Roberts and Descartes

As I understand, a lot of Western philosophy is fundamentally Hellenized Christianity. In this, God must be “wholly other” and has imagined a “creatio ex nihilo,” thus creating everything else, including our minds/souls, which essentially come to being when we are born on the Earth.

This is so different from Mormon ideas, where our mind/consciousness is uncreated; where God organized uncreated elements to provide innumerable universes where his children have place to get experience and learn what we must learn to become like him; where “cogito ergo sum” is just an observation related to “the unobserved life is not worth living,” meaning we have frustrated the purpose of our creation if we do not use our God-given faculties; where the physical is not “evil” but noble, actually, an eternal physical body is an attribute of God; where God’s power ultimately triumphs over entropy in that we are given an eternal habitation not subject to corruption.

Well, in talking with a non-Mormon philosopher we may profit from descriptions that come close, but really we come so clearly from left field to them. Cartesian? I think Descartes would have rejected my philosophy out of hand, as for him only God is self-existing. It is difficult to overemphasize how revolutionary our idea of physicality and eternal spirits is.

Ben, excellent response. I was hoping to hear some discussion along these lines.

I don’t know that scholars start out intending to pigeonhole Mormon thinking as much as perhaps it’s just inevitable as we try to engage in dialogue with the broader world. I do think we need to be careful especially in the cases where we qualify the terms so much that one wonders whether the term really is useful in the first place.

Presumably, these terms are trying to give readers a kind of short-cut to understanding Mormonism, but in doing so it might distort our subsequent discourse, as you point out, the risk is that we pass over some really fascinating developments.

So I really appreciate your restating of the question. I really like what you are saying here.

In the realm of Mormon metaphysics, Sterling McMurrin has largely shaped our discourse.

You really think that? Very few people I know who have read McMurrin’s book were happy with it. I tend to think people’s scholastic background shapes the metaphysics much more. (And this applies to Roberts and the books he read like Fiske as well as the current emphasis of Continental approaches or Process Thought approaches)

Good mechanists reduce mind to body and proclaim the primacy of matter. Romantics, uncomfortable with the implications for God (or spirit) in such a world, reverse the logic and reduce matter to mind (or spirit).

Unfortunately this conflates too much the Idealists with the Romantics. Romanticism definitely was a big influence on early German idealism but one ought keep them somewhat separate.

Joseph rejected the Cartesian dualism, opted for the primacy of matter, and retained spirit as some sort of refined material substance (see D&C 131:7-8).

I think one has to be careful here though since it’s not entirely clear what he means by reified here. If you’ve been reading Juvenile Instructor you know they’ve been discussing the influence of Christian Platonism here. This is precisely one place where I think things could get more complex – not the least of which because Joseph’s language is so often ambiguous. It’s easier to understand what those writing in Utah meant than what Joseph meant in terms of metaphysics. It’s clear Joseph had a materialistic thrust. It’s more difficult to say what that means metaphysically. (After all even the idealists have no trouble talking about matter – they just mean something different than the materialists do speaking metaphysically)

Further discussing Roberts’ thought in the forward to Roberts’ masterpiece, The Truth, The Way, The Life, McMurrin argues: Roberts was fully committed to materialism as the foundation of Mormon philosophy,

I’ll break out my long abandoned copy of McMurrin when I get home and see the context on this. It may just be one of the many places McMurrin attempts to put everything into his own philosophical taxonomy.

Roberts’ analysis makes the “materialism” of the new dispensation all-pervasive. There is no such thing as immaterial substance. (This is more than saying there is no such thing as immaterial matter, which is a tautology.) He wants to insist that everything that really is, is material. Subtler realities such as “thought,” “love,” “grace,” are actually materiate, though of a finer quality than we can perceive with our five senses.

This seems surprising to say given that chapter I mentioned. Does Madsen explain why he says this?

Blake Ostler, reviewing B.H. Roberts’ theology, also shows no indication that Roberts understood intelligences as Cartesian minds.

I don’t think that’s a fair characterization of Blake’s position. For instance Blake wrote the following at BCC after I outlined my argument for Roberts being a Cartesian influenced by Fiske.

Clark: I don’t disagree that Fiske’s views influenced Roberts, or perhaps better yet that Roberts saw Fisk’s views as a good expression of his understanding of what an intelligence is. However, the discussion of Roberts focuses on the various scriptural passages about intelligence(s) and how to reconcile them. He has a lengthy discussion about spirit birth as well and it seem clear, to me at least, that the attempt to reconcile these views is driving his conclusions.

Moving on:

If Cartesian means drawing a distinction between mind and body then Mormonism still retains this kind of dualism. As McMurrin observed, Mormonism “conforms to the general pattern of Christian theology, that the soul or spirit is immortal though the body is subject to death.” However, if rejecting Cartesian dualism means rejecting the primacy of spirit over the physical, then it does seems accurate to say Mormonism opted, as E. Robert Paul does above, for the primacy of matter.

Well when I’m using the term I mean it only about mind vs. body (whether spiritual or physical). The primacy of spirit over the physical is a whole other sort of dualism.

As to whether Mormonism retains a mental dualism I think it depends. I think the Roberts tripartite model is very popular still via folk traditions but so too is the Orson Pratt model which is much more property dualism rather than substance dualism. That said the fact most of this is done on the folk level means it’s hardly philosophically rigorous. Often people have very muddled beliefs. Then there is the philosophical debate about whether substance dualism is really that different from property dualism. But I’ll avoid that debate. (I clearly think them quite different)

Elsewhere Roberts wrote: “Intelligence is material. But it is also conscious. Matter is not. This is the ultimate dualism.” While phrased somewhat awkwardly here, this is consistent with Roberts’ view that some element is conscious and other element is not.

Clearly one can speak of dualism in Mormon thought, but if it is appropriate to describe element which is conscious and element which is not, as Cartesian, then it seems likely to apply not just to B. H. Roberts, but according to Peck, to the overall nature of consciousness found in LDS scriptures.

This is interesting and is something of Roberts I’ve not read. Apparently he was studying Spinoza (a property dualist). It’d be useful to read the text. Anyone know if it is available electronically? I’d love a copy if someone has it.

I appreciate the comment. A few clarifications.

1. I’m taking about our discourse, i.e. the way we talk about metaphysics, the language and descriptions that we employ. Mormon “materialism” is how many scholars (and early Mormons) describe Mormon metaphysics, regardless of the drawbacks. This is evident in the literature. This isn’t just McMurrin, but Truman Madsen, E. Robert Paul, etc. I’m showing a general trend in the literature, not based on idiosyncratic descriptions by any one author. (In addition, I’m trying to show that scholars do not use these terms blindly, but are cognizant that qualifications are necessary. The rationale for using labels is that they have explanatory power, but they also contain the potential to mask and confuse the issue.) The literature seems consistent in the view that Roberts did not deviate from the materialistic framework that he inherited. Thus, what I’m trying to show is that anyone familiar with the literature is going to be legitimately skeptical of the claim that Roberts adopted a view contrary to the tradition he inherited, since this is a novel interpretation.

That doesn’t mean it is incorrect per se, it simply means it requires an explanation.

Roberts himself was clearly capable of describing his position as Cartesian, and it seems clear to me he did not view himself as adopting Cartesian dualism as he understood it. It is insufficient to argue Roberts was Cartesian merely because he quotes from John Fiske because none of the actual Fiske quotations utilized by Roberts in his writings logically demand a Cartesian position. As Truman Madsen points out above, Roberts was eclectic, adopting but also rejecting views of those he read. The mere fact that he read a particular author does not rise to the level of proof that he adopted the views of any given author in toto. Roberts and other Mormon thinkers clearly appropriate ideas from their environment, but by bringing those ideas into a Mormon metaphysical framework, these ideas often undergo a significant change.

2. You have directed me to Blake Ostler’s response to your claim, which I find again consistent with established views on Roberts. Ostler writes: “It is fairly clear to me that JS at least used spirit/intelligences as synonyms, that he regarded this spirits/intelligences as uncreated and eternal and that neither BY nor OP had a view of eternal intelligences that was congruent with JS’s teachings. BH Roberts’ view was an attempt to reconcile spirit birth with an eternal intelligence (not Cartesian souls).” Ostler’s follow up comment merely acknowledges influence but as I point out above, influence is not sufficient.

3. The narrative that Roberts, out of the blue, and against his own theological tradition, decides to interject Cartesianism into Joseph Smith’s teachings on intelligence seems to have little explanatory value and rather seems to require explanation itself. You yourself have written “As to why as late as the 20th century Roberts would be embracing such a Cartesian view is unclear.” I agree, there doesn’t seem to be any kind of rationale for this, it lacks any kind of explanatory power. But doesn’t this at least introduce some doubt that perhaps the description of Roberts as adopting traditional Cartesian dualism might not be sound?

4. In telling the history of the development of Mormon thought, it makes more sense to me to see Roberts’ project as trying to advocate for taking Joseph Smith’s teachings on personal eternalism seriously. Roberts specifically coins the term “eternalism.” He writes:

It would be difficult to characterize Mormon philosophy under any of the schools extant. “Eternalism” I should select as the word best suited for its philosophic conceptions. It is dualistic, but not in the sense that it breaks up the universe into two entirely distinct substances-the material world and an “immaterial God,”-as the Christian philosophy, in the main does. It is also monistic, but not in the sense that in the last analysis of things it recognizes no distinctions in matter, or that matter-gross material-and spirit, or mind, a finer and thinking kind of material, are fused into one inseparable sole substance which is at once “God and nature,” as the monists claim. Its dualism is that which, while recognizing an infinitely extended substance, the universe, unbounded and empty in no part, but everywhere filled with substance-it holds, nevertheless, that such substance exists in two principle modes, having some qualities in common, and in others being distinct; first, gross material, usually recognized as matter, pure and simple; and, second, a finer, thinking substance, usually regarded by other systems of thought as “spirit,” i.e., “immaterial substance”-if one may use terms so contradictory. These two kinds of matter have existed from all eternity and will exist to eternity, in intimate relations. Neither produces the other, they are eternal existences-”things to act and things to be acted upon.” The monism of Mormonism, alluded to a moment since, while recognizing the universe as infinitely extended substance and all substance as material-and hence, in this respect, monistic; yet it also recognizes the world substance as being of two kinds: one gross material; the other a finer, or thinking material; having some qualities in common with gross matter, and in others being distinct. “All spirit is matter,” said our Prophet, “but it is more fine or pure [i.e., than gross matter tangible to our ordinary senses] and can only be discerned by purer eyes. We cannot see it; but when our bodies are purified we shall see that it is all matter.” B. H. Roberts, Defense of the Faith and the Saints (Salt Lake City: Deseret News, 1907-1912), 2:503.

5. At the very least, Roberts did not see himself as adopting Cartesian dualism. He seems to understand himself as expressly rejecting this view. Those arguing for a Roberts-Cartesianism would be more convincing if they argued that Roberts mistakenly believed he was rejecting Cartesian dualism but in fact inadvertently created a kind of Cartesianism. I remain tentatively skeptical that he even inadvertently adopted Cartesianism given the underlying Mormon materialism that Roberts inherited and clearly embraced.

Clark, thanks for the follow up. I do appreciate it.

I’m not at all convinced of the utility of the term “tripartite model” in our discussions of these issues. None of the thinkers involved ever described their own views this way. Tripartite simply means three parts: presumably intelligence, spirit, and body. But it’s the meaning of these very terms intelligence, spirit, and body that are at the very heart of our inquiries, so to say that “Orson Pratt had a tripartite model and B.H. Roberts had a tripartite model but that these models were ontologically different” is semantically equivalent to saying “Pratt and Roberts had different ideas” which is absolutely true, but it doesn’t really describe their ideas in any meaningful way, or the theological issues that they were attempting to address, and it just doesn’t advance our discourse, in my view.

Philosophy and theology is time-bound. Descartes was responding to specific issues in his formulations of mind and body. Roberts on the other hand is responding to a completely difference set of concerns in his thoughts on intelligence. It seems to me much more fruitful to make inquiries as to what these thinkers were responding, and the problems they were trying to solve. This isn’t to say that philosophical labels are hands-off in referring to Mormonism, but I’m trying to offer some skepticism that more labels is really what we need.

When Roberts introduced his ideas he acknowledged that the Church understood the journey of man to consist of three stages: spirit, mortal body, resurrected body. That is how he understood the status quo, and so the term “tripartite” completely masks this history, it is not useful. Roberts proposed to include intelligence as the first of four stages. But why? Again, not because he just wanted to explore this issue out of the blue, but because he was trying to be faithful to the teachings of Joseph Smith and bring that back into discourse. Now, how Roberts goes about trying to accomplish this goal, and the ramifications entailed, that’s the story.

Clark, I do appreciate the continued discussion. I think perhaps we are approaching the issue from fundamentally different vantage points, and perhaps we are simply interested in different questions.

My sense is that you are interested in seeking to describe with philosophical precision, exactly what Roberts really believed, regardless of what he thought he was doing or what he thought he was trying to accomplish: what were his philosophical views objectively speaking, disconnected from space and time. You seem to think Roberts’ reading library holds significant answers to these questions.

I’m also interested in what Roberts means by what he writes. Where I suspect we differ is that I think that a productive way to get those answers is to look at the kinds of problems that Roberts is trying to solve. This gives us insight into the appropriate domain of our inquiry. I think it is critical to look at the environment in which Roberts is working. Roberts is working within an ecclesiastical environment and he is religiously committed to the tradition preceding him. This will influence the kinds of strategies he employs and sheds insight into what ideas he chose to appropriate from those he read. Whereas you seem to think that Roberts is reading the King Follett Discourse through the lens of Fiske and James, I’m much more inclined work from the premise that Roberts is reading Fiske and James through the lens of Joseph Smith. Joseph takes hermeneutical primacy.

I think it is critical to examine what Roberts understood himself to be doing. I’m concerned with objectives, motives, and the story from the vantage point of Roberts himself.

Clark, thanks for the comment. I’m wondering if you have read this article: Ford, Clyde D., “Materialism and Mormonism: The Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy of Dr. John A. Widtsoe,” Journal of Mormon History, 36 (Summer 2010), 1–26.

Ford’s methodology, the questions that he raises and how he seeks to answer those questions, is sort of what I’m trying to get at. He clearly discusses Widtsoe’s influences, especially his professors, but he also discusses the questions on Widtsoe’s mind and his project to resolve them.

Clearly, some thinkers simply have not written on a given subject and therefore we may be looking for something that just isn’t there. Other thinkers might broach a subject indirectly or may provide enough material to draw some conclusions of what they might have viewed the issue had they been asked about it. And yet others clearly and explicitly take up a subject in complete detail. Many fall somewhere in between.

I think it is understandable to look to Roberts for some theory of the mind since he explicitly uses the term “mind.” In my reading, however, I’m just not convinced that Roberts is taking up the subject of the mind for the sake of philosophical inquiry in and of itself. Rather, my reading of Roberts is that he takes up the subject of the mind in the service of his goal to bring Joseph Smith’s ideas to bear on personal eternalism. So, I’m not saying that Roberts is philosophically naive here, rather I think that Roberts’ discourse about mind is being driven by his attempts to breathe eternalism into Mormon thought, and therefore, attempting to find a more developed theory of the mind as such, in Roberts might be looking for something that was not his intent or his project.

This is an area where we lack a really good study of Roberts’ intellectual history. Something along the lines of Ford’s paper above, but exploring B.H. Roberts’ works and influences would be a welcome study. Indeed, a new biography of Roberts taking up his intellectual thought is sorely needed.

Just to add, I find these questions relevant to more recent moves. So those who reject the spirit birth as anything but adoption of a sort raise obvious ontological questions about what spirit stuff is. (To a degree I find problematic) I think that these are important questions that it’s all too easy to brush aside.

See my comment (10) above. I suggest eliminating the terms “tripartite model” or even “Cartesian model” in discussing Orson Pratt’s or B.H. Roberts’ views of human origin. The track record of these labels in advancing our understanding is not very good. They can claim success in obfuscating and frustrating our discourse. Labels can be useful, but these haven’t proved so in this case.