Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 5

I am currently considering William Craig's second objection to Atheistic Moral Realism (AMR):Second, the nature of moral duty or obligation seems incompatible with atheistic moral realism. (WIAC, p.76)The following is a third piece of the paragraph where Craig presents this objection:Who or what lays such an obligation on me?  As the ethicist Richard Taylor points out, "A duty is something that is owed. ... But something can be owed only to some person or persons.  There can be no su … [Read more...]

Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 4

Here, once again, is William Craig's MOVE (Moral Objective Values Exist) Argument:1. If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist. 2. Objective moral values do exist. Therefore: 3. God exists.I am considering one possible objection, namely rejection of, or doubt about, premise (1). Atheists who are inclined towards moral realism or belief in objective moral values will be inclined to challenge premise (1) rather than premise (2).Craig raises three objections to what … [Read more...]

Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 3

William Craig's MOVE argument is simple:1. If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.2. Objective moral values do exist.Therefore:3.  God exists.One obvious atheistic objection would be to reject or cast doubt on premise (2).  If one rejects or doubts that objective moral values exist, then this argument will fail to be persuasive.Another possible objection is to reject or cast doubt upon premise (1).  Some atheists accept moral realism, and thus believe t … [Read more...]

The Atheist named Richard Swinburne

I was reading the Martyrdom of Polycarp recently, which is “the oldest written account of a Christian martyrdom outside the New Testament.” (The Apostolic Fathers, updated edition, edited and revised by Michael Holmes, p.222; hereafter: TAF). Polycarp was killed between 155 and 160 C.E:The Martyrdom of Polycarp sets out quite clearly both the issue at stake--Lord Christ versus Lord Caesar—and the state’s (as well as the general population’s) view of Christians as disloyal atheists who threate … [Read more...]

The Perfect Goodness of God – Again (Part 2)

In my previous post on this topic, I used conditional derivation to try to prove that one statement entailed another statement, to show that 'There is a person who is omniscient and perfectly free' entails 'There is a person who is perfectly good'.But because I'm a bit unclear on how the logic of conditional statements relates to entailment, I'm not sure that conditional derivation can be used this way.In any case, implication (the logical relationship in a true conditional statement) is … [Read more...]

Thoughts about Plantinga’s Interesting Paper on “Naturalism, Theism, Obligation, and Supervenience”

I’ve been studying Plantinga’s very interesting paper, “Naturalism, Theism, Obligation, and Supervenience.” (See here for Ex-Apologist’s very brief post about it.) Plantinga’s stated goal is to show that metaphysical naturalism cannot accommodate realism about moral obligation by "displaying the failure of the most natural way of arguing" that metaphysical naturalism can accommodate moral realism, viz., supervenience. There are many things about this paper which I find interesting … [Read more...]

Podcast: Objective morality and atheism; the evil god challenge; risks posed by religion

I did a podcast for Malcontent's Gambit here. It's about 45 mins long. Alan and I got into some interesting topics, including: whether atheists can allow for absolute moral values, my evil god challenge, and the potential dangers posed by religion. … [Read more...]

AdamHazzard’s Quick Parable Comparing Atheistic and Divine Command Theoretic Metaethics

I just read this in the combox on Randal Rauser’s blog. An atheist and a divine-command theorist are approached by someone who says to them, "God is telling me to kill my child. Am I crazy?"The atheist doesn't hesitate. "Yes! You need to seek help immediately!"While the divine-command theorist shuffles his feet and says, "Well, that depends. Is your name Abraham?" Is this parable a fair representation of divine command theory?ETA: I’ve posted this because I like the parable. It see … [Read more...]