One thing that I\u2019ve been discussing with a friend here is the issue of selfhood in Buddhism, which famously seems to reject that there is a \u2018self\u2019 (atta <\/span>in Pali, atman <\/span>in Sanskrit). To say that it is an incredibly dicey subject would be an enormous understatement. It has been at the heart of a huge amount of discussion in both Eastern and Western philosophy, and is by no means clearly answered anywhere.<\/p>\n I\u2019ll amend this post with some introductory reading on the topic \u2013 but for now I\u2019ll just toss you into my most recent thoughts on the issue:<\/p>\n My friend tells me: \u201cYour comments vis-a-vis personhood immediately brought to mind Hume, and I would challenge them up and down all the way (e.g., ***WHAT*** wants to cling to some definiteness, and ***based on what IT REALLY IS, HOW does it do so and WHY does it do so??????).<\/span>\u201c<\/p>\n And my reply:<\/p>\n The simplest example I\u2019ve heard to illustrate this is the janitor\u2019s mop. A janitor one day said something like, \u201cI\u2019ve had this mop for over 20 years.\u201d His hearer, in awe, replied, \u201cHow could you make a mop last 20 years?!\u201d The janitor replied, \u201cWell, one year I replace the head, and the next year I replace the handle, then the head, then the handle, and so on.\u201d<\/p>\n This simple old mop is nothing more than a head and a handle. It is held together by its form, a bond which breaks down over time just as its parts do.<\/p>\n I think Hume uses the example of a ship, asking if we replace one plank on it, \u201cis it the SAME ship? How about if we dry-dock it and replace every piece of wood and iron? Same ship?\u201d<\/p>\n People are more complicated. Beyond mere physicality are all the mental constituents, but, under analysis, we tend to find that they, like the mop and handle, are coming, staying for a while, and then being replaced. We never find a \u2018substance\/self\u2019 controling the whole thing which itself is beyond this process. There is no \u2018mopness\u2019 in the mop, above and beyond the two peices, which has remained intact over the 20 years. This raises the question of \u2018what IT REALLY IS\u2019. I think the answer is that what it really is is underdetermined by its mere physicality. It requires *our* interpretation, our label \u2013 what it is is what it is *for us* (starting to sound like Hegel\u2026).<\/p>\n The same goes for people. Who or what we are is underdetermined, even including our mental sides. The problem may be that we are caught up by our language, with the subject\/predicate break. We think that the subject must refer to some \u2018thing\u2019. I think this is part of Wittgenstein\u2019s work \u2013 but I think also that Hume rejected this. The example that comes to mind is, \u201cit is raining.\u201d The \u2018it\u2019 is just a kind of posturing\/pointing, but refers to no definite entity when we examine it. It is a true proposition only *for us* when water is coming from above. The same goes for language used in describing people, including ourselves.<\/p>\n \u2018How\u2019 things come together and are clung to is a good question. And in my mind there are many suitable explanations, from something strictly naturalistic: survival and the rise of mental states and language, to something more privileging the mental: a more \u2018original\u2019 mental clinging to perceptions and later concepts, which, due to their changing nature, led to dissatisfaction and new and ever more sophisticated concepts to be clung to. But, like most \u2018hows\u2019 (how to build a table, how to fix the car), different explanations may not be exclusively True.<\/p>\n \u2018Why\u2019 is another one open to multiple explanations. For me it is either 1) the wrong kind of question to ask (like the man struck by the poisoned arrow), or 2) a question which is best satisfied with a mytho-poetic fable. The problem with the latter answer is that, as a fable, it is meant to point beyond itself as a guide to life but it is easily clung to as an (exclusive) account of Truth.<\/p>\n Below are a couple comparative philosophy papers that get into Western\/Buddhist theories of self if you\u2019re interested digging deeper. In the first the author starts with Hume, proposes limitations to Hume\u2019s thought, and introduces Buddhism to overcome those limitations. The second I haven\u2019t read, but it\u2019s by a reputable philosopher (he just published a book on the topic called \u2018Empty Persons\u2019).<\/p>\n (1993) THE NO-SELF THEORY: HUME, BUDDHISM, AND PERSONAL IDENTITY<\/a><\/p>\n
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