On partisanship and division in American politics

On partisanship and division in American politics February 12, 2016

V0050236 A fist-fight between Lord Brougham and Lord Melbourne as Pea

OK, I lied — or, rather, changed my mind.  This isn’t about the latest Society of Actuaries’ study on retirement readiness.  And it’s got a dorky title, to boot.

But Obama gave a speech about this topic on Wednesday, at the Illinois state capitol in Springfield, symbolically important to him as the place where Obama cut his teeth politically.  Here’s the full text.  Some of it is actually rather good, pointing out, for instance that the climate of partisanship and division isn’t new, but there are a multitude of examples from our history, and that laments of corruption now likewise fail to recognize that the situation is much improved compared to Tammany Hall and Teapot Dome.  But he’s got a list of causes of and solutions to the problem that are questionable.  Before I get into those — sorry, in a separate post — I wanted to take a few minutes writing out some of my own thoughts on the issue.

Essentially, we’ve got three issues:

First, the acrimony in Congress that means that unlike in the (perhaps mythical?) past, we’ve got a level of division that is personal.  Our congressmen, and Obama and members of his administration, don’t “leave it at the office” and have a beer and socialize across party lines.  I’ve heard this explained as simply less socializing in D.C. in general, as congressmen fly back home as often as possible, rather than thinking of D.C. as their new “home,” or simply prefer not to go out to a beer anyway.   I don’t really know.

Second, and relatedly, in D.C., and outside of D.C., there is an increasing degree to which attacks one one’s political opponents stretch beyond political disagreement to accusations that the other point of view is not just wrong, but evil:  “my opponent won’t support gun control; clearly he wants children to be shot.”  “My opponent wants to cut food stamp spending; clearly he wants children to starve.”  “My opponent opposes state-funded healthcare; clearly he wants children to die from lack of medical treatment.”  etc.

Third, and you be the judge of how related these issues are, there seems to be a greater refusal to compromise in legislation.  Instead it’s “my way or the highway,” with bills only being passed to the extent that one party has the necessary hold on both houses and the presidency, or after a period of brinksmanship.

Why?

Here are a few cases:

Case 1:  when intransigence is the winning position.  Either, on your issue, you win the day, if you figure your side is able to outlast your opponent, or you take the long view and hope to position your party to ultimately take control and govern without need for negotiation.  And here the uncompromising position can help rally the base, and the compromise can lose supporters, if they’re likely to see things in black-and-white, and the compromise as betrayal.  This is a particularly effective strategy if you feel the media will tell your side.

Case 2:  there is no natural compromise position, if both parties are genuinely convinced that anything but their goal end result is unacceptable.

Case 3: there’s no point in compromising, where one party does hold all the power and sees no value in obtaining either (a) a bipartisan majority for its own sake or (b) consensus among the American people.

Case 4: the status quo is sufficiently acceptable to one party that there is no reason for them to “compromise.”

Case 5:  a potential compromise relies on each party trusting the other to implement the compromise as agreed; when the trust isn’t there, compromise isn’t possible.

Consider recent examples:

Case 1:  The budget battles.  Obama felt he held all the cards, especially with his ability to close national parks and make other arbitrary decisions to ensure maximum visibility.  Republicans felt (though eventually they caved) that surrender would be punished by GOP voters, through primary losses or walking away at the general election, and Ted Cruz judged that an uncompromising position would garner him supporters.

Or the current election:  consider the Democratic debate, and the fact that Sanders’ supporters cheer him for being uncompromising.

Case 2:  The budget battle in Illinois.  Rauner is determined to use the budget to force the Democrats to sign off on proposals weakening the influence of public sector unions, being convinced that this is the only way to move Illinois to long-term fiscal health.  Madigan is equally opposed to any such measures.  This isn’t about the amount of funding for specific budget entities, but a yes or no without a middle ground.

Also:  immigration reform.  No, not the Gang of 8 bill, but the fact that, from 2008 – 2010, when the Democrats held the majority and yet didn’t move a bill forward, there was substantial public support for a “DREAM Act” bill legalizing those who arrived as minors, but legalization advocates were insistent on an all-or-nothing approach, fearful that if they backed a bill legalizing the most sympathetic cases, support would evaporate for a wider mass legalization bill.  (At least that’s my memory.)

Case 3:  Obamacare.  ‘Nuff said, right?

Case 4:  gun control legislation.  Obama repeats that “we need to act with executive orders because Congress won’t make these urgently required changes on their own,” but it’s clear that the majority finds the status quo entirely acceptable.

Case 5:  immigration reform.  Immediate legalization and long-term implementation of enforcement requires trust, by the public, and by those who would accept legalization only as part of a compromise that includes enforcement, that the enforcement measures will actually be implemented and consisetnently applied over the long term.  Enforcement first, with promises of legalization later, requires trust that the reverse will happen.  (Well, there’s also the issue that, if enforcement is applied, supporters of legalization want assurances that future legalize-ees won’t be impacted, which itself means an immediate “pre-legalization.”) If the trust isn’t there, compromise isn’t possible.

How do you fix this?

To my mind, the lack of trust is the biggest issue, followed by the fact that the party bases reward refusal to compromise, and punish compromise — though this is related, as the punishment of compromise is often because there’s a lack of trust that the politician genuinely agreed to the middle ground out of compromise rather than secretly supporting the opponent’s position after all.

But how you get past this, I don’t know.

Thoughts?

(image from Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AA_fist-fight_between_Lord_Brougham_and_Lord_Melbourne_as_Pea_Wellcome_V0050236.jpg)

 

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