One of the Most Moving Moments in Sports

Recently, I have been focusing my Daily Reflections on the Parable of the Prodigal Son. In the midst of this parable, a father demonstrates his extraordinary love for his son by running to embrace him. In the last two decades, whenever I read about the father’s race, I remember something that happened in the 1992 Olympic games in Barcelona. It was one of the most moving events I have ever witnessed in an athletic competition.

It happened in a semifinal heat of the 400 meter race. Derek Redmond of Great Britain began strong, looking as if he would do well enough to make the finals. Indeed, he had a reasonable chance for a medal. But, on the backstretch of the race, all of a sudden Redmond pulled up lame, apparently having injured his right hamstring. Though writhing in pain and completely out of the race, his Olympic hopes dashed, Redmond nevertheless began hopping and limping toward the finish line. No matter how slow his time, he was going to complete his race. It was a heart-wrenching scene, as Redmond’s face revealed his extreme physical and emotional pain.

Meanwhile, at the top of the stadium, Derek Redmond’s father, Jim, saw what had happened to his son. So he began running down toward the track, dodging barriers and officials who tried to keep him away from the field, where he had no permission to be. Yet, Jim Redmond had one goal: to get to his boy. So he ran and pushed and jumped until he got to Derek. He threw his arms around his son and helped him cross the finish line.

My words cannot do justice to this event. Thanks to YouTube, you can see it online.

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Something to Think About: Justices Using Dictionaries

Adam Liptak explores the growing use of dictionaries by U.S. Supreme Court Justices in “Justices Turning More Frequently to Dictionary, and Not Just for Big Words.” Increasingly, justices are turning to dictionaries for definitions that help them decide legal cases:

A new study in The Marquette Law Review found that the justices had used dictionaries to define 295 words or phrases in 225 opinions in the 10 years starting in October 2000. That is roughly in line with the previous decade but an explosion by historical standards. In the 1960s, for instance, the court relied on dictionaries to define 23 terms in 16 opinions.

He's thinking about it.

This practice, which might seem unobjectionable at first glance, has raised concerns among many legal scholars. Liptak quotes from Learned Hand, one of the most highly regarded judges of the twentieth century:

“It is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary, . . . but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.”

In some cases, the use of historical dictionaries makes sense:

Justices who try to discern the original meaning of the Constitution sometimes consult older dictionaries, which makes sense given that usage may have shifted over time.

In a 1995 concurrence, for instance, Justice Clarence Thomas looked to dictionaries from 1773, 1789 and 1796 to determine what the framers of the Constitution meant by “commerce,” a question now in play in the challenges to the recent health care law. (They meant, Justice Thomas found, “selling, buying and bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes.”)

Liptak’s article, which appears in the New York Times, raises an curious and ironic way in which the Times might be influencing Supreme Court decisions:

The case for using dictionaries to determine the meaning of modern statutes is weaker, in part because the materials consulted by the people who compile definitions can skew the results. A 1988 survey of the lexicographic staffs of five publishers concluded that “the ‘polite press,’ with The New York Times at its pinnacle” is “the single most powerful influence in constituting the record of the English lexicon.”

A decade later, Ellen P. Aprill, who teaches at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles, considered the implications of that finding in an article on “dictionary shopping in the Supreme Court.”

“It may also be a surprise to the Supreme Court justices who look to dictionaries as authorities in construing statutes,” Ms. Aprill wrote in the Arizona State Law Journal, “that in good measure they are interpreting law according to The New York Times.”

Now that is something to think about.

Something to Think About: On Lying Politicians

As more and more national leaders from both political parties are calling for the resignation of Congressman Anthony Weiner because he sent lewd, unwanted messages to women over the Internet and then lied about it repeatedly in public, the executive director of Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington is confused. According to ABC News:

He's thinking about it.

“This is a massive overreaction and I don’t understand it,” said Melanie Sloan, executive director of Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington. . . .

As for Weiner’s bald lies to his family, constituents and the general public in media appearances last week about the lewd photo that appeared on Twitter, Sloan said it was disconcerting and tarnished his credibility but not the worst Washington has seen.

“A politician lying is not that unusual,” Sloan said. “If the new standard is that politicians are out the second they lie to us, then a lot of politicians could be gone.” . . .

“I think there will be a public backlash when people start to think about what is this guy really accused of doing, and is this the most serious thing a politician has done when most people are really concerned about politicians selling their office to special interests. There’s no kind of that allegation here.”

Okay, so let me get this straight, the executive director of Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington doesn’t have a problem with the fact that a congressman repeatedly lied in public (putting aside for a moment his behavior in private). Now that’s something to think about.