Quibbling over Semantics While Missing the Point

I've said it before and I'll say it again. I'm a linguistic relativist. I don't think words have objective meanings. I think the meaning of words is relative to time and place. So when I encounter someone who is adamant about defining a word in a different way than I do, I just shrug my shoulders. I'm much more interested in the concepts represented by certain labels than the labels themselves.I recently discovered (or re-discovered) an exchange on this site in which a Christian apologist … [Read more...]

LINK: “Ethics and Evolutionary Theory” by Erik J. Wielenberg

I haven't read this, but I'm posting the link because (1) I respect the author; and (2) I think the topic will of interest to many of our readers.LINK (Note: this article is behind a paywall)Reminder/Disclaimer: Posting links does not necessarily constitute endorsement. … [Read more...]

Euthyphro Dilemmas

As I explained on page 25 of my Primer in Religion and Morality I think there are multiple dilemmas floating around under the name "Euthyphro Dilemma" (hereafter, ED). ED: The literal, original formulation of the ED is this: "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it loved by the gods?" In that formulation, it's argubaly not really applicable to any contemporary discussions of theistic metaethics.In order to make it applicable, people often revise it. … [Read more...]

Are Atheism and Moral Realism Logically Incompatible?

I am a regular reader of Victor Reppert's blog, Dangerous Idea. In the combox for one of his recent posts, Steve Hays claimed that atheism and moral realism are logically incompatible. I wrote a lengthy reply to Hays in the combox and have decided to republish it here.Before I republish my comments, I will make one general observation about moral arguments for God's existence.Theists often claim that the so-called 'problem of evil' (read: arguments from evil for atheism) and the o … [Read more...]

Moral Arguments for God and Coining a Name for a Common but Fallacious Objection

In response to Wintery Knight's recent blog post on the plausibility of objective morality on atheism, I posted a comment in the combox on his site. The comment consisted solely of a link to my YouTube video, "Naturalism, Theism, and Moral Ontology: A Reply to William Lane Craig." In response to that link, WK wrote a response, which you can read on his blog. (I cannot figure out how to link to an individual comment on his blog or I would provide a direct link. In any case, I recommend you do … [Read more...]

Naturalism, Theism, and Moral Ontology: A Reply to William Lane Craig

(Reposting since this seems to be so popular. So far as I am aware, neither WLC nor anyone else has responded to this.)Abstract: This paper considers William Lane Craig’s metaethical argument for God’s existence. Roughly, the argument is that the existence of objective moral values provides strong evidence for God’s existence. I consider one by one Craig’s various reasons in support of the argument’s major premise, namely, that objective moral values and the nonexistence of God are at odds wi … [Read more...]

Preliminary Remarks Concerning Euthyphro-style Ojections to the Divine Command Theory

This post is meant to set the stage for a follow-up post in which I will argue that the Euthyphro Dilemma provides a definitive (or as close to definitive as we can reasonably expect to get) objection to divine command metaethics (even the modern so-called modified divine command theories associated with Robert Adams, Edward Wierenga, C. Stephen Evans and others). In this post I want to talk not about divine commands or love or metaethics, but rather supreme executive power, reasons, motives, … [Read more...]

Wes Morriston’s God and the Ontological Foundation of Morality

(Redated post originally published on 7 September 2012)Ouch!LINK … [Read more...]