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My studies of Buddhism<\/a> have always been with a philosophical bent<\/strong>. My first academic conference paper was titled, \u201cThe Use and Abuse of Ontology in Buddhist Philosophy<\/a> of Mind,\u201d trying to trace the history of how Buddhists have understood the connection between mind and body, and how Westerners have labeled those understandings. I think I covered everything from the Pali texts to Merleau-Ponty and John Searle. It was a mess, but a fun one.<\/p>\n More recently I\u2019ve looked at the categories Westerners have applied to Buddhism in the West (Three Buddhisms, Two Buddhisms, One Buddhism?<\/a>) as well as the ways that we might come to better understand Buddhist ethics<\/a> specifically. Categories, those created by Buddhists and by scholars<\/a>, have always been on my mind.<\/p>\n This week, the blog for Oxford University Press posted an article called \u201cBuddhism or Buddhisms? Rhetorical consequences of geo-political categories<\/a>\u201d by Dr. Richard Payne<\/a>,\u00a0the Dean of the Institute of Buddhist Studies at the Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley.<\/p>\n The argument in the article is simple enough: discussing categories of Buddhism based on country or regional names can obscure the realities of how Buddhism is actually understood and practiced in those areas<\/strong>. For example, in discussing Tibetan vs Chinese Buddhism, we may begin to think that:<\/p>\n Of course both of these are false<\/strong>. In my experience this isn\u2019t really a problem<\/em>, except perhaps with some practitioners or overly biased scholarly enthusiasts. Every scholar I have studied with knows that these are false, but is still happy to use the categories.<\/p>\n But Dr. Payne, and I know there are others out there, do see a problem. So lets get to the arguments<\/strong>.<\/p>\n ~<\/p>\n The article begins [in block quote with my responses to the side]:<\/p>\n The categorization of Buddhism along geo-political lines is perhaps the most common organizing principle today.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n True.<\/p>\n It also tends to be accepted uncritically.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n By whom? Be careful here. As I would tell a student, whenever you accuse someone of being \u201cuncritical\u201d you\u2019d better have evidence. As I mentioned, I have experienced some practitioners\/enthusiasts taking these (and other) categories uncritically, but scholars, especially those who focus in these areas, are well aware of the complexities involved.<\/p>\n Thus we find, without explanation, such expressions as \u201cIndian Buddhism,\u201d \u201cTibetan Buddhism,\u201d \u201cChinese Buddhism,\u201d \u201cBurmese Buddhism,\u201d and so on.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n We may find this, but the expressions themselves are not a problem<\/strong> (as I\u2019ll explain).<\/p>\n He goes on to explain that these categories are used all over, that this is a problem, and that we need to reevaluate the categories. He says he\u2019ll discuss 5 problems with the\u00a0rhetorical <\/em>use of\u00a0geo-political categories (lexical use will be covered next week). These five problems, using \u201cChinese Buddhism\u201d as an example are:<\/p>\n That\u2019s a lot to dissect, and he does give examples for #4 and #5, which I\u2019ll discuss as I go. But for now:<\/p>\n Payne cites D.T. Suzuki\u2019s polemic against non-Chinese Buddhism. Similar polemics exist for every nation\/region as far as I know, as Buddhists throughout history have been obsessed with having\/practicing \u201cthe right one.\u201d As long as I have been studying Buddhism, I have been told to treat all such polemics with caution.<\/p><\/li>\n I haven\u2019t given any knock-down counter arguments, mostly because I\u2019m not convinced that there is a case to be argued against (in terms of scholarship at least; again, in terms of popular misunderstandings, I generally agree with Dr. Payne).<\/p>\n The article continues with a proposed counter-argument and a defense against it; and again without instances, I can\u2019t help but wonder if it\u2019s a kind of straw man. He writes, \u201cThe counter-argument may be made that nationalistic forms of Buddhism do exist, and that they have played an important historical function in creating Buddhism as it is known today.\u201d So now the discussion is of \u201cnationalistic forms of Buddhism\u201d \u2013 not just the categories based on contemporary countries<\/strong>.<\/p>\n That\u2019s a very different thing, it would seem. However, one might also say that to some extent, our categories (thinking again of Tibetan Buddhism) do reflect some degree of historically-moulded nationalism. \u00a0Having spent some time in Burma and Thailand, I\u2019ve seen nationalism in major forms of contemporary Buddhism there as well. Some of that is quite recent while some of it goes quite far back. I wouldn\u2019t go so far as to say that \u201cthey have played\u00a0\u00a0an important historical function in creating Buddhism as it is known today\u201d but I would say that, often, the form of Buddhism that was successful in a region was the form that was able to play politics the best.<\/p>\n He concludes that \u201cfor this argument to be effective, a majority of Buddhist institutions would have to place a doctrinal emphasis on nationalistic concerns for the category system to be justified.\u201d Again, not necessarily. Instead of a doctrinal emphasis, we might say that they had to have a clear geo-political awareness.<\/strong> I\u2019m thinking here of the Tibetan aliances (first Sakya, then Geluk) with Mongolia\u2019s power, both to solidify religious power within Tibet (over other forms of practice) as well as to protect against other outside (Chinese) influence. Surely this kind of religio-political confluence occured elsewhere.<\/p>\n Further, he argues that \u201cThe proposed counter-argument also suffers from the historically anachronistic projection of the modern social, political, and ideological institution of the nation-state back onto earlier historical eras.\u201d Maybe. But again from my own experience this isn\u2019t the case. Tibet may be an easier case because even in the 1950s it barely had what might be considered a \u201cmodern social, political, and ideological institution of the nation-state.\u201d<\/p>\n And even in my Buddhism 101 class, we began by learning that the India in which the Buddha was born was nothing like it is today. It\u2019s clear (at least it always was to me) that when we talk about India 2500 years ago, we\u2019re talking about a geographic entity, NOT a geo-political nation state<\/em>. If this were really a problem, Michael Wood\u2019s (excellent) \u201cThe Story of India<\/a>\u201d would have to be renamed, \u201cThe Story of [insert myriad names for places and regions of modern-day India and surrounding areas].\u201d Dr. Payne suggests that:<\/p>\n One of the\u00a0legitimating\u00a0rhetorics of the modern nation-state is continuity with historically pre-existing forms, no matter how tenuous that continuity may be. (Consider the claim of the last Shah of Iran, Mohammad Rez\u0101 Sh\u0101h Pahlav\u012b: that he was heir to a continuous monarchy dating back 2,500 years to Cyrus the Great.) Religion has often been employed as part of that rhetoric of continuity.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Yes. Exactly. For some reason I think this hurts his point about scholarly imposition of an historically anachronistic projection\u2026<\/strong> In fact he could point instead to the 5th Dalai Lama, who claimed to be an incarnation of Avalokiteshvara, directly tying himself to the foundation myth of the Tibetan people. There, religion, politics, and legitimating rhetoric became one.<\/p>\n He continues:<\/p>\n Stepping through the veils of geo-political categories, one might well ask in what sense is the present-day\u00a0People\u2019s Republic of China<\/a>\u00a0continuous with the Tang Dynasty? More specifically, in what sense are contemporary Buddhist institutions in China continuous with those of the Tang?\u00a0Does it make sense to employ a single category, \u201cChinese Buddhism,\u201d\u00a0as if\u00a0it applied equally appropriately across all of Chinese history? The impression that a single, unified institution is the norm requires explanation.\u00a0This is not, of course, to say that there are not continuities, but rather that those should be demonstrated, rather than simply presumed because of a system of categories that molds our ways of thinking.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Okay, let\u2019s take a look at language. Think of a tree. No not that tree, another tree. No, not that one either. Did you think of three different trees? \u00a0(need help? click here<\/a>)<\/p>\n How were they related? They were all \u201ctrees\u201d in your mind. But what is \u201ctree\u201d? It\u2019s a category<\/strong>. It doesn\u2019t actually correspond to any particular thing in the world. Trippy, huh? In the world, there is just \u201cthis particular tree\u201d and \u201cthis particular tree.\u201d<\/p>\n Now look at this guy:<\/p>\n and this guy:<\/p>\n And look in the mirror.<\/p>\n [ you ]<\/p>\n In what sense are these continuous?<\/strong><\/p>\n Does the category \u201cprimate<\/a>\u201d really make sense? Sure does.<\/strong><\/p>\n But then<\/em> we should go on to make further distinctions. Even though the loris and you might be incredibly different today, common roots (that\u00a0have been<\/em> demonstrated) allow us to lump you both under this category: primate. Similarly with Tibetan [or, I imagine, Chinese] Buddhism, the continuities (as well as myriad external influences and historical contingencies) have been demonstrated by many scholars<\/strong>.<\/p>\n This is both common sense and<\/em> good scholarship. Of course common sense might not be so common, and a lot of scholarship isn\u2019t good<\/strong>, so I agree with Payne\u2019s suggestion that we always reevaluate our categories. But unless something convincinglybetter\u00a0comes along to replace them, they should stand and do the work that they\u2019ve done for so long. Perhaps further sequencing of the human genome will prove that we\u2019re all decendants of an alien race and completely unrelated to gorillas and lorises. Probably not. For now, we\u2019re primates, just like them.<\/p>\n And the Chinese Buddhism I experienced in China a few years ago is Chinese Buddhism just like the\u00a0Chinese Buddhism that\u00a0Kum\u0101raj\u012bva<\/a> experienced in China 1600 years ago. Of course it is\u00a0different<\/em> \u2013 only a fool would ask where the Maoists kept their tanks in 365 C.E. or some other historically anachronistic question. (Okay, maybe fool is too strong a word, as we could be dealing with people with no historical awareness whatsoever, but still, the category \u201cChinese Buddhism\u201d isn\u2019t the problem here<\/strong>.) Just as we create taxonomies of animals, we create taxonomies of Buddhism and other -isms. Sometimes we\u2019re wrong: some early Westerners thought Tibetan Buddhism was just Catholicism which had been contorted\u2026 by the devil.<\/p>\n Within those taxonomies, we can further hone our understanding through discoveries such as the Dunhuang cave manuscripts<\/a>\u00a0that reshape our understanding of Tibetan and Chinese Buddhism or the DNA links that tie modern humans and Neanderthals (we interbred<\/a> \u2014 or didn\u2019t<\/a>).<\/p>\n The article concludes:<\/p>\n Academics are sometimes accused of simply following fashionable trends of thought.\u00a0Thus, critical concepts such as \u201cessentializing\u201d and \u201chegemony,\u201d might negligently be dismissed as merely shallow thinking. However, essentializing rhetorics, in this case geo-political ones, mold the field of Buddhist studies in profound ways and shouldn\u2019t be employed uncritically. It is through critical self-reflection on the established field that new research and insights become possible.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n I agree that critical self-reflection is always needed.<\/strong> But it can become navel-gazing if there is nothing concrete to be gained. I\u2019m not sure how many physicists, for instance, are worrying, \u201cshould we really call them neutrinos? Won\u2019t that confuse people?\u201d Or \u201ccan we really call it an atom any more, now that we know it\u2019s divisible?\u201d (Atom is from the Greek\u00a0atomos<\/em>, \u201cindivisible.\u201d)<\/p>\n I sat in on a graduate class not long ago in which a student asked at the beginning, \u201ccan we talk like humans and leave crap like \u2018hegemony\u2019 and \u2018refication\u2019 out of the conversation?\u201d The instructor shrugged, asked if there were objections, and said yes. There is a certain level of discourse at which this jargon might become helpful, but that level is generally well beyond the hegemonic reach of the blogosphere. And \u201cessentializing\u201d is as old as Aristotle or the Upanishads.<\/p>\n People do it.<\/p>\n It\u2019s generally wrong.<\/p>\n Some categories have come down that are clearly wrong. \u201cHinayana,\u201d when used to denote any non-Mahayana Buddhist tradition, was onced used (and surely still is at times). \u201cLamaism\u201d is another one. Plenty of other terms have been SHOWN to be offensive or inaccurate and clearly REPLACED with new ones. If this is what is needed regarding our regional designations today, lets find those new ones.<\/p>\n\n
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