Plantinga Calls This A Good Argument for God’s Existence?

The title of my post might come across as snarky, so I want to begin my making it clear that is not my intent. In fact, I want to go on record as saying I have great respect for Plantinga's skill as a philosopher. Among other things, I think he succeeded in his attempt to refute Mackie's version of the argument from evil.Perhaps because I have to come hold Plantinga's work to such a high standard, I continue to be surprised whenever I read Plantinga's version of the so-called argument from … [Read more...]

In Defense of an Evidential Argument from Evil: A Reply to William Lane Craig

Abstract: In a popular article about general arguments from evil against the existence of an all-powerful, all-knowing, and perfectly good God, William Lane Craig raises objections to such arguments that are consistent with those he earlier raised against Paul Draper's evidential pain-and-pleasure argument from evil in an oral debate with Draper in 1998. In this article Jeffery Jay Lowder considers whether Craig's points have any force in rebutting Draper's writings on his pain-and-pleasure … [Read more...]

The VICTIMs of Christian Apologetics

My latest video, "The VICTIMs of Christian Apologetics: The Things Apologists Falsely Say Depend on God, But, if God Exists, God Depends on Them," is now available on YouTube. It is a narration of some of the many hundreds of PowerPoint slides I created in preparation for my recent debate with Frank Turek on naturalism vs. theism.This video presentation is a (roughly) 2 hour 30 minute critique of Frank Turek's latest book, Stealing from God: Why Atheists Need God to Make Their Case. T … [Read more...]

An Evidential Argument from Evil: Natural Inequality

I want to quickly sketch an evidential (aka "explanatory" aka "abductive" aka "F-Inductive") argument from evil, one which focuses exclusively on natural inequality.  The argument is not mine; it belongs to Moti Mizrahi.The key point of Mizrahi's argument, which he credits to an insight of John Rawls, is this: ... natural endowments are undeserved.Now, if natural endowments are undeserved, then the fact that one person is more innately endowed than another is arbitrary from a moral point of … [Read more...]

When are Theistic Arguments “God-of-the-Gaps” Arguments?

In a recent post, Victor Reppert asks: Is there any theistic argument [from/in natural theology] that can't be accused of being a god-of-the-gaps argument? Is this an all-purpose reply to all natural theology? My answers are "yes" to the first question and "no" to the second question.I think it would helpful if everyone would agree upon or stipulate what it means for an argument to be a "God-of-the-gaps" argument.Here's my proposal: "God-of-the-gaps" arguments have the following … [Read more...]

An F-Inductive Moral Argument for Theism

Here is an F-inductive argument for theism based on ontologically objective moral values. Note that this argument assumes that such things exist. If you don't think they exist, then you may want to skip reading this post.As usual, let B be our background information; E be the evidence to be explained (in this case, the existence of ontologically objective moral values); T be theism; and N be naturalism. Here is the explanatory argument.1. E is known to be true, i.e., Pr(E) is close to 1. … [Read more...]

A Good F-Inductive Argument for Theism based on Consciousness

I was waiting for someone to bring this up in the combox on my recent post on Swinburne's cosmological argument, but no one did. The argument from consciousness (to theism) is a parallel argument to the cosmological argument against theism.In the cosmological argument against theism, I pointed out that naturalism entails a physical universe whereas theism does not. Since a physical universe exists, it follows that the universe is evidence favoring naturalism over theism.The parallel … [Read more...]

F-Inductive Arguments: A New Type of Inductive Argument

In his extensive writings, the prestigious philosopher Richard Swinburne makes a useful distinction between two types of inductive arguments. Let B be our background information or evidence; E be the evidence to be explained; and H be an explanatory hypothesis.“C-inductive argument”: an argument in which the premisses confirm  or add to the probability of the conclusion, i.e., P(H | E & B) > P(H | B).“P-inductive argument”: an argument in which the premisses make the conclusion pro … [Read more...]