The Facts About Intrinsic and Instrumental Goods and The Cultural Construction of Intrinsic Goods

September 23, 2011 By 8 Comments

In this post I want to say something which many would find radical and would assume is impossible and clearly false: I want to say that it can be a fact whether something is intrinsically good in some particular respect, for some particular being. A major part of this requires that I distinguish another two other [...]

Filed Under: Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Ethical Pluralism, Ethical Pluralism, Ethics, Ethics, Metaethics, Metaphysics, Metaphysics, My Theory of Morality's Rational Foundations and Nature, Philosophy, Virtues, Virtues Tagged With: 8 Comments

The Objective Value of Ordered Complexity

September 13, 2011 By 9 Comments

I argue that the word goodness should be interpreted to mean, in the most fundamental sense of the word, “effectiveness”. I also argue that since effectiveness is a factual issue, goodness is a factual issue. These controversial positions of mine raise a lot of thought provoking questions and challenges from readers. I am using this [...]

Filed Under: Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Ethics, Evolution, Evolution, Metaethics, Morality, Morality, My Theory of Morality's Rational Foundations and Nature, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Teleology, Teleology, Virtues, Virtues Tagged With: 9 Comments

Goodness Is A Factual Matter (Goodness=Effectiveness)

January 23, 2011 By 11 Comments

All statements about values can be restated as statements of facts. The truth or falsity about value claims can be discovered by investigations of facts. Goodness is a word that can be defined by reference to certain kinds of factual relationships in the world. Whether or not something deserves to be called good can be [...]

Filed Under: Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Ethics, Ethics, Featured, Metaethics, My Theory of Morality's Rational Foundations and Nature, Naturalistic Fallacy, Naturalistic Fallacy, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Teleology, Teleology Tagged With: , , , , 11 Comments

What’s Wrong With Prejudice And Is It Prejudicial To Dislike Someone Over His Bad Thinking?

August 4, 2009 By 6 Comments

Over at Unreasonable Faith, guest contributor Custador thinks he is a bigoted atheist: The knowledge that my cousin is a creationist has actually made me dislike him. I wonder now if I’m any better than any other prejudiced person — a racist or a sexist or a homophobe — because I pre-judge a group of [...]

Filed Under: Applied Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Epistemology, Ethical Pluralism, Ethics, Faith, Featured, Intellectual Vices, Intellectual Virtues, Moral Psychology, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Prejudice, Secularism, Virtues Tagged With: , , , , , , , 6 Comments