I’m no expert in metaphysics, so this post won’t be a polished lecture for a philosophy class (I do, however, have certification from Honda Motors to do repairs and maintenance on their cars, but that was from 1980, so it probably has expired). But the questions raised by Jeff Lowder in his recent post on Moral Ontology (http://secularoutpost.infidels.org/2012/12/moral-ontological-argument2.html) intrigue me, and perhaps I can make a small contribution towards development of the basic categories needed to get the Argument from Moral Ontology off the ground.
(C2*) Is this entity able to affect a natural entity?
This is a no-brainer. Obviously there are natural entities that are able to affect a natural entity. The sun can warm a stone, for example. The sun is a physical entity, so it is a natural entity. A rock is a physical entity, so it is also a natural entity. The sun can affect a stone, so the sun can affect a natural entity.
This is an interesting combination. Physical entities are paradigm cases of natural entities, based on the definition. It seems to me that physical entities not only are typically able to affect a physical entity, but that a physical entity must, of logical necessity, be able to affect a physical entity, and thus be able to affect a natural entity. Isn’t this a necessary condition of being a physical entity? So, at first blush, this category appears to be incoherent.
But what about an isolated single atom or sub-atomic particle? Can’t we imagine, for example, a single electron existing all by itself, with no other physical particles with which to interact and affect? Such a lonely electron would not be able to affect other physical entities because there would be no other entities to affect. Although there may never have been a time when the only physical entity in existence was a single electron, we can conceive of this scenario, and there appears to be no logical contradiction or impossibility about there having been such a circumstance at some point in time.
Nevertheless, such an electron would still have the power to repel another electron if another electron were to come into existence. So, the one lonely electron does have the potential to affect another physical entity, once such an entity comes into existence. Apart from such potential, the single particle would not be an electron, for being an electron means having a negative charge, and having a negative charge means having the power to repel other particles with a negative charge.
So, given some clarification of the concept of ‘able to affect a natural entity’, my inclination is to reject the ‘natural and non-able’ category as being incoherent. In doing so, I commit myself to understanding the concept of a ‘physical entity’ to logically entail the concept ‘able to affect a physical entity’.
NA3. Non-Natural and Able
If there are supernatural persons, then there are non-natural entities that are able to affect natural entities. Whatever ‘supernatural’ means, it surely excludes natural entities. So, a supernatural entity would necessarily be a non-natural entity. Furthermore, supernatural entities, or at least some supernatural persons are supposed to be detectable by means of their occasional interventions and interactions with natural entities: ghosts appear or make noises, demons possess people or animals and cause odd behavior or illness, gods intervene in nature causing storms or calming a raging sea. If there are such supernatural persons, then there are non-natural entities that are able to affect natural entities.
However, the idea of a ‘supernatural person’ has seemed to some people to be an incoherent idea. If a supernatural person is a bodiless person, and if Antony Flew was correct that the idea of a bodiless person is incoherent, then the idea of a supernatural person is also incoherent. Further, if the idea of a supernatural person is incoherent, then it might well be the case that the more general category of non-natural entities that are able to affect a natural entity is also incoherent.
It is not clear to me that Flew was correct on this point, so I’m not ready to set aside this category as a logical impossibility. But it is certainly controversial whether this category represents a coherent concept.
Numbers and other abstractions appear to fall into this category. The number two is clearly not a physical entity, nor is it reducible to physical entities. Like other sorts of entities, numbers exist, and numbers have properties. The number two is an even number and it is greater than one and less than three. So, it is plausible to think of numbers as entities.
But numbers don’t occupy space, nor do they begin to exist at a particular moment, nor cease to exist at a particular moment. Numbers do not have mass, nor do they have energy, nor do they have a size, shape, or velocity. So, the number two is not only not a physical entity, but it is nothing like a physical entity. Even supernatural persons (gods, ghosts, and demons) have positions in space and time. A ghost can be here now, or have been in that house over there last week, but not the number two. A demon can come into existence at one point in time, and cease to exist at a later point in time, but not the number two. So, it seems right to say that if the number two is an entity, it is NOT a natural entity, and thus it must be a non-natural entity.
Because the number two cannot occupy space, have a shape or size, have mass or energy, have a velocity, begin to exist or cease to exist, it is difficult to see how the number two could affect a physical or natural entity. Furthermore, the properties of the number two don’t ever change, and cannot change. The number two cannot be less than three today but more than three tomorrow. The number two cannot be even today but odd tomorrow.
So, the number two appears to possess a quality that even God cannot have: immutability. Ancient theologians tried to attribute immutability to God, but the idea of an immutable person is, as Swinburne argues, an incoherent idea. But numbers not only can be immutable, they appear to be necessarily immutable. Since the properties of numbers cannot change, it is difficult to see how an unchanging number can cause a change in a natural entity.
The same problem exists for the idea of an unchanging cause of the origin of the universe. In the Kalam cosmological argument, the cause of the beginning of the universe is inferred to be a person, because only the choice of a person can explain why the universe would begin to exist at a particular point in time (an unthinking mechanical cause would always be operative and thus cannot explain why the universe began at a particular instant rather than at some previous instant).
Setting aside my theological musings, it appears to me that the number two is a non-natural entity which is NOT able to affect natural entities, in which case the ‘Non-natural and Non-able’ combination represents a coherent idea or category of entities.
Could there also be a ‘supernatural person’ who is not able to affect natural entities? hmmmm.
I’m not sure what to say about that.
To be continued…