog all (or almost all) the lecture topics for the two Philosophical Ethics classes I am teaching this semester. Each of these posts will primarily explicate the reading or a theme that dominated class discussion in a way that should be accessible to novices [Read More...]

A Question For My Readers About “Moral Facts”

In metaethics debates, there are disputes between various forms of cognitivists and non-cognitivists.  Cognitivists claim that when we make a claim that “x is wrong” or “x is right” we mean to say that “it is a fact that x is wrong” or that “it is a fact that x is right.” Whether it turns [Read More...]


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