Arguments from Reason

I've finally gotten around to starting Victor Reppert's book, C.S. Lewis's Dangerous Idea: In Defense of the Argument from Reason. As Reppert points out in one of his chapters, we can really think of the "argument from reason" as the name for an entire family of theistic arguments. Indeed, Reppert formulates six different versions of the argument from reason which, he says, can be combined to form a cumulative case.Here are his six arguments.Argument from Intentionality Argument from … [Read more...]

Input Requested: Facts about Mental Properties Which Might be Relevant to Theism and Naturalism

I'm interested in collecting a list of mental properties which might be relevant to theism and naturalism. Examples:Consciousness Intentionality Reliability of Cognitive Mechanisms Mind-brain dependenceWhat else have I missed? … [Read more...]

Melnyk, Goetz, and Taliafero on the AFR

Lately I have been doing a book revision and in the process reflecting on the "Great Debate" between Andrew Melnyk and the Christian philosophers Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliafero. Melnyk defends the thesis of the physical realization of the mental (PRM) and Goetz and Taliafero offer criticisms. Here are my thoughts so far. Comments would be welcome. Sorry for the length and apologies also that I am too lazy to put in references in this draft. The MTB thesis is the claim, broader than … [Read more...]

Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism refuted

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“The Argument from Reason” (2)

At 349, Reppert says: "We ought to draw the conclusion if we accept the premises of a valid argument".This is obviously wrong. Suppose, to take the worst case, that my beliefs contradict one another. If we are supposing classical logic -- as Reppert clearly is -- then, from my contradictory beliefs, using Reppert's principle, I ought to infer that every claim is true. But, even though there IS a valid argument from premises I accept to an absurd conclusion, I ought NOT to "draw" the absurd … [Read more...]

“The Argument from Reason”

A couple of comments on Reppert "The Argument from Reason" in Craig and Moreland (ed.) Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, 344-90. (I have a long list; I may post further comments later.)1. At 368, Reppert argues: If the reference of our terms is indeterminate, then this has the disastrous consequence that we cannot reason to conclusions.This is surely wrong. Reasoning can be purely formal. (If all flombs are bloops, and all bloops are shimbs, then all flombs are shimbs. The reasoning is … [Read more...]


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