Sometimes atheists become enamored with some pretty psychologically shallow memes. In this post, I fisk one.
Oh You Can Get Good People To Do Bad Things Without Religion Alright…
Filed Under: Atheism, Ethics, Moral Psychology Tagged With: Are people basically evil?, Are people basically good?, Are people evil?, Are people good?, But for good people to do evil things that takes religion, Cultural Relativism, Does religion make people evil?, Dutifulness, Ethics, ethics of duty, Moral Philosophy, moral philospohy, Moral Psychology, Philosophical Ethics, religion and morality, Self-Righteousness, Steven Weinberg, stoic psychology, Stoicism, that takes religion.", Vices, Virtues, Weakness of Will, why do good people do evil, With or without it you would have good people doing good things and evil people doing evil things But for good people to do evil things that takes religion 30 Comments
Forward Thinking: What is the Ethical Relevance of Pride?
“Forward Thinking” is a blog series in which Libby Anne and I prompt bloggers and other commenters to write about their views on values questions. Two weeks ago, Libby Anne prompted posts on our responsibilities to our parents (particularly when their effect on our lives has not been all positive). See what the bloggers had [...]
Filed Under: Ethics, Forward Thinking, Virtues Tagged With: Forward Thinking, Is Pride a Vice?, Is Pride a Virtue?, Pride, Virtues 4 Comments
On Unintentionally Intimidating People
While most of us rightly want to be exceptional in some way or another, we often feel a lot of social and moral pressure not to think of ourselves as generally better than others. And, even more urgently, we feel pressure not to convey to others that we think ourselves superior and not to be [...]
Filed Under: Applied Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Ethics, Ethics, Intellectual Vices, Intellectual Vices, Intellectual Virtues, Intellectual Virtues, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Psychology, Psychology, Psychology, Social Psychology, Social Psychology, Virtues, Virtues Tagged With: False Modesty, Graciousness, Intimidating People, Modesty, Self-Deprecation, Sensitivity, Virtues 10 Comments
Further Towards A “Non-Moral” Standard Of Ethical Evaluation
In reply to a recent post, Tyler writes: Your definition of ethics and morality is well taken and allows for further interesting debate on culture and moral systems but it still requires assumption of benefit. Defining phrases like “fully flourishing life” and “most excellent characters we can develop” require a standard of evaluation which I [...]
Filed Under: Authority, Duty, Ethical Pluralism, Uncategorized Tagged With: Arete, Atheistic Ethics, Autonomy, Care, Equality, Ethics, Evolutionary Psychology, Excellence, Fairness, Fruits and Ladders, Harm, Human Flourishing, Ingroup Loyalty, Jonathan Haidt, Justice, Moral Goods, Moral Psychology, Moralism, Motives, My Theory of Morality's Rational Foundations and Nature, Non-Moral Goods, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Purity, Quality vs. Quantity, Sociobiology, Tyler Samien, Values, Virtues 1 Comment
Towards A “Non-Moral” Standard Of Ethical Evaluation
In a previous post, I raised some remarks from psychologist of morality Jonathan Haidt, in which he discussed his theory that moral thinking appeals to 5 essential modules hardwired into our brains by evolution. In the interview I cited from a couple of years ago he only referred to 4 of the 5 modules but [...]
Filed Under: Atheistic Ethics, Authority, Autonomy, Duty, Ethical Pluralism, Ethics, Evolutionary Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, My Theory of Morality's Rational Foundations and Nature, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Sociobiology, Virtues Tagged With: Arete, Aristotle, Care, Equality, Excellence, Fairness, Harm, Human Flourishing, Immanuel Kant, Ingroup Loyalty, Jonathan Haidt, Justice, Moral Goods, Moralism, Motives, Nietzsche, Non-Moral Goods, Purity, Thomas Hurka, Tyler Samien, Values, Virtues 2 Comments
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