Besides, my point was simply that people need not understand something in order to declare they believe in it.
Indoctrination, Evangelism, and Free Will
(58 posts) (10 voices)-
Nox, I need convincing of this. I don't think equating the Calvinist doctrine of free will with the Christian doctrine of free will is all that legit... The wiki article you point out on original sin says "This condition has been characterized in many ways, ranging from something as insignificant as a slight deficiency, or a tendency toward sin yet without collective guilt, referred to as a "sin nature," to something as drastic as total depravity or automatic guilt by all humans through collective guilt." Total depravity isn't required for Christianity. This article leaves out not only major US Christian denominations (Baptist, Pentecostal, Methodist, etc.) but (scare quotes!) "non-denominational" churches, which make up the vast majority of the evangelical movement in the US.
I'd love to talk to you guys about my evangelical Christian home schooled childhood, and why I don't feel indoctrinated (and why by most accounts I have developed into a normal, sociable human being who disagrees with his parents quite often). Currently, though, I am having a hard time actually jumping in, because one of your terms isn't defined very well. What, exactly, are you talking about when you talk about indoctrination?
Posted 2 years ago # -
Elemenope
ModeratorWhat, exactly, are you talking about when you talk about indoctrination?
What I would generally characterize as childhood indoctrination involves two necessary elements:
1. The complete or near complete saturation of life with a particular world view, such that most or all questions that would relate to the episteme of the world view are answered for the child through the lens of that view
2. The isolation from exposure to non-caricatured sources of disagreement with that world view, the discouragement (through use of ridicule or punishment) from exploring such sources, and an unwillingness to engage those critiques when they do appear
-----------Clearly, most Christian childhoods wouldn't meet this definition. However, terrifyingly many would. "I have developed into a normal, sociable human being who disagrees with his parents quite often" is usually a pretty big clue that you haven't been (or at least not effectively), especially if your parents don't mind all that much.
Posted 2 years ago # -
Alright, but that isn't what we usually think of when we think of indoctrination, is it? I mean maybe it is, but I think it carries with it some extreme connotation.
My other principle objection is that although you've narrowed down indoctrination a great deal, I don't know that you've eliminated things like State-run public schools, politically motivated parents of any and all stripes, sports fanaticism, etc.
I mean, even TV is a tricky thing here: the fact that Brits find the violence on American TV to be shocking, and that Americans find the nudity (or profanity, if you like) on British TV to be shocking. Not that this is, strictly speaking, an effect of indoctrination; but it does make sense to me that the most universalizable aspect of childhood is a child's tendency to be impressed upon by the outside world. Even worse, these impressions tend to support themselves within society (a nice example for non-theists would be religious belief, but any number of "impressing systems" are self-sufficient within society, impressing successive generations with standards of normality.) At some point, we're gonna have to wonder about how *anyone* who doesn't spend childhood bouncing either from town to town, or better from country to country, can possibly get sources for world-view disagreement that aren't complicit with the rest of those "impression makers." (Yes, this is a terribly old school reading of social ideology.) But really, I think both 1 and 2 happen to children *routinely.* I actually think that 1) having questions predominantly or solely answered from one worldview is *extremely* common, and 2) children are discouraged from looking for disagreement from outside that worldview is probably even more common.
Posted 2 years ago # -
Elemenope
ModeratorI think it carries with it some extreme connotation.
I think it carries a hefty *moral* connotation, and in one's mind eye, a strong moral approbation leads to imagining the process or event itself as more extreme than it actually is.
My other principle objection is that although you've narrowed down indoctrination a great deal, I don't know that you've eliminated things like State-run public schools, politically motivated parents of any and all stripes, sports fanaticism...
I would either argue (in the case of political indoctrination) that it isn't any different, or that (in the case of state run Public schools) that the issue is much broader than indoctrination since the whole society is in on it, in a sense, or that (in the case of sports fanaticism) the episteme is not encompassing enough to qualify as indoctrination; certainly the moral element is mostly missing (i.e. it is hard to argue that it is an objectively bad thing to tell a kid to like one sports team over another).
Posted 2 years ago # -
"any people don't need to know how evolution works or really even what evolution is, they are happy to say merely that scientists think thus and they have assurance from their religious leaders it doesn't conflict (as, from the same cite earlier, just over 70% see no conflict)."
Besides having missed my point, the very fact that even moderate religious followers feel it necessary to correct their scientific views based off of the wisdom of their religious leaders satisfactorily demonstrates my point.
But, you've dragged it away from the main point that religious lunacy poisons the well that even the moderates drink from. In our day and age, it should be 100% of people that believe in evolution, 100% support for equal rights for ALL sexual orientations, and 100% support for a Presidential candidate that was atheist.
Why isn't it? The statistics don't suggest that these issues are split between a small vocal minority and a large, silent majority. Because even moderates drink the same Kool Aid that fundies do.
Posted 2 years ago # -
Elemenope
ModeratorI disagree with your point, because I tend to view the nature of a belief on how it cashes out in effects. In the case of moderates, the woo that they happen to marry in their minds with evolution *has no practical effect*, and so I can't bring myself to care about it. As Jabster pointed out, [evolution] == [evolution + god], the hypothesis is not changed functionally, the predicted results do not differ in any way.
In our day and age, it should be 100% of people that believe in evolution, 100% support for equal rights for ALL sexual orientations, and 100% support for a Presidential candidate that was atheist.
Doesn't that presuppose that you and I are right about those things? Does it follow that in the 10th century everyone in Europe should have been Catholic, that in the 16th century everyone should have believed in phlogiston and ether, that in the 19th our society should have judged a person's future criminal tendency by studying the morphology of their skull? There is no anterior reason why we should believe our moment in history is possessed, in absolute terms, of more truth than any other; such opinions can only be derived by *presuming* that our episteme is superior, that our methods generate truth at a greater rate. Petitio principii, writ large. It should be noted that at their moments, the people who held the opinions I noted above were equally convinced of the superiority of their constructs.
I tend to *believe* it is so, that our science is superior and that its current theories represent real (rather than merely instrumental) progress towards an accurate model of the universe, but I will not begrudge others their doubts.
Posted 2 years ago # -
"I disagree with your point, because I tend to view the nature of a belief on how it cashes out in effects. "
Yeah, because beliefs and actions are completely separable. Nobody ever acts according to their beliefs..
Such as stem cell research being blockaded funding? Such as abstinence only sex education? I could go on and on and on... but since I'm a personal fan of Sam Harris (and Real Time) I invite you to watch this: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z4erANdR9Yw
"Doesn't that presuppose that you and I are right about those things?"
Yes. I'll go out on a limb and say equality is a good thing, and evolution is an observable fact.
There is no anterior reason why we should believe our moment in history is possessed, in absolute terms, of more truth than any other; such opinions can only be derived by *presuming* that our episteme is superior, that our methods generate truth at a greater rate."
Science is A MUCH SUPERIOR episteme than asking the clergy how they think disease should be treated. I don't care how "convinced" people are about their constructs - belief doesn't mean shit to me.
"but I will not begrudge others their doubts."
This doesn't make sense to me. Just earlier in this thread you begrudged someone for taking a swipe at SSRI treatments, calling it "irresponsible". I would say this is a far larger, and far more irresponsible claim to say that the 10th century Europeans had the same market on truth as we do.
Posted 2 years ago # -
Elemenope
ModeratorYeah, because beliefs and actions are completely separable. Nobody ever acts according to their beliefs...
That's the point; moderates tend not to. That's what makes them moderates.
Such as stem cell research being blockaded funding? Such as abstinence only sex education? I could go on and on and on...
No you can't. Stem cell research is backed by a solid majority. Comprehensive sex education is backed by a majority. Your real problem is a structural one, a political system that amplifies the immoderate impulses of one party in a desperate (and ultimately doomed) attempt to remain relevant by playing on dying fears and prejudices. Their extremity is dragging them into irrelevance by pissing off the very moderates who you are convinced are lost because they are filled with woo.
Science is A MUCH SUPERIOR episteme than asking the clergy how they think disease should be treated. I don't care how "convinced" people are about their constructs - belief doesn't mean shit to me.
Way to miss the point. Everyone who has *ever* stood in your shoes making the claims about their episteme that you claim has been wrong. Your conviction (and what you expressed here in this sentence is nothing more that that; putting CAPS on "much superior" kinda underlines my point) is alike in kind and in extent to theirs. Since they have all been wrong, why should I believe you?
Just earlier in this thread you begrudged someone for taking a swipe at SSRI treatments, calling it "irresponsible".
The criticism was within a shared episteme. Both Custador and I share an committed belief in the related processes (and, I assume, the fruits) of science and medicine. *Given* the shared axioms and assumptions, a claim, a criticism, and a response can be made. It is far different a case than what we are talking about, the challenging of the foundations of the episteme itself. If you like I can rock the philosophy of science till one of us bursts a vessel, but in the end the argument comes down to the simple fact that "to say that the 10th century Europeans had the same market on truth as we do" rests on more firm epistemological ground than the contrary claim. You will note that I excluded instrumental arguments; those are the *only* ones that trend in the other direction, and they at best buy you ground only within the pragmatic theory of truth. Not, I think, where you want to go if you really want to assert the contrary claim.
Posted 2 years ago # -
"That's the point; moderates tend not to. That's what makes them moderates"
Please, please, please... watch the Sam Harris video.
"Stem cell research is backed by a solid majority."
51% is a solid majority? We have different definitions of the term. But, if you can't see that beliefs and actions are inevitably linked, then I'm going to have to let bygones be bygones.
http://www.pewforum.org/Science-and-Bioethics/Declining-Majority-of-Americans-Favor-Embryonic-Stem-Cell-Research.aspx"Way to miss the point."
Not getting the point and thinking the point is post-modern bullshit are two different things. A 10th century European does not have the same market on truth as we do. Science may not be perfect, but it's much better than anything that previously stood in its place.
"Everyone who has *ever* stood in your shoes making the claims about their episteme that you claim has been wrong. "
That's not true. The thinkers who have previously heralded science as our best path of gathering truth were correct.
"If you like I can rock the philosophy of science till one of us bursts a vessel, but in the end the argument comes down to the simple fact that "to say that the 10th century Europeans had the same market on truth as we do" rests on more firm epistemological ground than the contrary claim. "
Aristotle's physics and the physics we know today are not equal. The physics we have today is far more in accordance with reality than Aristotle's were. Likewise, wanting to put cow shit on a battle wound in 10th century Europe versus cleaning and sewing the wound are not equal treatments.
Posted 2 years ago # -
Elemenope
ModeratorPlease, please, please... watch the Sam Harris video.
I had, a while ago. Here is the discussion that followed. It covers similar ground to what we are covering now, certainly better than rehashing it all.
51% is a solid majority? We have different definitions of the term.
Yes, we do. I'd consider the question in terms of trends, since belief on moral issues doesn't change sustainably except in line with long-term social trends. Sensationalism and clever poll construction always overwhelms longitudinal analysis in the short term, but in the final analysis, to put it crudely, people want cripples to be healed and they don't care how.
Aristotle's physics and the physics we know today are not equal. The physics we have today is far more in accordance with reality than Aristotle's were.
Sure, given that our theories of observation are correct. Good luck proving that to be so.
Likewise, wanting to put cow shit on a battle wound in 10th century Europe versus cleaning and sewing the wound are not equal treatments.
Ooh, a functionalistic argument which only shows that we have happened upon a more effective method. Try again.
Posted 2 years ago # -
"It covers similar ground to what we are covering now, certainly better than rehashing it all."
Harris clearly illustrated how someone who, by your own terms, is a poster-boy for moderate religion. He doesn't critique Collins for not doing proper work, but says that the scope of science will always be limited if people like Collins are the ones guiding it. As he notes in the interview, Collins thinks that morality comes from God and has no natural origins. What does he base it off of? His personal faith.
Woohoo for science!
"but in the final analysis, to put it crudely, people want cripples to be healed and they don't care how."
I just showed you that half the population cares very strongly that cripples will not be healed using stem cell research.
"Sure, given that our theories of observation are correct. Good luck proving that to be so."
Our physics work. Aristotle's doesn't. It's very simple.
"Ooh, a functionalistic argument which only shows that we have happened upon a more effective method. "
It's more effective because it more accurately represents reality, which also means it is closer to the truth. The only way you can judge an epistemological frame is by results.
Posted 2 years ago # -
Elemenope
Moderator...but says that the scope of science will always be limited if people like Collins are the ones guiding it.
As I pointed out (repeatedly) in that thread, Harris doesn't have the proper ground to make that assumption. It does not follow that because Collins believes that morality has a supernatural basis that therefore he and other scientists will hesitate to probe the etiology of morality scientifically. Scientists design experiments with the null hypothesis being their own prior beliefs *all the time*.
I just showed you that half the population cares very strongly that cripples will not be healed using stem cell research.
Did you even read your own link? All you showed was that 35% *cared enough to say no*, (51% said yes, 14% said 'don't know'), and notably does not measure the intensity of the assertion. Banning flag-burning consistently polls at 65-70%, and yet when it comes down to the actual issue mattering, nobody cares; when you measure the *intensity* of the belief, nearly nobody is willing to change their vote over it. A 51-35 split is, in the business, known as strong support, and the high degree of 'don't knows' indicates that the belief is *very soft*, much like flag-burning. In general, the less abstract, more visceral, easier to understand side in soft beliefs wins, and cripples walking beats two-week-old blastocytes there every time. Further down in the link (the clincher, if you will), another survey showed that the percentage of people who support stem-cell research increases linearly with knowledge of stem-cell research (a knowledge-response curve that you don't see with issues like abortion), which lends credence to my 'if they know it'll heal cripples' theory.
It's more effective because it more accurately represents reality, which also means it is closer to the truth.
Er, no. That's the unjustified assumption. It's more effective because it's more effective. Its effectiveness has no necessary correlation to a correspondence of actual facts. The miasma theory of disease led to the practice of patients being segregated from one another and underwrote reforms in sanitation, which caused better outcomes because of a reduction in iatrogenic illness; does it then follow that the miasma theory of disease has a better correspondence with the actual facts of the matter than a prior theory (like, say, the imbalanced humour theory of disease)? I doubt it, and even trying to analyze such a claim runs headlong into problems of the general incommensurability of claims between any such two theories.
The only way you can judge an epistemological frame is by results.
That's definitely not true. Otherwise, you commit yourself to preferring an epistemological frame that produces wonderful results for entirely incorrect reasons. Unless we are naive pragmatists, we don't believe that truth == "what works", and certainly from an epistemological tack that is an equivalence to be avoided. It is especially true in science, since a new paradigm is generally not as immediately fruitful as the old, dominant one. There is no decisive moment in the life-cycle of a research programme in which we can say "well, now we have produced more consistent results with less anomalies than the prior theory, so it must be true", but rather only something that can be observed in hindsight. The process by which a programme becomes better able to handle anomalies is through auxiliary hypotheses, and so the rules governing them are particularly of interest.
This is why so much attention is paid in the philosophy of science to method, theories of observation, the dynamics of constructing null hypotheses and the formation of auxiliary hypotheses; it is thought nearly universally (I will exclude Feyerabend here, for the moment), that the process is at least as important as the result for judging the robustness of an epistemological frame. How the conclusion is reached, and what tools are used, are right up there with result in determining our confidence in the alethic quantity of one practice over another. If we did not, we would always discard the new, unproven theory in favor of the old, established one.
Posted 2 years ago # -
LMNOP did you edit your post later or something? I could have sworn the first time I looked back at this thread only the first paragraph was there! Anyways...
"It does not follow that because Collins believes that morality has a supernatural basis that therefore he and other scientists will hesitate to probe the etiology of morality scientifically. "
Not only does it follow logically, but it's actually demonstrable. In his Language of God, Collins makes it very clear that he views science is the highest form of worship towards God, and that this is his own aim within science. He has also repeatedly made it very clear that he feels morality is instilled in us via God, and has repeatedly dismissed Harris' own work within a science of morality. This is not to mention his contributions to the BioLogos foundation which essentially is a Christian propaganda machine which tries to intersect faith and science, which has absolutely no business in what must be, by definition, a secular pursuit. This is only the tip of the iceberg, and there is much more to draw from that I didn't even mention with regard to his book The Language of God.
So, not only has he already hesitated to probe morality from a scientific perspective, but he's funded programs that dismiss the notion almost entirely.
" Its effectiveness has no necessary correlation to a correspondence of actual facts. "
This is a key source of our disagreement. To actually support this argument you must believe one of two possibilities:
1) There are no "actual facts"
2) Our theories about the actual facts have no real way of coinciding with the actual facts
If you believe (1) then I am afraid I have wasted my time completely. By principle, I try never to engage in discussions with people who dismiss a physical reality. I don't think you'd be on this forum if that is the case, however. If you believe (2) then I'd like to see that claim substantiated. If there is an actual reality, it must be of a certain nature and certain theories about that nature must be more accurate than others.
"does it then follow that the miasma theory of disease has a better correspondence with the actual facts of the matter than a prior theory (like, say, the imbalanced humour theory of disease)?"
It has a better correspondence with a certain set of facts, namely the spread of diseases. Was it completely accurate? Obviously not. But it is closer to the nature of how diseases are spread than other theories.
"that the process is at least as important as the result for judging the robustness of an epistemological frame."
The process is only valuable if it leads to accurate results. By saying an epistemological framework can only be judged by its results, I was making the claim that science is only valuable because we have seen it produce results. I don't pretend to think that scientific inquiry is meticulously designed to procure pragmatic data, but I was making the claim that science works because it gives us useful information. If it didn't, science would be useless.
"For whatever little it's worth: NewStoic, I agree with LMNOP."
Do you also believe that 10th century European medicine is on an equal footing in regard to physical reality as our current understanding?
Posted 2 years ago # -
Elemenope
ModeratorSo, not only has he already hesitated to probe morality from a scientific perspective, but he's funded programs that dismiss the notion almost entirely.
This claim is a new one to me; I'd like to learn more, if you have a linkee.
This is a key source of our disagreement. To actually support this argument you must believe one of two possibilities:
1) There are no "actual facts"
2) Our theories about the actual facts have no real way of coinciding with the actual facts
Or 3) There is no necessary connection between usefulness and truth
This is the real crux of the disagreement. I do think there are actual facts, and I do think in principle it should be possible to construct a theory coincident with those facts. The problem is the evidence that we can use to see if the theory is coincident with the facts is completely corrupted by our epistemologically impoverished position. What I am attacking, here, in particular, is your proposition that we can tell that there is some correspondence to facts by looking at outcomes.
Your argument repeatedly interchanges these two qualities, and makes one evidence for the other. When you say: "I was making the claim that science works because it gives us useful information. If it didn't, science would be useless.", this elision of distinction is in full force. I would say, rather, that science gives us useful information, which is why it is not useless. It has *instrumental* value, it works in the sense of having valuable-to-humans outputs. This is why humans engage in it. This does not in any way mean that there is corresponding alethic value, that because science produces more useful tools and methods that it is therefore accessing facts of the matter, that it is approximating truth.
[re: Miasma]It has a better correspondence with a certain set of facts, namely the spread of diseases.
I chose this example for a good reason. The spread of disease is a phenomenon demanding explanation from any theory of disease. The miasma theory of disease's mechanism of explanation for that phenomenon is *entirely wrong* (at least, according to our current understanding), and yet it has instrumentally better results. It is no more correct in explaining why diseases pass from one person to another than the humour theory of disease, but it produced a better result (it was instrumentally efficacious) *despite being entirely wrong* about the facts of the matter. Are you really arguing that the miasma theory of disease is alethically superior to the humour theory of disease because it supplies an entirely incorrect answer to the question of why diseases spread that happens to have the happy accidental side-effect of actually working to stop the spread of disease?
-----------------------LMNOP did you edit your post later or something? I could have sworn the first time I looked back at this thread only the first paragraph was there!
Yep. I addressed the politics and public opinion stuff while I was at work, and then posted, then went back later to address the philosophy of science stuff when I had down-time at home.
Posted 2 years ago # -
"This claim is a new one to me; I'd like to learn more, if you have a linkee."
The mindset that people go to defend so-called moderates has always puzzled me. The invisible separation between beliefs/actions has always been puzzling to me, as if the declaration of belief in the Bible has no bearing on their actions in the public realm. But, I don't really want to beat a dead horse so if after reading a little about that foundation you still aren't convinced even moderates drink from the lunatic well, we can just agree to disagree.
"This does not in any way mean that there is corresponding alethic value, that because science produces more useful tools and methods that it is therefore accessing facts of the matter, that it is approximating truth."
So why is the theory of spreading disease today more useful than miasma if there is no relation to an actual set of facts? In my estimation, it is more useful because we more accurately understand where disease comes from, how we can avoid disease, and other sanitation protocol.
I fail to understand how effectiveness does not necessarily derive from a better understanding. This doesn't mean effectiveness can't happen by random chance, but the difference in effectiveness from a 10th century understanding until now is markedly disproportionate to be explained by random chance.
"Are you really arguing that the miasma theory of disease is alethically superior to the humour theory of disease because it supplies an entirely incorrect answer to the question of why diseases spread that happens to have the happy accidental side-effect of actually working to stop the spread of disease?"
I admittedly don't know anything about miasma but after a brief reading on our best friend Wiki, I can see that what miasma did was draw attention to the effects of poor sanitation. In this way, it was better at explaining the spread of disease than the humour theory of disease because it supplied a (relatively) better description of how disease is spread. Germ theory, of course, corresponded better to reality and therefore has had even better effectiveness.
In respect to how diseases spread, the miasma theory is in closer accordance with the facts (or "alethically superior".. you love obscure diction). In the humour theory of disease, disease is simply an excess or deficit of one of the four humours. It has absolutely nothing to do with the outside environment. Miasma, even though completely wrong about the specifics, at least recognized that disease could result from outside presences and therefore increased desire to create a sanitation standard.
Posted 2 years ago # -
**** The length people go to defend the mindset of moderates is what I meant to say. I shouldn't write on this forum after classes, my brain is dead enough.
Posted 2 years ago # -
Elemenope
ModeratorI shouldn't write on this forum after classes, my brain is dead enough.
LOL. I remember that feeling. I probably won't get to an in depth response tonight, but perhaps tomorrow (though a good friend of mine is coming around due to being in town for Thanksgiving, so I might be too drunk tomorrow to make a good showing. :)
Posted 2 years ago # -
LMNOP, may I ask how old you are ? I remember you said you studied Poli Sci/Philosophy, do you use the degrees or? If that's TMI feel free to ignore, I just like to get a feeling for who I am talking to.
Posted 2 years ago # -
Yeah, no kidding! Damn, I thought you were like a policy maker or something... it's a shame you can't trade places with one of the many dumb asses that run things.
Posted 2 years ago # -
Ty
ModeratorHey, Hotel receptionist is not a terrible gig. Better than breaking rocks at a quarry. I travel a lot, and I always go out of my way to be nice to the desk staff. If the people at the desk like you, there is literally nothing you can't get out of the hotel. And if the desk people hate you, they can truly make your stay miserable. "You're an asshat, therefore you get the room that sits in the magic triangle between the elevator, the ice machine, and the partying teenagers just back from prom."
It is another data point in my theory that I am composed entirely of luck molecules that I got a totally recession-proof job just seconds before the economy rolled over and died. My old consulting firm is struggling to survive right now. I could still be there taking pay cuts and pounding the streets sixteen hours a day for business. Ugh.
Posted 2 years ago # -
Elemenope
ModeratorIt's a good gig (heck, I'm thankful to be employed at all in this economy; my state's rocking an 11.5% unemployment rate), except when you have to work Thanksgiving evening. Grr.
At least I was able to steal an hour earlier in the day to hang out with the family and get turkey.
Posted 2 years ago # -
Ty
ModeratorYeah, that is the downside to service industry jobs. Sometimes the hours can suck.
But go you, having gainful employment when so many do not. At least half of my circle of friends are either working outside their area of expertise just to have a job, or are completely unemployed right now.
Posted 2 years ago #
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