If I understand William Craig's third objection to AMR, then he is basically offering an inductive  teleological argument for the existence of God (similar to how Richard Swinburne argues for God)  based on the assumption that there are objective moral values plus the claim that humans and the circumstances in which humans find themselves are such as to allow humans to live morally significant lives (we have free will, are able to grasp moral principles, are able to reason from moral principles t … [Read more...]

When I argue against the resurrection of Jesus, I generally take a two-pronged approach. First, I argue that there are various good reasons to doubt the claim that Jesus was alive and walking around on the first Easter Sunday. Second, I make a concession for the sake of argument; I grant the supposition that Jesus was alive and walking around on the first Easter Sunday. Then I point out that this assumption, an assumption that Christian apologists work very hard to try to prove, actually … [Read more...]

I am currently considering William Craig's second objection to Atheistic Moral Realism (AMR):Second, the nature of moral duty or obligation seems incompatible with atheistic moral realism. (WIAC, p.76)The following is a third piece of the paragraph where Craig presents this objection:Who or what lays such an obligation on me?  As the ethicist Richard Taylor points out, "A duty is something that is owed. ... But something can be owed only to some person or persons.  There can be no su … [Read more...]