Utah Cross Case Rehearing Denied; Next Stop SCOTUS

by Brittany Meyer

Just in time for the Northern Hemisphere’s winter solstice, the 10th Circuit declined an en banc review of a previous ruling that 14 large white crosses used as roadside memorials for fallen troopers on public land in Utah violated the Establishment Clause because it gave the appearance of endorsing Christianity.

In other words, the atheists have won the case, and the Circuit Court declined to reverse the ruling.

As it stands, the following cross is still officially an endorsement of Christianity:

Procedurally, here’s what happened: rather than drag the entire court out of bed for a case, decisions at the appellate level are sometimes made by a panel of three judges. The losers can then request an “en banc” rehearing in front of all the judges currently on the bench. The Utah state government did this, but their request was rejected.

After an en banc decision (or a denial of review), the only place left to go is the Supreme Court. Will the state government pursue this route? We don’t know yet.

Substantively, though, this ruling is peculiar considering the Supreme Court spoke explicitly about crosses on the side of freeways in dictum in the majority opinion for Salazar v. Buono earlier this year — they said crosses were not necessarily an endorsement of Christianity:

“The goal of avoiding governmental endorsement does not require eradication of all religious symbols in the public realm. A cross by the side of a public highway marking, for instance, the place where a state trooper perished need not be taken as a statement of governmental support for sectarian beliefs. The Constitution does not oblige government to avoid any public acknowledgment of religion’s role in society.” Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. (2010).

Doesn’t that passage lend support to the opposition?

Though the original 10th circuit opinion came out about four months after Salazar v. Buono, the majority does not mention this legally persuasive paragraph. The two dissents in the denial for rehearing both mention the paragraph, showing that the majority knew about — and then rejected — the notion that Salazar mandated a reversal.

What does this mean? It’s possible the Supreme Court could take up this case and use their own past decision to overturn the Duncan case, thus ruling against the atheists.

One difference in the cases is Salazar uses the a full Lemon analysis in its decision and American Atheists v. Duncan uses the more simple Establishment Clause Endorsement test in arriving at the opposite result.  The Endorsement test asks whether a government action creates a perception in the mind of a reasonable observer that the government is either endorsing or disapproving of religion. The Lemon test uses a 3 prong approach where each prong must be met in order for an action to be valid.  Right now, both of these are a legitimate way to decide Establishment Clause cases, but current jurisprudence seems to prefer the Lemon analysis.

It’s possible the Supreme Court will take on Duncan and use it to overturn the Establishment Clause Endorsement test. The test is easier to meet than the more complicated Lemon test, so its reversal would change how the church separation community will go about framing arguments.

It is unfortunate that even in the highest court in the nation, a true separation of (Christian) Church and State fails to exist. Maybe in the next Court.

Standing: A Plaintiff’s Worst Nightmare

– by Brittany Meyer

Another day, yet another “God” lawsuit thrown out due to lack of standing.

Recently, The Freedom from Religion Foundation sued the Architect of the Capitol in federal court to get the “In God We Trust” and Pledge of Allegiance engravings removed from the Capitol Visitor Center in Washington, D.C.

Like my last article on Newdow’s struggle to get “so help me God” taken out of the presidential oath, this case was thrown out on an unfortunate, though needed, procedural technicality. Last week, the case was tossed for lack of standing -– because providing the taxes to pay for the building isn’t enough — FFRF had failed to show that it had been or would be injured by the existence of the engravings.

The judge in this case didn’t rule on the merits, but I will.

At the moment, this lawsuit is premature. Say what you want about references to God in our nation’s government documents, but at issue in this case is a depiction of an established (though, yes, extremely offensive) mainstay of America. The engravings reflect the current state of our national motto, our money and our pledge. FFRF and others should wait until they have successfully eliminated God from the pledge and money before going after the folks who chiseled it into a wall.

And while it doesn’t seem like lawsuits that get to the root of the problem ever do any good, there are victories. One success I know of — because my mother was directly involved with the issue — happened in 2004 when the Los Angeles County seal was redesigned to remove a cross representing LA’s history with Catholic missionaries. They also removed a depiction of a pagan goddess. You can read about that here and here.

Keep up the fight, FFRF, just keep your priorities in order.

North Dakota’s Religious Liberty Restoration Amendment is Bad News

Apparently, all it takes for a crack at privileging religion is 25,688 individual signatures.

The North Dakota Family Alliance is working toward that magic number in order to get the Religious Liberty Restoration Amendment before North Dakota voters this November. If passed, this amendment to the state constitution raises the burden a governmental entity must meet before passing a law that strains individual religious beliefs.

To understand what exactly the amendment does, here’s some legal review:

Most laws, by their very nature, burden individuals. It is the reason society functions — we all give up a little for the greater good. Normally, to survive a challenge, a run-of-the-mill law must meet the rational basis test.

To pass the rational basis test, a governmental action be rationally related to a legitimate government interest. This is extremely easy to pass. For example, a law that outlaws spitting might be justified like this: the government has an interest in having clean streets and spitting covers the street in dirty mucus. Done. Almost any explanation works.

Skipping intermediate review, the highest level of review is strict scrutiny. In contrast to rational basis, this is an extremely hard burden to meet. Here, there must be a compelling government interest and the law must be narrowly tailored meet to that interest. Also, the law must utilize the least restrictive means possible. Almost no law survives.

Functionally then, to raise the level of review to strict scrutiny means that no law burdening religion can be passed and survive judicial review. Scary stuff.

North Dakota would not be the only state to have this kind of law in place. In fact, in 1993, Congress passed a law called the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). This law was nearly identical to the now proposed ND amendment. RFRA was struck down as unconstitutional in 1997 via City of Boerne v. Flores as exceeding Congress’ federal enforcement powers under the 14th Amendment. Ever since the federal RFRA was struck down, similar state versions have popped up around the country.

The original RFRA and newer state versions are troublesome because they open the door to claims from individuals who wish to use religion to not follow laws. For example, a Christian might use the amendment to say a housing discrimination law burdens their honestly held religious belief that they shouldn’t rent to a gay person. Or someone might try to escape compliance with a drug law. It allows what Justice Scalia (of all people) feared in 1990 when he wrote in his opinion disallowing American Indian use of the drug peyote in Employment Division v. Smith, “to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.” The original federal RFRA was enacted by congress as a direct response to Scalia’s opinion in Employment Division with the urging of both Americans United for Separation of Church and State as well as the ACLU– groups that see the law as a good way to strengthen the line between church and government by not allowing interference absent the most extreme circumstances. However, when the line separating church and state becomes so strong as to privilege religion, it has gone too far. Which I guess is to say, if you live in North Dakota, don’t sign that petition!

Christmas in July

– by Brittany Meyer

It’s that time of year again — time to revamp the “religious winter holiday display on public property” debate. It’s a discussion that never seems to take a holiday of its own. This week, Leesburg, VA decided to decide and then decided to decide later whether holiday displays would be allowed on Loudoun County courthouse grounds this upcoming December. One side, the Courthouse Grounds and Facilities Committee wants to ban all displays. The other side, including many community members and Supervisor Eugene Delgaudio, thinks all displays should be allowed — apparently even atheist ones.

Holding aside my belief that there are bigger unconstitutional fish to fry and arguing about whether a “Merry Christmas” sign should greet us on court house steps only serves to make atheists look petty and without more important grievances, the case law on religious holiday displays is, in a word, wrong.

In Lynch v. Donnelly, a Christmas display including Santa and a nativity scene was challenged in the Supreme Court. The court found the display constitutional because taken along with the rest of the scene, it had the “legitimate secular purpose” of celebrating the season and the origins of Christmas.

In Allegheny County v. ACLU, two displays went up on the chopping block — a nativity scene and a Christmas Tree along with a Menorah. Here, the nativity scene did violate the constitution because it was alone and without other Christmas symbols, like a statue of Santa Claus. The Menorah was fine, because it was with a Christmas Tree.

I disagree with both of these decisions — the establishment clause prohibits endorsement of religion over no religion as much as it prohibits the endorsement of one religion over another. SCOTUS is not perfect (try as lawyers and law students might to convince themselves otherwise) and sometimes they get it wrong before they get it right.

Assuming then, legally, all a display depicting the virgin birth of the Christian savior need do to become ‘secular’ is be placed with an overweight man and his flying reindeer, Loudoun County is doing the diplomatic thing by deciding between all displays or none at all. Either of these options should be constitutional under any evaluation. It will be interesting to see what they decide.

Supreme Court Decision in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez

Is it discrimination to not allow discrimination backed by religion?  This is an oversimplification of the question asked in Christian Law Society v. Martinez (PDF), but the Supreme Court ruled on it today in the negative.

Here’s a quick and dirty review of the facts:

1) Hastings is a public law school.

2) Hastings implemented a generally applicable and “viewpoint-neutral” policy (legal talk for it applied to everyone and didn’t target any one group for enforcement) that said no student group with official status was allowed to discriminate on the basis of race, sexual orientation, etc.

3) The Christian Legal Society (CLS) asked to be exempted from this policy because they wished to make every member affirm the following:

Trusting in Jesus Christ as my Savior, I believe in:

• One God, eternally existent in three persons, Father, Son and Holy Spirit.
• God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth.
• The Deity of our Lord, Jesus Christ, God’s only Son conceived of the Holy Spirit, born of the virgin Mary; His vicarious death for our sins through which we receive eternal life; His bodily resurrection and personal return.
• The presence and power of the Holy Spirit in the work of regeneration.
• The Bible as the inspired Word of God.”

CLS also interpreted this affirmation as requiring them to exclude homosexuals and non-Christians from their group.

4) Hastings took away CLS’s official group status.

5) CLS sued saying Hastings’ nondiscrimination policy and subsequent derecognition of CLS violated their free speech and free association rights.

It was a close 5-4 decision but we now know that “(c)ompliance with Hastings’ all-comers policy… is a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral condition on access to the student-organization forum. In requiring CLS — in common with all other student organizations — to choose between welcoming all students and forgoing the benefits of official recognition… Hastings did not transgress constitutional limitations” (emphasis added).

This is very good news for Secular Americans because it upholds the notion that a group can’t use religion to hide their hate and wiggle out of laws and rules that apply to everybody else.

Additionally, because Hastings is a public institution, it protects atheist and homosexual students from funding their own discrimination with tax money and student activity fees they pay the school.

You can read the full (85 page) opinion here.

Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion (and was joined by Justices Sotomayor and Breyer). Justices Stevens and Kennedy filed separate concurring opinions.

Justice Alito wrote the dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Roberts, Scalia and Thomas.

According to Howard Friedman:

The dissent argued that the Court should focus on the non-discrimination policy as written, since that was the policy originally invoked to deny CLS registration. That policy, the dissent argues, amounts to viewpoint discrimination since only religious groups are required to admit students who do not share their views. Political groups or groups formed around other causes can limit membership. The dissent goes on to argue that even limiting the analysis to the broader all-comers rule, the policy is unconstitutional. It was adopted as a pretext to suppress a particular viewpoint and it is not reasonable in light of the purposes of the student organization policy which is promoting diversity among student organizations.


The Michael Newdow Case: Standing Under the Law

According to an American Humanist Association press release,

Michael Newdow filed a petition with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit requesting a panel rehearing or for rehearing en banc in the case of Newdow v. Roberts. The case challenges the oath administrator’s addition of the phrase “so help me God” to the constitutionally prescribed presidential oath and the inclusion of sectarian prayers in the invocation and benediction of the 2009 inauguration of President Obama and the 2013 and 2017 ceremonies.

U.S. District Court Judge Reggie B. Walton had ruled on March 12, 2009 that all plaintiffs in Newdow v. Roberts lacked standing to pursue such cases. And on May 7, 2010, a three-judge panel issued an order affirming Judge Walton’s order dismissing the case for lack of standing.

In English, Newdow is requesting a rehearing on his denial for a rehearing.

Now, some schooling on an unsexy part of US law:

In order to bring a law suit in the United States, three things must be true: (1) the plaintiff must have standing, (2) the case must be ripe for review, and (3) the case must not be moot.  If any of those three things are not true, the case is dismissed.

The Newdow case has already been dismissed once for lack of standing. 

Standing also has three requirements. A person bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of a law must demonstrate they have suffered an ‘injury in fact.’  Plaintiff must also show the defendant, and not an intervening third party, is harming him.  Finally, plaintiff must prove that a favorable decision will solve their injury.  In legal terms, standing requires (1) injury, (2) causation, and (3) redressability. The Newdow case was dismissed for lack of standing because Newdow has been unable to prove injury and redressability.  In other words, the court is unable to answer “what is Newdow’s injury here”?  (The pain in his ears by hearing that toxic word God?)  Also, if he wins his case, will his injury be over?

Over the course of my brief time blogging here, I’ve become quite the gambler. I’ll gamble once again on this case:

Newdow has no standing, and the case will again be dismissed. (My apologies for disagreeing with Mr. Ritter of AHA — I’ve worked with him and he is a great attorney and almost always right). The only people with clear and unarguable standing in this case are the elected officials themselves.

Do I believe that the words “so help me God” included in a presidential oath and the inclusion of prayers during a presidential inauguration violate the Establishment Clause?  Abso-freakin-lutely.  But I also don’t see it getting struck down until an elected president challenges it before his (or HER!) inauguration.

And I’m not holding my breath for that.

Not Your Ordinary Cap and Gown

This past weekend, my Muslim friend graduated from The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law. Her facebook album revealed that the commencement ceremony was held at the Basilica of the National Shrine of the Immaculate Conception. One would assume Jesus looked down with a special disapproval at this particular graduation — as Jesus replied, “And you experts in the law, woe to you, because you load people down with burdens they can hardly carry, and you yourselves will not lift one finger to help them” (Luke 11:46).

Obviously, the private Catholic University has every right to hold its own private school ceremonies and graduations in places of worship. Aesthetically, the Basilica is a truly stunning piece of architecture, and were it not a — well, a Basilica — it would be a beautiful location for a secular graduation as well.

And apparently I’m not the only one who thinks so. Recently, Americans United for the Separation of Church and State stated in a press release that a federal judge just declared a Connecticut school’s plan to hold graduation ceremonies at a Christian church unconstitutional. The school board was told to find an alternative venue.

Barry Lynn, the executive director of AU, said: “Though there’s no definitive U.S. Supreme Court decision barring public school graduation ceremonies from houses of worship, litigation across the country has made it clear that absent extraordinary circumstances, graduations should not be held in private church or religious institutions.”

Well, maybe.

There is extremely limited case law dealing specifically with the constitutionality of public school commencement activities held at a religious venue.  And these cases haven’t made it any higher than the state supreme court level. The few cases that have been filed mostly allowed the church venue, sometimes citing space and acoustic concerns.

Since a higher court would not likely have case law directly on point to guide its reasoning, let’s examine possible arguments using the established Supreme Court precedent:

Holding a public graduation in a place of worship violates the establishment clause. The Supreme Court has already placed prohibitions on prayer before football games (Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe) during graduations (Lee v. Weisman) and before a public school day (Engel v. Vitale). The present case is no different. Holding a school graduation in a place of worship sends a message of state endorsement because the choice of venue states clearly, if silently, that the school finds the religion behind the venue important — especially if other religious and secular venues were not considered. Government and religion is excessively entangled when a nonbelieving student is forced to graduate in a religious building or else miss one of the most important moments in their adult life.

–Or–

Using a church venue for a public graduation does not violate establishment clause. The present set of facts are distinguishable from established Supreme Court principles because each case stated above involved prayer — a distinctly and overtly religious activity that students were subjected to. Here, nothing is overt. To non-subscribers, a building that happens to be a church is just a building — just like a stick figure of Muhammad without the religious belief forbidding the depiction is just a stick figure. So long as the school pays for the facilities and there is no prayer or other religious activity during the commencement, using a passively religious location is completely constitutional.

While there are logical arguments on both sides, if the current trend of decisions continue, church held commencements are likely to be struck down.

Would you be mad if your graduation was held in a building normally designated as a place of worship?

Much Ado About Your (Arizona) Neighbor’s Taxes

The Supreme Court has agreed to hear Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn and Garriott v. Winn and will decide the constitutionality of a program that diverts tax money into private-school scholarships.

This program allows donors a dollar-for-dollar reduction in state income taxes. The reduction is good for contributions of up to $1,000 if made to certain non-profits organizations. These non-profits collect the money and distribute them in the form of scholarships for students. The law allows organizations to limit the scholarships they disperse in any fashion including exclusively to religious schools.

Unsurprisingly, organizations linked to a certain religions give the majority of scholarships to schools tied to that religion. Upset, taxpayers sued. (Another issue in these cases I’m not mentioning is taxpayer standing for lawsuits — usually there is none — but the unique circumstances are likely to allow it here).

The taxpayer plaintiffs stated — and the April 2009 Ninth Circuit opinion agreed — “that Arizona’s tax-credit funded scholarship program lacks religious neutrality and true private choice in making scholarships available to parents.”

The other side, however, points out that individuals decide to which non-profits they donate. Then those non-profits divvy up the money. They argue the money is clean of any ‘state taint’ that would render it subject to the Establishment clause. This view is consistent with Everson v. Board of Education, a 1947 case that upheld NJ’s travel reimbursement to parents of religious schools and Zelman v. Simmons-Harris where a government voucher program was upheld despite the option for a religious school voucher. The idea in both of these cases was that because the assistance goes to the children and not the church it is neutral toward religion.

What will happen?

I predict the program will be found constitutional. As seasoned SCOTUS watchers know — for the Supreme Court office pool, always vote against the 9th Circuit’s winning side. Furthermore, the weight of the existing Supreme Court precedent is behind the Court finding for the tax program’s constitutionality. Even if the taxpayers are correct that “the Arizona program is neither based on financial or academic need … [and] instead, […] awards most of its scholarships to the children of middle-class and wealthy parents on the basis of religion,” the fact remains that it is individuals who choose where to donate and the state has no hand in who gets the funds.

That’s what I think will happen and I expect to be right just about exactly half the time. What do you think?

Would you be upset to see your neighbor’s tax money going towards tuition at a religious school if you knew you could donate your own tax money to a non-profit with a history of creating scholarships for secular schools?

Post The First — Why Is This Stuff So Darn Hard To Begin With

Hemant’s note: Brittany Meyer is a guest-blogger who will be writing exclusively about law-related issues. You can read her bio here.

Church and State cases are often very difficult, legally and constitutionally, and the “right” answer is always elusive. It’s almost impossible to completely comply with the establishment clause, “congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion” without infringing on the free exercise clause, “ or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”

Church and State law isn’t the only area where protecting the freedom of one group will infringe on those of another. Take criminal procedure, for example. A maddeningly frustrating course in law school, this body of law pits the rights of the individual against the rights of the greater society. Is forcing a person to remove their jacket to search for weapons too invasive? What about a general pat down of outside clothing? What if the former would provide vital evidence and the latter will leave a murderer free? In other words, what personal freedoms should the Supreme Court make us give up for the safety of the whole?

Similarly, church and state law juggles the protection of one’s right to practice religion against unlawful government entanglement and the appearance or actuality of government endorsement of religion.

Sometimes this is an easy equation — most people will agree that the 10 Commandments shouldn’t be at our Courthouse steps and that students shouldn’t be forced to pray in public schools. But often cases are not so simple. A good example of this is the recent Supreme Court Case, Christian Legal Society v. Martinez.  This case’s facts questioned whether a rule forbidding discrimination is itself discriminatory against a group’s honestly held religious belief that they should discriminate against atheists and gays.

On the other side, we wonder whether a government body granting the group a special exemption and allowing discrimination then results in government endorsement of that discrimination, or the faith-based beliefs motivating them. As a strong advocate for the separation of Church and State I had, at first glance, a hard time choosing a side. It’s an extremely difficult line to draw, and cases with nearly identical facts sometimes result in random and seemingly irreconcilable decisions. See, for example, Lynch v. Donnelly (nativity scene on public property ok) and County of Allegheny v ACLU (nativity scene on public property not ok).

And so my mission in contributing to this blog is not only to provide links and descriptions of the cases relevant to church and state separation law, but also to help readers appreciate the nuances inherent in them. If I miss a hot case, please let me know and I’ll try my best to look into it. I may also occasionally go back in time to describe and explain how and why old cases came out the way they did and why that’s important in the bigger picture.

I look forward to sharing my thoughts on this fascinating, confusing and passionately-contested constitutional issue. Thanks for reading, and please check in and comment frequently.