God as a ‘Necessary Being’ – Part 4

Previously, I argued that it is not possible to become eternal. Recall that a person P is eternal if and only if P has always existed and P will always continue to exist. Here is a step-by-step proof showing that it is impossible for a person to become eternal:<------------|-----------|-------------->................t1...........t21. At time t1 person P is NOT eternal AND at a later moment t2 P is eternal. (supposition for indirect proof/reduction to absurdity)2. At time t1 … [Read more...]

God as a ‘Necessary Being’ – Part 3

Richard Swinburne analyzes the concept of 'necessary being' into two implications (COT, p.241-242):1. It is not a matter of fortunate accident that there is a God; he exists necessarily. 2. God is necessarily the kind of being which he is; God does not just happen to have the properties which he does.In his simpler and more popular book on God (Is There a God?), Swinburne clarifies these implications further in terms of the concept of 'essential properties':But theism does not claim … [Read more...]

God as a ‘Necessary Being’ – Part 2

Although there is an extensive discussion of the meaning of the claim 'God is a necessary being' by Richard Swinburne in his bookThe Coherence of Theism (revised edition, hereafter: COT), the main passages that I'm interested in understanding are found in a shorter and more popular book: Is There a God? (hereafter: ITAG), also by Swinburne.In COT, Swinburne specifies two implications of the claim that 'God is a necessary being':However, most theists, and certainly most theologians, have … [Read more...]

God as a ‘Necessary Being’ – Part 1

In his book The Coherence of Theism (Revised edition, hereafter: COT), Swinburne defends the claim that the sentence 'God exists' makes a coherent statement.In Part II of COT, Swinburne defends the coherence of the concept of "a contingent God", which is basically the traditional concept of God minus the attribute of 'necessary being'. In Part III, Swinburne analyzes, clarifies, and defines the attribute 'necessary being', but he concludes that when this attribute is added back into the … [Read more...]

Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 11

If I understand William Craig's third objection to AMR, then he is basically offering an inductive  teleological argument for the existence of God (similar to how Richard Swinburne argues for God)  based on the assumption that there are objective moral values plus the claim that humans and the circumstances in which humans find themselves are such as to allow humans to live morally significant lives (we have free will, are able to grasp moral principles, are able to reason from moral principles t … [Read more...]

Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 10

When I argue against the resurrection of Jesus, I generally take a two-pronged approach. First, I argue that there are various good reasons to doubt the claim that Jesus was alive and walking around on the first Easter Sunday. Second, I make a concession for the sake of argument; I grant the supposition that Jesus was alive and walking around on the first Easter Sunday. Then I point out that this assumption, an assumption that Christian apologists work very hard to try to prove, actually … [Read more...]

Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 9

I have argued previously that Craig's first two objections to AMR are weak at best. The third objection might not be as weak as the previous two. However, the third objection is the most unclear of the three, so if it turns out to be a strong objection, that will be because we help Craig to clearly formulate his third objection.William Craig’s third objection to AMR is given in a single brief paragraph:Third, it is fantastically improbable that just the sort of creatures would emerge f … [Read more...]

Atheistic Moral Realism – Part 8

I am not impressed by Richard Taylor's appeal to etymology as an argument for the claim that all duties and all obligations are 'owed' to some person or persons (see part 7 for my objections to that line of reasoning).However, to be fair to Craig, Taylor's appeal to etymology is not specifically and explicitly quoted by Craig in his essay 'Why I Believe God Exists' (WIAC, p.62-80). Perhaps Craig is aware of the weakness of Taylor's appeal to etymology, and so he avoids quoting such appeals … [Read more...]


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