Obviously, one posted message cannot begin to solve the problem(s) of God and evil. All I want to accomplish here is clear up some misconceptions about the Arminian view and ask some questions about the classical Calvinist view as some haver articulated it here (and elsewhere).
First, all classical Arminians AGREE that evil is not a “thing” or a substance; it is strictly no-thing: the absence of the good. That is not a notion of evil unique to Calvinism. And Augustine did not come up with it, either. It is clearly articulated by Gregory of Nyssa before Augustine.
What evil is, exactly, is not pertinent to the Calvinist-Arminian debate. We can agree that it is the absence of the good. The issue is WHY evil exists. (I realize “exists” not not the best word for “absence,” but any better way of stating the question eludes me right now. By “exists” I simply mean “is.”) Even though evil, like darkness, exists in the mode of absence and not substance it is still real. (Try going on a cave tour and having the guide turn out the lights and sit in the dark for a while. The absence of light is very real!)
The question, then, is not WHAT evil IS but WHY evil is. From the Arminian perspective, the Calvinist (or any believer in what we regard as determinism whether they use that language for their view or not) MUST say (althought they do not always say) that the ultimate cause of evil is God. That is not because we Arminians think Calvinists believe God forced Lucifer or Adam or anyone to sin but because we think the Calvinist system necessarily implies that God positively planned and rendered it certain.
Contrary to the accounts of Calvinism offered here by some, Calvin himself strongly denied that God merely permitted the fall of Adam and Eve. His language against that is quite strong; he scoffs at the idea that God would ever merely permit something. We Arminians are confused and even bemused by contemporary Calvinists’ use of “permission” when referring to God’s relationship to sin and evil.
One reason is classical and contemporary Calvinists’ strong doctrine of providence. (See Paul Helm, Providence and R. C. Sproul’s books as examples.) According to this doctrine, God foreordains and renders certain and controls everything in creation including the very thoughts and intentions of every creature without exception.
After articulating this very strong idea of God’s sovereignty, some Calvinists turn around and say that God did not cause the fall of humanity but that it was freely chosen by Adam and Eve and that God permitted it. When I look deeper into the meaning of “permitted it” in the leading Calvinists’ books, however, what they seem to mean is “efficacious permission.” That is, God planned for the fall to happen, it was willed by God and God rendered it certain by withdrawing the grace Adam and Eve needed not to sin. This is clearly and unequivocally stated by Edwards and other Calvinists.
So when I hear Calvinists talking about God’s permission of sin and evil, in light of their doctrine of God’s providence and their rejection of libertarian free will (as ability to do otherwise), I hear their language of “permission” as meaning something quite different than “the man in the street” or I mean by it. I wish they would abandon it (following Calvin) and come up with some clearer language for what they mean.
Sure, no Calvinist I know believes God forced Adam and Eve to sin against their wills. God exercised no compulsion on them. But that’s not sufficient to say God is not the author of sin and evil. EVEN if God only planned and rendered certain the fall by withdrawing the grace they needed not to fall, God is the author of sin and evil. Sin and evil, in the Calvinist view, in contrast to the Arminian view, are positively the will of God to glorify himself (by overcoming them).
What I still want to know that, no Calvinist here or anywhere, in my experience, has sufficiently answered, is why anything is considered truly evil in the Calvinist account of God and creation. If everything is planned and rendered certain by God for his glory, including sin and evil (even as only absences and not substances) why not praise God for sin and evil? They are, after all, his will and necessary for his full glorification.
So, to sum up, we agree that evil is not a “something” but rather a “nothing” (in the sense of an absence, not a substance). What we disagree about (among other things) is whether God positively willed evil to glorify himself and whether God’s causal agency with regard to sin and evil is determinative or not. I think ONLY the Arminian (or person who holds a similar view of God’s sovereignty) can consistently say that God is not in any sense the author of sin and evil and use the language of permission for God’s relationship to them. I wince when a Calvinist uses that language because it seems to me misleading at best and disingenuous at worst.
Roger, you are again EXACTLY RIGHT on Calvinism. And you have the gift of simplicity to explain it. I again put you on my blog [with full source and credit]. If these posts are a hint of the content of your upcoming book from Zondervan – I CAN’T WAIT !!!! [What is its title?]
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If this is the case, is there any real difference in the obeying the law of gravity and obeying the law of sin in Calvinist systems? If we must do both, why is one considered moral, while the other is not?
The fundamental issue is not whether God is author of evil but whether God can be charged with evil. Scripture, of course, denies both charges but, as Dr. Olson affirms, doesn’t spell out exactly _why_ the omniscient, omnipotent, sovereign God is innocent of the evil that has corrupted his creation. Dr. Olson’s Arminian theory claims to deal with the first charge. But it is not adequate to deal with the second charge. Both Arminans and Calvinists must ultimately concede that the problem of evil is one we cannot fully resolve.
As I understand Arminius, he affirms, with Calvinists, that nothing happens without God’s permission _and cooperation_. The issue of God’s cooperation is significant. For instance, under law the distinction between planning a criminal act and cooperating in a criminal act is not sufficient to exonerate a defendant. It may reduce, but not eliminate, culpability. So, the Arminian theory does not make the problem of evil go away.
Moreover, on the classical understanding (which, of course, may be disputed) that God is outside time, I can’t make much of the difference between planning an act and cooperating in an act. The key distinction seems to involve time and therefore doesn’t apply.
So far as I can tell, we Calvinists and Arminians are bedfellows with respect to the problem of evil. Arminians may claim a edge. But, even accepted at face value, their edge is like that of the man who has committed one less sin than his neighbor. Much, much more is required.
McCarty wrote:
“The fundamental issue is not whether God is author of evil but whether God can be charged with evil.”
Trying to change the subject here?
Dr. Olson was clearly discussing how calvinism makes God the author of evil. Olson was not talking about the more general subject of “whether God can be charged with evil.”
“ Scripture, of course, denies both charges but, as Dr. Olson affirms, doesn’t spell out exactly _why_ the omniscient, omnipotent, sovereign God is innocent of the evil that has corrupted his creation.”
If “Scripture . . . denies both charges”, then since calvinism/exhaustive determinism logically entails that God is the author of evil, this amounts to Scripture denying calvinism to be true.
Of course this is not the first time this has been noted. Virtually all non-determinists (which is the majority of the Christian church) who have thought about it have come to this same conclusion (i.e. if God predetermines “whatsoever comes to pass” then God is the author of evil). Now calvinists hem and haw and dance around this conclusion, but they do so only because the conclusion refutes calvinism. And they feel compelled to do whatever they can to defend their system of theology.
Now a standard strategy or technique of calvinists/determinists, when directly confronted with the charge that exhaustive determinism entails that God is the author of sin, is to try to shift the discussion away from their irresolvable problem by attempting to argue that Arminians have the same problem. Note this evasive maneuver in McCarty’s next words:
“As I understand Arminius, he affirms, with Calvinists, that nothing happens without God’s permission _and cooperation_. The issue of God’s cooperation is significant. For instance, under law the distinction between planning a criminal act and cooperating in a criminal act is not sufficient to exonerate a defendant. It may reduce, but not eliminate, culpability. So, the Arminian theory does not make the problem of evil go away.”
So according to McCarty, in Arminian thinking, God COOPERATES with all evils, therefore making him culpable for all evils.
Hmm.
Exactly how is God “cooperating” with evils McCarty?
When a woman is raped or a child molested, precisely how is God “cooperating” with these evils McCarty?
Now we know that if God has a total plan in which every event is decided to occur beforehand and then history is the actualization of this total plan (i.e. if exhaustive determinism/calvinism is true): then it follows that God planned for every rape or act of molestation to occur. He planned for them to occur because he wanted them to occur. And in calvinism/exhaustive determinism God exercises a kind of control in which he ensures that all of these evils occur exactly as they occur (which is opposite “permitting” or “allowing” them to occur).
The Arminian view is not that God “cooperates” with evil, rather, God created beings (both men and angels) who are capable of evils/sins when they make the wrong choices. God created angels and men to be independent beings with their own minds, wills, capable of doing their own actions and making their own decisions. As independent beings, men and angels can be held accountable for their freely made and evil choices. But when we do choose to commit sin or engage in some evil, God is not “cooperating” in our sin. Nor did he plan every evil as determinism entails.
McCarty’s attempt to conflate directly causing and planning (i.e. determinism/Calvinism) and allowing or permitting independent beings to do their actions (i.e. indeterminism/Arminianism) reminds me of a joke circulating in prisons. A criminal upon arrest declares: “Don’t arrest me, arrest my parents for these things that I did. If they had not brought me into the world I never would have done these things. So arrest them, not me, it is their fault these things happened!” Now most of us see through the muddled reasoning of this criminal. But then apparently determinists such as McCarty do not. If we follow the criminal’s claims, then we should hold God responsible for all evils that occur because if He did not create humans and angels who are capable of choosing to do evil, no freely chosen evils would have occurred. Therefore, God is at fault for all evil and sin according to the determinist. I would never tell an inmate in reference to one of their freely chosen acts of violence or crime, that “God was ***cooperating*** with you in that action”.
“Moreover, on the classical understanding (which, of course, may be disputed) that God is outside time, I can’t make much of the difference between planning an act and cooperating in an act. The key distinction seems to involve time and therefore doesn’t apply.”
Again, McCarty wants to claim that Arminians believe that when angels or men sin, God is “cooperating” with the sin. That is not the Arminian view as it leaves out free will and that God created us capable of acting independently and doing our own actions.
Lately I have seen determinists modify this argument by suggesting that since God maintains the world in existence at all times and places, no event including evil could ever occur without God willing it to occur (can you hear the criminal now modifying his claim: “Don’t arrest me, arrest God, if God had not maintained the world in existence I never would have done these things, so arrest God not me for these things!”).
Robert
@”So according to McCarty, in Arminian thinking, God COOPERATES with all evils. . . .”
@”The Arminian view is not that God “cooperates” with evil”
@”Again, McCarty wants to claim that Arminians believe that when angels or men sin, God is “cooperating” with the sin. That is not the Arminian view. . . .”
No, sir, not according to me but according to Dr. Roger Olson’s account of Arminius himself:
Arminius did maintain that this cooperation with sin does not entail God having caused the sin. But, his qualification does not eliminate grounds for culpability any more than doe those of the Calvinistic theory. Neither theory provides a nice, tidy theodicy. Instead, we must trust Scripture that tells us that God is the holy one whose righteousness and goodness are unfailing.
Dr. Olson, you’ve made a very good point in this post, bravo!
I’de just like to add that I think that if God was just chiefly concerned about getting more glory than He would have not determined the Fall to happen. If the Fall never happened then no one would have went to hell, and so EVERY human being would be worshiping and glorifying God forever, and ever!
Now if what God chiefly desired was a true, loving relationship with His creations (both human and angel), then it seems to me that He’d grant them the freedom to choose to be in that relationship or not to be. What glory can God have over Satan when Satan could simply say “Well, they only serve you because you’ve determined them to do so.”
It also seems odd to me, and contrary to God’s revelation of himself in Jesus, that he would get more glory from those in hell than he does from those in the new heaven and earth. That is, more people go to hell than to heaven, so there is more glory to him from hell than from the new heaven & earth. Or, possibly, it takes more people in hell to bring the same amount of glory to him as it does people in heaven. Or, It takes more people in hell to bring glory to God’s justice than it does people in heaven to bring glory to his love. Or, if the number of people in hell is irrelevant to the amount of glory God receives from hell, then why not just stick one person in there and bring the rest to salvation irrestibly?
As the robot in Lost in Space would say, “Warning! Warning!”, “That does not compute”, “Danger, Will Robinson!”.
regards,
John abc
W B McCarty wrote, “As I understand Arminius, he affirms, with Calvinists, that nothing happens without God’s permission _and cooperation_. The issue of God’s cooperation is significant.”
This, among other things, is what makes Open Theism so attractive. A loving human father may permit his children to make their own choices though he knows they will make some wrong choices (but doesn’t have exhaustive knowledge of their future wrong choices, and hopes to be pleased by their good choices). When they do make bad choices, we cannot rightly say that they made those choices with their father’s cooperation. No, the father had instructed them on right and wrong, even warning them of the consequences of making bad choices, but he knew it was in their best interest to allow them significant freedom in making their own choices. It’s more difficult to defend the claim that a father with exhaustive foreknowledge does not cooperate with his children’s bad choices when in fact he is the one who sent them out into the world to make choices (all the while knowing what choices they would make).
Hello Vance,
First you quoted McCarty as saying:
“W B McCarty wrote, “As I understand Arminius, he affirms, with Calvinists, that nothing happens without God’s permission _and cooperation_. The issue of God’s cooperation is significant.””
You then wrote:
“This, among other things, is what makes Open Theism so attractive. A loving human father may permit his children to make their own choices though he knows they will make some wrong choices (but doesn’t have exhaustive knowledge of their future wrong choices, and hopes to be pleased by their good choices). When they do make bad choices, we cannot rightly say that they made those choices with their father’s cooperation. No, the father had instructed them on right and wrong, even warning them of the consequences of making bad choices, but he knew it was in their best interest to allow them significant freedom in making their own choices.”
Now it is interesting that everything you say here except for the denial of exhaustive foreknowledge, an Arminian could agree with you on. In fact this is one of the common strengths that I see in both Arminian and Open Theist thinking (i.e. genuine and personal relationships involving free will as ordinarily understood).
Now where I see a problem is your denial of exhaustive foreknowledge.
I also have a problem with your attempt to distance Open Theism from Arminianism regarding the problem of evil, with your two suggested options being that (1) in Arminianism exhaustive foreknowledge goes against the father analogy you provide here, and (2) in Open Theism with its denial of exhaustive foreknowledge you imply that this Father here “A loving human father may permit his children to make their own choices though he knows they will make some wrong choices.” And then add that “When they do make bad choices, we cannot rightly say that they made those choices with their father’s cooperation.”
First, couldn’t the Arminian say the same thing about evil choices (that ““When they do make bad choices, we cannot rightly say that they made those choices with their father’s cooperation.”)??
Or put another way, both the Open theist and the Arminian could say this, but you seem to think that if the Open theist says it, God is NOT “cooperating” with evil when it occurs, while if the Arminian says it, God IS “cooperating” with evil when it occurs. Seems to me that if God is not cooperating when they make bad choices, then this would be true whether an Open Theist or an Arminian stated it.
Second, it seems to me that you are suggesting with these comments that Arminians have a problem with evil events occurring because Arminians believe in exhaustive foreknowledge (so you imply that if God knew it was going to happen then he should have prevented it from happening) while Open Theists do not because they deny exhaustive foreknowledge.
But may I suggest that I see very little difference here between the supposed problem for Arminians and the supposed lack of a problem for Open Theists. Allow me to explain with an example. Say that a truck is heading down a street towards a house where a toddler is out playing in the front yard. And say that the toddler with the Father there sitting at the door steps, runs out into the street directly in front of the on-coming truck. Now you would say that the Arminian has a problem here because if God has exhaustive foreknowledge then he would have known about the truck and should have prevented this tragic accident from occurring (in various ways including miraculously bursting the tires of the truck so that it stops before it gets to the child). Now you seem to suggest that the Open Theist does not have a problem since the God in open theism does not know the future exhaustively (by choice or by nature makes no difference here).
But I thought that Open Theists affirm that God knows all that can be known?
That means that God knows the present fully and perfectly according to Open Theism. If so, then the Open Theist God while he may not know the distant future, he knows the immediate future (i.e. the transition between the immediate present and the present becoming the past). He knows that truck is coming down the street, he knows the toddler is playing in the yard (he knows the present thoughts of the toddler, knows the toddler is considering going into the street because his ball rolled into the street, or knows the toddler wants to run into the street to go greet a friend, etc. etc.). Knowing those things, He is in the place to in fact prevent the tragedy by doing different things as well [also it should be noted, and I see calvinists especially, make this really dumb error in regards to Open theism: if God knows the present perfectly as Open Theists believe, then God is not going to be “surprised” by events, this is true because if he knows the present perfectly, then he knows what people are thinking before they do their ridiculous or foolish or bizarre actions, if I know you are about to fall off the ramp and go with your whacky craft into the ocean while engaging in “flugtag” how will I be surprised by your comical and bizarre action? I won’t because I knew exactly what you were thinking just before you went with you goofy looking craft into the ocean off the ramp!
).
You seem to suggest that in Arminianism that when an evil occurs God is **cooperating** in it (because he knew it was coming and did not prevent it therefore you conclude he is **cooperating** in it, desires for it to occur). But this same thing applies to Open Theism here as well (if God knew the toddler was going to go into the street, since he knew the toddler’s present thoughts) and God knew the truck was coming the speed and direction of the truck, then there was time for God to intervene and prevent the tragedy as well. And if he does not, then is God**cooperating** in the evil event? How is God “cooperating” with evil if he allows evil to occur under Arminianism but not under Open Theism?
Seems to me the better approach is not to deny exhaustive foreknowledge or affirm open theism in order to show that God is not responsible for evil events. No, the answer partly involves that God creates independent beings who are capable of choices. Just as there are laws of nature (and God rarely suspends them, except to do occasional miracles) there are also “laws of nature” in regards to how God designed humans (e.g. one of these laws is that he created us with our own minds and wills, so we are independent beings, we are not God contra pantheism, we are limited and finite and yet we have some independence from God in our actions). Regarding the so-called problem of evil there is no single answer that will satisfy everyone or explain every evil event, though there are principles that are true (e.g. the free will defense is based on the principle that if God creates being with significant free will, then there will be the possibility of evil choices).
And it seems to me Vance that you are trying to use McCarty’s “cooperation” argument against Arminianism.
If you are doing so, then I ask you the same questions that I asked McCarty: When a women is raped or a child is molested, exactly how is God “cooperating” in those evil events?
Now Vance if you answer by appealing to free will, then so can the Arminian. If you answer by saying that we make the evil choices not God, then so can the Arminian. My point is that the answers that you come up with I predict will be the same or very similar answers to how Arminians deal with evil events.
“It’s more difficult to defend the claim that a father with exhaustive foreknowledge does not cooperate with his children’s bad choices when in fact he is the one who sent them out into the world to make choices (all the while knowing what choices they would make).”
God foreknowing an event is not the same as God causing an event.
And God foreknowing an event does not mean that he intended the event to occur.
And God knowing about an event occurring does not mean that he intended it to occur.
And God knowing about and event and allowing an event, does not mean that he intends for or desires for that event to happen.
In both Open theism and Arminianism, when sins occur they result from evil choices made freely by humans and angels. It is exhaustive determinism that makes God the author of sin, that makes God the one who intends and preplans for every evil event to occur.
Vance you also said:
“When they do make bad choices, we cannot rightly say that they made those choices with their father’s cooperation.”
I agree with you on this.
But let me ask you a question based on your statement here: couldn’t an Arminian say the exact same thing?
Couldn’t an Arminian say that when humans commit sins that “we cannot rightly say that they made those choices with their father’s cooperation”???
You went on to say to reinforce your point that:
“No, the father had instructed them on right and wrong, even warning them of the consequences of making bad choices, but he knew it was in their best interest to allow them significant freedom in making their own choices.”
And couldn’t an Arminian say this exact same thing as well?
Vance what you are saying here is what Christians that have held Arminian beliefs have been saying for all of the churches history. Open Theists did not invent these ideas concerning freely made choices and responsibility, they have been circulating in church history all along.
Vance do you understand what I am saying here: many of the arguments and points that you are making are the identical arguments and points that Arminians make.
Keep in mind that Open theists and Arminians agree on the nature of free will (i.e. that we sometimes do have a choice, where God allows the decision to be ours, where are choices are our choices and have real consequences in the real world, where God does not always intervene to prevent all choices from being made, etc.).
Personally I like a lot of what the Open Theists are suggesting (especially that God is like the Father that you mention here, that our relationships with God and others involve real genuine choices, that God does not coerce or force us into a saving relationship with Him that is one of the areas where he leaves some choices up to us).
My only problem with open theism is the claim that God does not have exhaustive foreknowledge of the future. And while I disagree with open theists on the foreknowledge issue, I do not declare them to be heretics and if they affirm essential Christian doctrines I have no problem seeing them as genuine Christians.
Oh and one last thing, I really do not appreciate how calvinists/determinists have unfairly attacked Open theists, have intentionally lied about them and their beliefs. Intentionally ridiculed and misrepresented what Open theists believe. But then I know what it is like as the determinists/calvinists do the same thing with Arminians as well!
Robert
Thanks for your comments, Robert.
I consider myself Arminian/Wesleyan, though admit leanings to the openness view. I may change my opinion at some point, but it seems to me that open theists have the edge (exegetically and philosophically) in the debate. I am *very glad* to hear that you do not consider open theists heretics and that you do know how badly determinists have misrepresented their view.
It seems to me that the kind of relationship Arminians believe exists between our heavenly Father and us requires genuine freedom. But can a human person have this kind of freedom in the classical Arminian model?
We’ve discussed it before, but I still have a problem with the distinction some simple-foreknowledge advocates make between *certainty* and *necessity*. I’ve heard all the arguments, but it just seems to me that the Calvinists are right when they describe this as an argument of semantics. If God *knows* that I will freely choose to have tuna salad for lunch tomorrow, then I am not free to do other than that. How can I possibly be free to do other than what God *knows* I will do? In such a case, I would only be “free” (free in the sense that my choice was not coerced) to choose tuna salad for lunch. I don’t see how this freedom (i.e., the freedom to choose tuna salad *without* the freedom to choose something else) is all that different from Calvinism’s concept of freedom.
It appears that it comes down to the question of *how* God knows all future free choices. It’s tempting to follow the line of thought (as put forth by Jack Cottrell) that we do not know *how* God knows the future exhaustively; we only know that He *does*. But I can’t buy this. If God knows the future exhaustively, it seems to me there’s no getting around one of two possibilities: either (1) the future exists, or (2) the future is determined. Those who believe God dwells in the “eternal now,” not in time, hold #1; all others (including Cottrell) hold #2.
I reject the idea that the future exists. If it exists, it’s the present, not the future. As long as it’s 2010, 2011 does not exist. We will one day look back and see that there was only one set of realities that made up 2011, but on this side of 2011 we cannot say that–unless determinism is true.
As of today, tuna salad for lunch tomorrow is not a certainty. I haven’t decided yet. I am truly free to choose to have or not have tuna salad. If I am only free to have it, but not free to not have it, then my lunch is predetermined, even if I’m the determining agent. The *fact* that God knows it now means it is predetermined.
Hello Vance,
“I consider myself Arminian/Wesleyan, though admit leanings to the openness view. I may change my opinion at some point, but it seems to me that open theists have the edge (exegetically and philosophically) in the debate.”
I disagree with you on that, but that will not be the focus of my post here.
“I am *very glad* to hear that you do not consider open theists heretics and that you do know how badly determinists have misrepresented their view.”
If you really want the truth, then you have no need to distort other views or intentionally misrepresent them. You want to know what they really believe so that you can carefully consider the real deal not a straw man or ridiculous caricature of a view. When I take my car to the mechanic I don’t want a false representation of the problem the car has, I want to know exactly the nature of the problem. Don’t you?
Or when I go to the doctor I want an accurate description not a pretend and false representation.
“It seems to me that the kind of relationship Arminians believe exists between our heavenly Father and us requires genuine freedom. But can a human person have this kind of freedom in the classical Arminian model?”
Yes, one of the reasons that Arminians reject calvinism is that they do not believe that God treats us as genuine persons if everything is predetermined and God controls everything to make sure that what he has already decided will occur. Arminians believe that one of the reasons God created us with the capacity to have and make our own choices is that God wanted genuine persons not puppets!
“We’ve discussed it before, but I still have a problem with the distinction some simple-foreknowledge advocates make between *certainty* and *necessity*. I’ve heard all the arguments, but it just seems to me that the Calvinists are right when they describe this as an argument of semantics.”
There is definitely a difference between something that occurs as a result of necessity versus something that results from a freely made choice and is certain to happen.
“If God *knows* that I will freely choose to have tuna salad for lunch tomorrow, then I am not free to do other than that.”
Think about that comment for a moment. Say tomorrow I have a choice of having a tuna salad or not having one. I will in fact have one or I will not have one. I CANNOT BOTH HAVE ONE AND NOT HAVE ONE AT THE SAME TIME!!. God’s foreknowledge is of what I will in fact do. Once you make the choice to have the tuna salad it is true that you cannot do “other than that” (again I cannot both have it and not have it at the same time). The key is whether or not BEFORE you choose to have it you also could have chosen not to have it! Having free will does not mean that I can do two opposite things at the same time (like have a tuna salad and not have a tuna salad). Having free will means before making the choice to do what you end up choosing to do, you had different choices available to you.
“How can I possibly be free to do other than what God *knows* I will do?”
If God knows what you will choose to do, then no matter what choices you make, then God knows you will make those choices. God merely knowing what you will choose to do does not remove your free will at all.
“ In such a case, I would only be “free” (free in the sense that my choice was not coerced) to choose tuna salad for lunch. I don’t see how this freedom (i.e., the freedom to choose tuna salad *without* the freedom to choose something else) is all that different from Calvinism’s concept of freedom.”
Actually if you had to do one and could not do the other, that **is** the calvinist’s concept of freedom. The non-calvinist’s concept of freedom (held by both Arminians and Open Theists) is that you could do either one, you don’t have to do what you end up doing.
“It appears that it comes down to the question of *how* God knows all future free choices.”
I disagree with you here, cause no one knows how God knows what he knows. The real crucial question is ***how are events involving choices actualized***, what or who settles the outcome?
God’s plan and making sure the plan occurs (determinism), or us freely making choices (Arminians and Open Theists)?
“It’s tempting to follow the line of thought (as put forth by Jack Cottrell) that we do not know *how* God knows the future exhaustively; we only know that He *does*. But I can’t buy this.”
Why not?
That is my position as well and it is very simple to prove. Start by asking: “How does God know anything that occurs in the world?” He has no brain, no sense organs, no eyes to see ears to hear, hands to feel, nothing, so how does he know? It has to involve his mind but without sense organs, without any physical inputs of any kind, it has to be purely mental and must be different from how we know things, and that applies to the past as well as the present, so if we don’t know how he knows the past and present, then how in the world will we know how he knows the future?? Seems arbitrary to me to admit that we don’t know how he knows what he knows about the present and yet then demand that we know how he knows the future, seems much more rational and consistent to admit we don’t know how he knows what he knows, but if that is true, then the question becomes not How HE KNOWS but does he know? And HE says that he knows everything happening now as well as everything else.
“If God knows the future exhaustively, it seems to me there’s no getting around one of two possibilities: either (1) the future exists, or (2) the future is determined. Those who believe God dwells in the “eternal now,” not in time, hold #1; all others (including Cottrell) hold #2.”
You are leaving out other possibilities. Here is one: (3) only the present exists for us in our experience, we experience successive “presents”, the future is a “present” that will be experienced but has not yet been experienced, and the present we now experience as well as the present that we will experience involve events that are brought about or caused by different realities including God, angels, men and animals and even natural laws operating on material things. And God in some mysterious way, beyond us, and yet nevertheless real, knows what the future “presents” will be as well.
“I reject the idea that the future exists. If it exists, it’s the present, not the future. As long as it’s 2010, 2011 does not exist. We will one day look back and see that there was only one set of realities that made up 2011, but on this side of 2011 we cannot say that–unless determinism is true.”
I personally believe that we only experience a succession of “presents”, though God experiences past, present and future “presents” simultaneously.
“As of today, tuna salad for lunch tomorrow is not a certainty.”
Actually if God foreknows that you will choose to have tuna salad tomorrow, then it is certain but not necessary.
“ I haven’t decided yet.”
But you will either decide to have one or not have one when confronted with that choice, whatever you freely choose to decide is what God foreknows that you will freely choose to do.
“I am truly free to choose to have or not have tuna salad.”
If you have a choice, if you have what is technically called libertarian free will: Yes.
“If I am only free to have it, but not free to not have it, then my lunch is predetermined, even if I’m the determining agent.”
If you are not free to not have it, then you don’t have libertarian free will. If you have to do it, if you had no choice when you chose to do it, then you were not acting freely.
Now note carefully your words “even if I’m the determining agent.” If God creates us with the capacity to have and make our own choices then when we are acting freely, if the choice is up to us, then we do decide what choice we will make. If you mean THAT by being “the determining agent”, then that means God in giving us the capacity for free will decided beforehand that we would sometimes be “the determining agent”, the one who makes the decision.
In contrast in exhaustive determinism, God made ****all*** of the decisions, the choices, beforehand, he alone had choices, we are just rubber stamping his already made choices for us (e.g. he decided that “Joe” would be an open theist, rejecting both calvinism and Arminianism and he controls “Joe” in such a way as to make sure that that already made decision by him comes true in “Joe’s” experience, we may mistakenly believe that we freely make our own choices but this is not true, we only and always make the choices he already decided that we would make). In a completely predetermined world we NEVER EVER HAVE A CHOICE (we think we have options, but in reality the only option is the one that he decided beforehand that we would pick). In contrast to exhaustive determinism, both Open Theists and Arminians and Molinists believe that we sometimes have choices where we decide which of the available and accessible options are chosen.
“The *fact* that God knows it now means it is predetermined.”
No, you are confusing something being foreknown and something being predetermined. Something is merely foreknown if when it comes to the time of me making my choice, I could choose either option, I could choose A or I could choose B, I am not forced to choose A or forced to choose B, the choice is up to me. Now whichever choice I do in fact make, God knows which one I will choose.
Something is predetermined if God set up the situation completely in every detail, and knew that in that situation we would believe that we were facing a choice (we thought we could choose A or choose B) but God already decided that we would, say choose A, and God controls things in such a way as to make sure that we choose A (which means we had to choose A, we had no choice, our belief that we had a choice was mistaken, because God already decided that we would choose A, so if he decided that and he controls us in such a way to make sure that we choose A, then our belief that we could really choose A or B was false, we had to choose A and it was impossible for us to have chosen B).
In non-determinism, you really could choose either A or B, and whichever option you choose is what God foreknows you will choose. His knowledge does not cause your choice, and neither does your action of choosing A or B cause his foreknowledge (rather his foreknowledge is his belief that corresponds with what will in fact happen). In non-determinism you really can choose either option and God foreknows what choice that YOU WILL DECIDE TO MAKE. Note carefully that in one scenario God alone HAS CHOICES, while in the other scenario God has choices and God allows us to have some choices.
Robert
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“And God in some mysterious way, beyond us, and yet nevertheless real, knows what the future ‘presents’ will be as well.”
But isn’t the concept of a range of *possible* future “presents” more compatible with libertarian free will? Indeed, God knows all the options; He knows every possibility. He knows I could have tuna salad for lunch tomorrow, but He also knows I could choose a good artery-clogging cheeseburger or a serving of liver with some fava beans and a nice Chianti. As far as the options are concerned, nothing is hidden from Him. We cannot make a choice He hasn’t already foreseen as a possibility. And that’s just the point, isn’t it? Aren’t there many *possibilities* for the future? If God knows every future free choice each of us will make, doesn’t that mean there are no real *possibilities* for the future? Doesn’t it mean that there are only *certain* events but no *possible* events? And doesn’t it mean that when we speak of possibilities regarding the future, we are speaking entirely from the way it appears to us at the moment? If God knows I’m going to have tuna salad for lunch tomorrow, then there never was a possibility that I might choose the cheeseburger or the Lecter Lunch Special.
We agree that God’s foreknowledge does not cause our future free choices. We agree that God did not predetermine our future free choices. And we agree that our future free choices are not the cause of God’s foreknowledge (though some Arminians would disagree). We now come to that “mysterious way, beyond us, and yet nevertheless real.” That’s the “great gulf” between me and Classical Arminianism. Whatever the “mysterious way” may be, it rules out a future of real possibilities and affirms a future of absolute certainties. Yet, the Bible certainly seems to indicate there are real possibilities for the future of individuals, just as it certainly seems to present a God who actually hopes for the best outcomes. If the Bible does teach that God hopes and that there are real possibilities for the future, then open theism is biblical.
Hello Vance,
“But isn’t the concept of a range of *possible* future “presents” more compatible with libertarian free will?”
I do not view the future as a range of “possible future presents”. Rather, I see us experiencing consecutive “presents” (so the “presents” that we have already experienced we call “the past”, the “presents” that we have not yet experienced we call “the future”). I also believe the realm of possibilities is always in the present (e.g. before we make the choice of fettuccine, we have the choice of different possibilities, fettuccine, spaghetti, lasagna, etc.). Before you make a particular choice you have different possibilities, once you make the choice you actualize one possibility while excluding and eliminating others. For example a student may be considering different colleges to attend (so they have different possibilities). Once they choose one of the colleges, they make that the actual outcome while making the others eliminated possibilities.
“Indeed, God knows all the options; He knows every possibility.”
OK, so if He knows all possibilities then why do you believe that he cannot know what we will actually choose as well?
“He knows I could have tuna salad for lunch tomorrow, but He also knows I could choose a good artery-clogging cheeseburger or a serving of liver with some fava beans and a nice Chianti. As far as the options are concerned, nothing is hidden from Him. We cannot make a choice He hasn’t already foreseen as a possibility. And that’s just the point, isn’t it?”
No, the point in regards to the foreknowledge issue is whether or not God not only knows the possibilities (which you seem to say that He does), but whether or not He also knows what we will actually, in fact choose to do before we make that choice.
“Aren’t there many *possibilities* for the future?”
No, there are many possibilities before you make the choice of one of them and exclude the others. Once you make that choice, the many possibilities become one actuality. And again I see us experiencing successive “presents” where we have various choices to make. Once we make a choice, at least with regard to that choice, it then becomes a past and settled event. We speak of the future as events that have not yet been settled. But they will be settled in some very specific ways (when you go to the restaurant you will choose something and not choose other things).
“If God knows every future free choice each of us will make, doesn’t that mean there are no real *possibilities* for the future?”
No, because in time as we experience events, we first HAVE A CHOICE, then we MAKE A CHOICE.
God’s foreknowledge concerns what choices we will actually make.
When we speak of foreknowledge it does not include statements like: “well Vance will have three choices when he goes to the Italian restaurant, it may choose fettuccine, he may choose spaghetti, or he may choose lasagna . . .” No, the statements are like: “Vance will in fact choose X at that Italian restaurant.” And all we are saying is that God knows how you will in fact choose. And you will in fact choose to do something, so your action will be very specific.
“Doesn’t it mean that there are only *certain* events but no *possible* events?”
You need to distinguish two time frames. The time frame in which we HAVE A CHOICE (call that TF1) and the time frame when we MAKE A CHOICE (call that TF2). Having a choice (TF1) precedes Making a choice (TF2) in time. When we speak of God foreknowing we will do X, we are referring to TF2. When we are speaking of having a choice and being able to choose from among different possibilities we are speaking of TF1. Determinists often argue from the fact that we will make choice X at TF2, to the conclusion that therefore we never had a choice. but this neglects, ignores, minimizes that we HAD THE CHOICE before we MAKE THE CHOICE. It is true that prior to our making the choice (at TF1) we did in fact have various possibilities. Once we make the choice at TF2 we actualize one possibility while excluding the other possibilities. But God knowing what choice we will make at TF2 does not eliminate the fact that at TF1 we did in fact HAVE A CHOICE.
To use your statement, the “certain event” (TF2) follows the “possible events” (TF1) in time. Or to use my illustration, when you are thinking about what one of the three dinners you will choose at the Italian restaurant, each of the dinners is a “possible event.” Once you make a selection, make a choice, the possible choices become the actual choice (whatever you actually end up choosing for dinner).
“And doesn’t it mean that when we speak of possibilities regarding the future, we are speaking entirely from the way it appears to us at the moment?”
True. In our use of language we talk about “presents” that we have not yet experienced as the “future”. We talk about “presents” that we have already experience as the “past.”
“If God knows I’m going to have tuna salad for lunch tomorrow, then there never was a possibility that I might choose the cheeseburger or the Lecter Lunch Special.”
Alright here Vance you are making the determinist’s argument, the argument that argues from the certainty of the event occurring (again that is referring to the time frame when we MAKE THE CHOICE, TF2) to the conclusion that therefore “there never was a possibility that I might choose the cheeseburger or the Lecter Lunch Special.” You are arguing from the certainty that you will choose tuna salad (that will be your actual choice tomorrow, what you will in fact choose to do) that that must mean that BEFORE YOU MADE THE CHOICE YOU HAD NO CHOICE. But that is fallacious and does not follow from the certainty of the choice that you will in fact make.
In reality, BEFORE you MAKE THE CHOICE of tuna salad, if you had free will, then in the time frame TF1, you HAD A CHOICE. In that time frame the tuna salad, the cheeseburger and the Lecter special were all open possibilities you could have chosen any of them. Now if instead of freely choosing the tuna salad you had in fact chosen the Lecter special, then God would have foreknown that. Whatever you end up choosing, God foreknows what you will in fact choose. And not matter what you in fact end up choosing, prior to making that choice YOU HAD A CHOICE. And if you had a choice you had free will.
“We agree that God’s foreknowledge does not cause our future free choices.”
Yep.
“ We agree that God did not predetermine our future free choices.”
Yep.
“ And we agree that our future free choices are not the cause of God’s foreknowledge (though some Arminians would disagree).”
Nope.
Vance you are failing to distinguish a causal relation from a logical relation. God’s foreknowledge involves a logical relation (i.e. his beliefs correspond with what will in fact occur, though his beliefs do not cause what in fact will occur). Our actions do not **cause** God’s foreknowledge, nor does God’s foreknowledge **cause** our actions. That would be a causal relation. But God’s foreknowledge concerns a logical relation. Here is something that I posted on another thread here that will help you better understand the difference:
“And I need to throw in one more important point anticipating what some skeptics will claim. God’s knowledge of future events has a logical relation with those events not a CAUSAL RELATION. In a causal relation one thing causes another (so sometimes people will speak about how our future actions CAUSE God to have the knowledge that he has, and so God becomes dependent upon us). In a logical relation, the key is that the relation is not causal but logical. Here is an example. I know that 1 + 1 = 2. Does my knowing that, cause 1 + 1 = 2 to be true? No. Does the fact that 1 + 1 = 2 cause my knowledge that 1 + 1 = 2? No. It is a logical relation. My belief that 1 + 1 = 2 corresponds with the reality that 1 + 1 = 2. Likewise, God’s foreknowledge does not CAUSE my future action (that would be causal relation), rather, his belief corresponds with what will in fact take place (logical relation). I mention this so I don’t’ get someone responding that this view makes God “dependent” upon his creation.
“We now come to that “mysterious way, beyond us, and yet nevertheless real.” That’s the “great gulf” between me and Classical Arminianism. Whatever the “mysterious way” may be, it rules out a future of real possibilities and affirms a future of absolute certainties.”
No, it means that God foreknows all of the choices that we make, but that prior to the choice that we make, if we were acting freely we had free will, we had choices.
“Yet, the Bible certainly seems to indicate there are real possibilities for the future of individuals, just as it certainly seems to present a God who actually hopes for the best outcomes. If the Bible does teach that God hopes and that there are real possibilities for the future, then open theism is biblical.”
The bible teaches that God has foreknowledge of future events, which means that the future is settled, it is not open, you are not going to be ordering the tuna salad, the cheeseburger or the Lecter special, you are going to be ordering one of them and not the others. The one you actually in fact choose is the one that God foreknows you will choose. That means the future is just as settled as the past. The key question is what settles the present? Who or what, in the present (cause the present is all that we ever experience) makes one possibility actual and others eliminated possibilities? If our actions are sometimes self determined, and we are acting freely, then at least sometimes, we are the ones that determine or settle an actual outcome.
Robert
One could affirm 1) that God has exhaustive foreknowledge of all our future free choices, and 2) that His knowledge is not the cause of our choices. Affirming these two points might lead one to affirm a third point: We do not know HOW God knows; we just know that He does. So we leave it at that. God knows–period!
OK, to an extent, I can appreciate that explanation. But there’s something unsatisfying about leaving the “how God knows” mystery unaddressed.
How does God know today that tomorrow I will choose the tuna salad rather than the Lecter special? We don’t know how He knows, you say; we just know that He does. We also know that the choice is entirely mine, not God’s. His knowledge of my choice is not the cause of my choice. So at lunchtime tomorrow, my choice of tuna salad is 100 percent certain. And I will make that choice freely.
Agree so far? Read on…
In fact, I am not free to make any other choice. My freedom is limited to only one choice, the one God knows. The FACT that God knows today what I will do tomorrow means that someone or something predetermined my choices. The FACT that God knows, at this moment, all events of the future means that someone or something predetermined those events. If God knows that Bob will die in a plane crash on October 17, 2017, then that event has been predetermined by someone or something. Saying, “God knows it will happen, but we don’t know HOW He knows it,” is just not satisfying. If, as you say, “the future is just as settled as the past,” then either God or some kind of force, whether natural or supernatural, predetermined all things. If tomorrow’s events are settled, then something settled them! Do you see why open theists think exhaustive foreknowledge and libertarian free will are incompatible?
You say the Bible teaches that God has foreknowledge of all events. Does it? ALL events? Where does it say that? What principle of exegesis are you applying when you insist that scriptures stating that God seeks to find out, changes His mind, waits to see, etc., are mere anthropomorphisms, but those scriptures that tell us God has knowledge of future events can only mean that God has knowledge of ALL future events?
Correct, Vance. The belief that God knows future “libertarian” free choices has a problem of grounding. It does not ground God’s knowledge in anything (and Molinism shares the similar problem of grounding). The problem is serious and should not be dismissed with an assertion of hocus pocus, that is, the solution of “God can do anything, even the impossible like making square circles; I don’t know how he can make a square circle, or what that would look like, but I believe he can.” The hocus pocus solution is also problematic in a missional and apologetic sense: how can one address the incoherent or illogical beliefs of others if one accepts such beliefs in ones’ own religion? One can’t, and so cannot reasonably or without hypocrisy assail the beliefs of others: one has to accept them at face value.
John I.
Hello Vance,
You wrote:
“One could affirm 1) that God has exhaustive foreknowledge of all our future free choices, and 2) that His knowledge is not the cause of our choices. Affirming these two points might lead one to affirm a third point: We do not know HOW God knows; we just know that He does. So we leave it at that. God knows–period!
OK, to an extent, I can appreciate that explanation. But there’s something unsatisfying about leaving the “how God knows” mystery unaddressed.
How does God know today that tomorrow I will choose the tuna salad rather than the Lecter special? We don’t know how He knows, you say; we just know that He does.”
You know Vance I was sitting one day with an extremely intelligent friend of mine mulling over this issue of HOW GOD KNOWS WHAT HE KNOWS. And we both started with the fact that in the bible God reveals, states, declares, however you want to put it, that He knows everything. So we both said OK let’s start with the assumption that He knows everything. Then we said let’s think about HOW God knows what is happening right now? It suddenly dawned on us, THAT WE DON’T EVEN KNOW HOW HE KNOWS THAT!!! No believer I know would deny that God knows what is happening RIGHT NOW. And yet if you actually stop to think about it, we don’t know how he knows what he knows about what is happening right now! God is a spirit (that is revealed in the bible) so he has no body which means he has no brain, no sense organs (including eyes to see or view), no skin, the usual ways that WE know many of the things that we know. My friend and I both agreed that while we are quite certain that God knows things, we really do not know how he knows what he knows. Now that is true of God knowing what is happening right now. If we don’t know THAT, then how are you surprised that we do not know HOW he knows future events??? It seems arbitrary to me to be amazed about how he knows the future when we don’t even know how he knows the present.
“We also know that the choice is entirely mine, not God’s. His knowledge of my choice is not the cause of my choice. So at lunchtime tomorrow, my choice of tuna salad is 100 percent certain. And I will make that choice freely.”
I would agree with all of these statements.
“Agree so far? Read on…
In fact, I am not free to make any other choice. My freedom is limited to only one choice, the one God knows.”
No, God knows what choice you will in fact make. If you really have a choice about something tomorrow, then that means that you could freely choose to actualize either option (say tuna salad OR a hamburger). If you face that choice tomorrow, then you will make some choice (either the tuna salad, the hamburger, something else or even order nothing: but you will choose something). I call that something that you will actually choose and “actual outcome.” God’s foreknowledge concerns actual outcomes, events that will in fact occur. They will occur with certainty because if you really face an actual choice then you will in fact make some choice (with that some choice that you make being the actual outcome). When you state: “My freedom is limited to only one choice” you are confusing the fact that an actual choice will (and can only result in) ONE ACTUAL CHOICE with determinism. With determinism I can only do one thing, the thing that I was determined to do by causal factors that necessitate one particular action and exclude all other possible actions. God’s foreknowledge is not a causal factor that necessitates one particular action. Now if you forget or neglect the fact that an actual choice will result in a specific choice, you will end up arguing that free will is the ability to actualize a contradiction (like choosing to both raise my hand and not raise my hand AT THE SAME TIME in a class). That is not what free will involves. It does not mean that I can do both simultaneously. It does mean that given different options, I decide which option to actualize (and by deciding on the one I necessarily exclude the other option, if you choose the tuna salad then you won’t choose the hamburger).
Free will does mean that the resulting choice, the actual outcome, will in fact be one specific choice (not two mutually exclusive choices being actualized simultaneously).
“The FACT that God knows today what I will do tomorrow means that someone or something predetermined my choices.”
No, that does not follow at all. God’s foreknowledge is of what choice YOU will decide to make (His foreknowledge does not cause your choice nor does your choice cause his foreknowledge, that is a **causal relation** something that I have already discussed with you; on the other hand, His foreknowledge has a logical relation with the actual event, his knowledge corresponds to what will in fact occur).
“The FACT that God knows, at this moment, all events of the future means that someone or something predetermined those events.”
If God decided beforehand that you would pick tuna salad, and then controlled all of the circumstances involved to ensure that you picked tuna salad: then the event would be predetermined. And in that case you could not choose anything else you would have to choose the tuna salad. Your action would be completely controlled and you would not have free will. In that scenario it would be impossible for you to choose anything else than tuna salad.
Now contrast THAT, with God knowing what you will choose to do, but not controlling your action, leaving the choice up to you, and the choice being up to you. In this scenario, you will in fact freely choose the tuna salad, so that is what God foreknows that you will choose to do. But it was not impossible for you to choose something else. Prior to making the choice the choice if it was up to you mean that you really could choose different options. And note this carefully, if you have free will and face a choice, then you could choose different options but you will in fact choose one. And the one that you choose is the actual outcome. And God’s foreknowledge concerns actual outcomes, what you will in fact do.
We could put it another way, say Joe has the ability to foreknow future events (this is purely hypothetical in fact only God has this ability). Say Joe knows that you will choose the tuna salad (and say that in fact that is the choice that you will make). So you will pick tuna salad. But say that we eliminate Joe and that you will in fact pick tuna salad. So you will pick tuna salad with certainty tomorrow whether or not Joe exists and whether or not Joe foreknows your choice. what this brings out is that we have to distinguish the causal factors that bring about events from the knowledge of events (recall my example of watching OJ and Al Cowlings driving down the LA freeways in the infamous Bronco, my knowing this was happening, actually seeing it while it was happening did not cause it to happen, no Al Cowlings choosing to drive the bronco and all of LA’s finest choosing to follow that Bronco caused those events, not my knowledge of the events).
“If God knows that Bob will die in a plane crash on October 17, 2017, then that event has been predetermined by someone or something.”
No, again you are confusing predetermining something and foreknowing something, they are not the same.
“If Joe knows that Bob will die in a plane crash on October 17, 2017, then that event has been predetermined by someone or something.”
You assume or confuse KNOWING SOMETHING WITH PREDETERMINING SOMETHING. God knows what is happening right now, does that mean that he predetermined all of it? NO. If I turn on the TV and watch some event happening so that I know that it is happening, does that mean that I predetermined for it to happen? No.
“Saying, “God knows it will happen, but we don’t know HOW He knows it,” is just not satisfying.”
To you, but then I am quite satisfied that none of us even knows HOW GOD KNOWS THE PRESENT, let alone the future. Does it bother you that none of us knows HOW God knows what he knows?
“If, as you say, “the future is just as settled as the past,” then either God or some kind of force, whether natural or supernatural, predetermined all things. If tomorrow’s events are settled, then something settled them!”
I think I would add another clarification here. When we talk about events that God foreknows we are talking about actual outcomes that will in fact occur in the future. As such they are going to be settled and God knows precisely how they will end up. But in the case of freely made choices, WE are the ones who will settle them. So it is true they are not yet settled by us (assuming the event is something we settle, like choosing the tuna salad or something else tomorrow). The orthodox claim is that God can and does know events that will be settled but are not yet settled by the causal factors that will bring them about. So we need to distinguish between knowledge about settled outcomes that will occur, versus the actual causal factors that will settle those future events.
“Do you see why open theists think exhaustive foreknowledge and libertarian free will are incompatible?”
I understand why that is problematic for some, but I also understand that free will the ability to make a choice when having a choice precedes the actual outcome in time. So the fact that there will be a certain outcome does not take away the fact that free will is present before that actual outcome occurs.
“You say the Bible teaches that God has foreknowledge of all events. Does it? ALL events? Where does it say that?”
I could cite the passages but I have a feeling that you already know them, so I am not sure what that would accomplish at this point.
“What principle of exegesis are you applying when you insist that scriptures stating that God seeks to find out, changes His mind, waits to see, etc., are mere anthropomorphisms, but those scriptures that tell us God has knowledge of future events can only mean that God has knowledge of ALL future events?”
Well one of them is that more clear declarative statements (that do not involve figurative language or anthropomorphic language) take priority over statements that involve figurative language and/or anthropomorphic language. Here is an example. Say we have a bible verse that directly states “GOD CANNOT CHANGE”. And say we had another bible verse that says “God changes his plans like the seasons change”. For me the first one is a straight declaration, while the second one has obvious figurative language (God does not change like the seasons do). So the first one has priority for me over the second one.
Now I have read open theists, including Boyd, Sanders and Hasker et al. And they argue correctly that God knows all possibilities. Well if God knows all possibilities and knows all that is happening right now (he knows my thoughts, wishes, plans, deliberations, values, etc. etc.), then he is never going to be surprised by anything that we do (surprised in the sense that he had no idea that that could possibly occur). And yet in the bible there are statements of surprise. I think those kinds of statements indicate an emotional reaction on the part of God (I do believe that God experiences emotions to some extent) and yet you cannot take them too far (as if God is emotional in just the same way that we are, or “surprised” in exactly the same way that we are). Likewise I think some of the open theist proof texts are texts that they take too far. The way I see it there are two extremes: the open theism extreme which takes these statements too far (so God is just a bigger version of us)and others who take these statements as if they do not present any reality (so God has no emotions whatsoever, God never responds to what we do in real time).
Take God changing his mind for example. If God says at one point in time that I will judge you if you do X. Call that state of mind A. But then you actually do X and yet instead of judging you God has mercy on you, that would be state of mind B. Is that a “change of mind”, well technically I would say Yes. The bible is quite clear that God will change his dealings with us depending on what we do (he says of the evil person that they will be judged and yet if they repent he will forgive them and restore them). With Israel he said if they were disobedient he would curse them and bless them for obedience (and yet he also had mercy on them sometimes when they were disobedient). So I take the “change of mind” language to be pointing to a reality that God has actual and real interactions with us, that these interactions were not predecided by God as part of some total plan. Anyway I take much of the open theist “proof texts” to be texts pointing to realities but I also think the open theists take them too far forgetting what other declarative texts have clearly stated and revealed.
Robert