A Reply to Armstrong on the Ontological Argument<\/span>\nI\u2019m a regular reader of your excellent website; I find your writings on apologetics to be, as a rule, very well done. I have learned a lot from them myself, and I have recommended your work to many other people.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\nThanks very much for your kind words, and the plugs! I appreciate it.<\/p>\n
For some reason, I hadn\u2019t read your work in philosophical theology until recently, though, and when I read your discussion of the ontological argument (henceforth, \u201cOA\u201d), I discovered some weaknesses that I wanted to bring to your attention.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\nCool! I hope to learn a lot from you. This is the subject to do that, because it has traditionally not been one of my favorite theistic arguments. I\u2019m very fond of the cosmological, teleological and moral arguments.<\/p>\n
It seems to me that the most important oversight in your treatment of the OA is that you don\u2019t take cognizance of the fact that arguments are powerful: they can teach you new things, but they can also make you stupider.<\/span><\/p>\nInteresting way to put it. I shall like to see how you \u201cunpack\u201d this.<\/p>\n
It\u2019s pretty obvious how an argument can teach you something. So leave that aside. Here\u2019s how an argument can make you stupider. You look at the premises, and find that you believe them all to be true: indeed, you would (for the moment) claim that you know them to be true. You look at the argument\u2019s structure, and find that it is deductively valid. But now you think really hard about the conclusion and find that you are unwilling to believe it. You reject the conclusion. But you\u2019re not an illogical person: you recognize that the argument is valid, so you grant that if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. Since you grant that the argument is valid, but you deny that the conclusion is true, you must reject one of the premises, even though initially you believed them all. So you pick the one(s) to go, and you now believe less than you started out believing.<\/span><\/p>\nThere are lots of unproven or inadequately established premises of arguments. I can readily see that. In fact, I would say that the self-evident nature of premises is perhaps the most difficult part of the process of logical argumentation.<\/p>\n
Well, what if you\u2019re wrong in your denial of the conclusion? What if the conclusion is true, and what if the premise you have now come to reject is also true? In that case, you started out the process knowing more than you ended up knowing. You started out with a piece of knowledge that you now have lost.<\/span><\/p>\nHow to\u00a0get<\/i>\u00a0to any knowledge\u00a0in the first place\u00a0<\/i>is the fascinating thing. I love that intersection between logic and epistemology.<\/p>\n
Now, let\u2019s bring that point to bear on the OA. We will cover a lot of ground on this point, but remember that in the long run, we\u2019re going to be coming back to whether the OA can make you stupider.<\/span><\/p>\nBefore we get into that, I would say that the\u00a0last<\/i>\u00a0thing I would ever say about OA is that it makes one \u201cstupider.\u201d One is enriched by even following the logical steps involved. It\u2019s a real brain teaser. Even if it doesn\u2019t totally succeed (and I agree with Alvin Plantinga that it ultimately doesn\u2019t, in terms of proving God\u2019s existence \u2014 I don\u2019t think\u00a0any<\/i>\u00a0one argument does that), it is good and fun to ponder he logic involved and the deeper implications of it. That\u2019s what I got, anyway, out of studying it what little I did, in putting together my paper.<\/p>\n
Take a nice simple version of the argument. The complicated one you discuss in your paper doesn\u2019t actually say anything more than is said in the following:<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n1. God is possible.
\n2. Therefore, God exists.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
I suppose so. But there are many logically sound steps in-between these which make OA a far more serious philosophical argument than this simplistic presentation would suggest at first glance (wouldn\u2019t you agree?).<\/p>\n
Let\u2019s interpret the first premise carefully, since there\u2019s a lot packed in there. Let\u2019s start with the meaning of \u201cpossible.\u201d There is some controversy about the best way to approach this issue. Putting it very roughly: some people think that an object is possible because it exists in at least one possible world. (I will usually refer to \u201cpossible worlds\u201d as p-worlds, for short.) Others think that an object exists in at least one p-world because it is possible. I believe the latter\u2014I am a non-reductivist about modality (as is Plantinga).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\nThe relationship between \u201cexistence\u201d and \u201cpossibility\u201d in both these scenarios is unclear to me. In my philosophical naivete, and in layman\u2019s terms, I would say that something is possible if it is rationally conceivable without an immediate contradiction or absurdity resulting (or not logically\u00a0im<\/i>possible). In other words, if it is intelligibly thinkable and not contrary to logic itself. Whether it in fact\u00a0exists<\/i>\u00a0is (in my thinking) a separate question. I doubt that I used the right terms, but if you understand what I mean by this, is it a decent, defensible opinion to have?<\/p>\n
This dispute between the non-reductivists and their foes, the (you guessed it) reductivists, is not relevant to our discussion here. I mention it only to note that the dispute exists. For our purposes, we need to take note of the following: whatever the order of explanation, if an object possibly exists, then it exists in at least one possible world. To say that \u201cX is possible\u201d is to say, then, that \u201cX exists in at least one p-world.\u201d\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\nAgain, I am reluctant to link the word \u201cexist\u201d with \u201cpossible.\u201d For me (again, in layman\u2019s terms), existence is tied up with actuality, not mere possibility.<\/p>\n
(As an aside\u2014you wrote that Plantinga asked the atheist to grant only that God is possible in some p-world. That\u2019s not right. To say that God is possible is to say that God exists in some p-world. But p-worlds are not actual; they\u2019re just possible. That\u2019s why they\u2019re called p-worlds. So Plantinga is still not asking the atheist to grant that God actually exists anywhere.)<\/span><\/p>\nYes, I understand that. I would prefer to say that \u201cGod possibly exists in actuality\u201d rather than \u201cGod exists is p-world 473.\u201d I always want to tie such speculation in with actuality.<\/p>\n
Here we must make a vital distinction between metaphysical and epistemic possibility. I might ask you \u201cis there life in outer space?\u201d And you might answer, \u201cI don\u2019t know: it\u2019s possible.\u201d That answer is not about metaphysical possibility. You are not saying \u201cthere is some possible world where there is life in outer space.\u201d What you are saying, rather, is \u201cFor all I know, there could (actually) be life out there.\u201d You don\u2019t know the actual answer\u2014it\u2019s an open question to you\u2014but it seems like it could be so. This is epistemic possibility, and it has nothing to do with the ontological argument.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\nOkay. It looks like I confused that. I was, then, discussing epistemic possibility.<\/p>\n
Take another example: I ask, a day after the big game, \u201cDid the Pistons win Game Five?\u201d You say, \u201cWell, I had to shut it off in the third quarter, so I don\u2019t know. They were behind by five when I turned it off, but they were on a run\u2014I\u2019d say it\u2019s quite possible that they won.\u201d That\u2019s epistemic possibility, again. You aren\u2019t speculating about how things could possibly be. You\u2019re speculating about how things really are, in a case where you don\u2019t know. Take this kind of possibility and chuck it aside. It will only confuse us, and it\u2019s not related at all to the OA.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\nI\u2019m not sure one can totally separate it at every level from OA. I like the way Charles Hartshorne described St. Anselm\u2019s argument:<\/p>\n
One way to put Anselm\u2019s contention is this:<\/p>\n
A. \u201cDivinity exists\u201d is, though not without difficulty, or without severe qualifications, conceivable by the human mind;<\/p>\n
B. \u201cDivinity does not exist\u201d is strictly inconceivable (in a more than verbal sense) by any mind, being either self-contradictory or meaningless.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Thus the usual symmetry between the conceivability of existence and that of nonexistence is here upset in favor of existence. Taking this as the Anselmian position, refutation must consist in showing\u00a0either<\/i>\u00a0that divine existence and divine nonexistence are alike conceivable, or that divine existence is inconceivable. These two ways of upsetting the asserted asymmetry, though obviously incompatible, are very commonly confused, and this is one of several defects which disfigure this prolonged controversy . . .<\/p>\n
. . . His nonexistence must be unknowable absolutely. For, one who knows cannot know nonentity only, he must know something positive . . . divine nonexistence is unknowable absolutely, whether by divine or nondivine cognition. By contrast, divine existence is conceivably knowable, both by God Himself and also by any nondivine cognition able to connect effects with their universal Cause (not to mention able to understand the Ontological Proof). I conclude that the asymmetry to which Anselm points is quite real, and that on this main issue he is essentially correct, and his critics essentially mistaken. It is true, like it or not, that divinity,\u00a0differing in this from all ordinary properties, cannot be conceived (relative to possible knowledge) unless as existent<\/i>.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The kind of possibility that we\u2019re interested in has to do with how things could be, and how things have to be. For example, could 2+2=5? No\u2014it\u2019s impossible. Could Ringo Starr have been a guitarist instead of a drummer? Sure\u2014that\u2019s possible. (Not epistemically possible: we agree that in fact, Ringo is a drummer. ) Could Ringo have been a dung beetle? Umm\u2014that\u2019s a tougher question. I doubt it. I think any human being is essentially a human being. (Meaning that if Ringo\u2014or any of us humans\u2014exist at all, we must exist as humans.) But I admit to not being absolutely sure about this. Here, then, I don\u2019t know the answer. But we\u2019re still talking about metaphysical possibility: we agree that Ringo, in fact, is not a dung beetle, but, rather, a Beatle. What we wonder is whether he could have been a dung beetle. And we might ask that very same question this way: \u201cis there a possible world where Ringo is a dung beetle?\u201d We might not know the answer. Similarly, we could ask about the above mathematical example this way: \u201cis there a possible world where 2+2=5?\u201d Here, we do know the answer: no.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\nOne very helpful way to think about metaphysical possibility is to ask \u201ccould God bring it about that\u2026?\u201d So, is it metaphysically possible that 2+2=5? No\u2014even God can\u2019t make it the case that 2+2=5. But is it metaphysically possible that Ringo is a guitarist? Of course! God could easily have brought it about that Ringo became a guitarist instead of a drummer. Is it metaphysically possible that Ringo be a dung beetle? Here, again, I think not. God can obviously make dung beetles, but it\u2019s not clear that he could have made a world where Ringo\u2014that very person\u2014was a dung beetle. (Kafkaesque imaginary scenarios don\u2019t help here. What we imagine in the Metamorphosis is Gregor Samsa taking on the bodily appearance of a bug, not a p-world where he is just a regular old bug, born of bug parents, with a bug\u2019s consciousness, and so forth).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\nWe must also avoid getting hung up on so-called \u201caccidental necessity,\u201d according to which things that have already happened are now necessary even though it used to be that they could have gone otherwise. One might think it is accidentally necessary that I am a father, since now even God cannot make it the case that I never had children. That\u2019s all true, but it\u2019s irrelevant to the kind of modality that we\u2019re concerned with. Even though God cannot now make it the case that, in fact, I never had children, it is still metaphysically possible that I never had children. That is, there are p-worlds where I never had children. There have to be such p-worlds, for there are, presumably, lots of p-words where I don\u2019t exist at all. God didn\u2019t have to create me in the first place: nothing about me is metaphysically necessary. (Note that even if I am essentially a human being, as I said perhaps Ringo is, that doesn\u2019t mean that it is metaphysically necessary that I am a human being. If it were metaphysically necessary that I am a human being, then it would be metaphysically necessary that I exist, for I cannot be a human being if I do not exist. However, if I am essentially a human being, then it is necessary only that if I exist, then I am a human being. And this is a very different thing.)<\/span><\/p>\nAlright. That makes sense. Of course, God\u2019s unique properties, by definition, are the key and essence of OA and why it succeeds at all.<\/p>\n
So I hope there\u2019s some clarity now about the kind of metaphysical possibility we\u2019re interested in. Now, we must next turn to the question of what\u2019s a p-world? This, too, is a disputed question. David Lewis\u2014a reductivist, for what it\u2019s worth\u2014believed that p-worlds are real, concrete universes like ours, only spatio-temporally isolated from ours. They\u2019re not like the other worlds in the Narnia stories, which you can travel to by magic. They\u2019re also not like the worlds in the alternate universe hypotheses in contemporary physics. They\u2019re completely \u201capart\u201d from ours. Lewis\u2019s view is not widely accepted.<\/span><\/p>\nIt doesn\u2019t strike me as very plausible or likely.<\/p>\n
Plantinga\u2019s view is rather different. To Plantinga, a p-world is a maximal consistent proposition. It\u2019s a complete way things could have been, described down to its smallest detail.<\/span><\/p>\nI like this much better because it resonates with the notion of Providence (and possible Plantinga borrowed from that notion a bit?). I know that is not strictly philosophical, but then I am not speaking strictly from a philosophical perspective, so I can say it! :-)<\/p>\n
So there\u2019s a p-world where I\u2019m wearing a different color shirt than I am, in fact, wearing, but where everything else is exactly like it is in the actual world. However, that world isn\u2019t really a world like ours, it is really just a complete, maximal description of a world\u2014a world that does not actually exist (and never will). You might do well to think of p-worlds as thoughts in the mind of God: they are ways he could have created things, if he had chosen to. There is no p-world where 2+2=5, because even God could not make a world where that was true. But there are p-worlds where I do not exist, and where I am president of the US, and perhaps even where I am a gallant talking mouse. There is a p-world for every way things could possibly have gone.<\/span><\/p>\nYes, I agree. This also is similar to the theological concept of God\u2019s\u00a0middle knowledge<\/i>, or\u00a0scientia media\u00a0<\/i>(I am a Molinist, and accept this, insofar as I understand it).<\/p>\n
Since I exist only contingently, I exist only in some of these p-worlds. There are lots of ways things could have gone such that I never have come to exist. My grandfather could easily have been killed in WWII, for example. Or humans could have never been created. Or God could have chosen not to create anything at all. And so forth. If, however, something exists necessarily, then there is no possible way things could have gone such that it not exist. If God is a necessary being, then it is not possible for God not to exist.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\nYes, but the trick, of course, is convincing the atheist that:<\/p>\n
1) There is such a thing that we know as \u201cGod.\u201d<\/p>\n
and<\/p>\n
2) This \u201cGod\u201d is a self-existent, necessarily-existing Being.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
And if it\u2019s not possible for God not to exist, then there is no possible world where he fails to exist. Things just couldn\u2019t have gone that way. (Note, then, that thinking of p-worlds as \u201cways God could have made things go\u201d is slightly misleading, since God doesn\u2019t create Himself, yet he exists in all p-worlds. But God couldn\u2019t have made things go such that he doesn\u2019t exist: His own existence lies beyond his will, and is necessarily included in every possible way things go. This is just a minor complication which can, for the most part, be ignored. Incidentally, at this point, I am invoking God as a heuristic device: it doesn\u2019t beg the question against the atheist to say \u201cit\u2019s helpful to think of p-worlds as ways God could have made things go.\u201d The atheist can ponder that mental picture to learn something about the nature of possible worlds, even without for one moment pretending there\u2019s anything to this whole \u201cGod\u201d thing.)<\/span><\/p>\nYes. Though in my experience (including dealing with more than one atheist philosopher or philosophy major \/ grad student) they are quite predisposed against doing even that. They are every bit as dogmatic (I think,\u00a0irrationally<\/i>\u00a0so) as they claim theists are about our beliefs that God\u00a0does<\/i>\u00a0exist, and what He is like.<\/p>\n
OK, so remember, from a few pages back, that we\u2019re trying to get straight on the first premise of the simple OA. That premise is \u201cGod is possible.\u201d We should be OK now with \u201cpossible.\u201d The premise, then, is claiming simply that there is a p-world where God exists: in at least one way things could possibly have gone, God is there.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\nBut what does it mean to say \u201cGod is possible\u201d? God is that being than which greater cannot be conceived. Part of what it is to be God is to be a necessary being. Imagine a really great being, loving, powerful, knowledgeable\u2014but a being that could be killed. That might be a really great being to have as a friend. But it\u2019s not God. (Here, of course, complications having to do with the Incarnation are left aside.) This is a conceptual matter. By \u201cGod,\u201d I just mean, in part, a necessary being. So to say that God is possible is, in part, to say that it is possible for a necessary being to exist.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\nOkay, I follow you. That was what I had in mind in my argument.<\/p>\n
Again, there\u2019s nothing question-begging about this. I am not saying that God exists: I am simply clarifying my terms. The OA is an argument that purports to prove that something exists: namely, God. Well, what is this \u201cGod\u201d the argument is trying to establish the existence of? Simply the greatest conceivable being. That\u2019s what the OA seeks to prove the existence of. Perhaps there are other, competing notions of God out there. But that\u2019s a sociological issue. Who cares if there are other notions of God out there? I\u2019ve got a notion in hand here\u2014greatest conceivable being\u2014and I think it\u2019s a pretty important notion. If such a thing could be shown to exist, that would be A Big Deal. So that\u2019s the notion I\u2019m using. I\u2019m not saying such a thing exists, at this point. First, I simply say\u2014here\u2019s the notion I\u2019m working with. Next, I simply say\u2014that kind of thing is possible. Nothing dubious about any of this. (Of course, some might object that it is not possible, or that we couldn\u2019t hope to know if it is possible: but those are not objections to the use of the notion. They\u2019re objections to the soundness of the argument, or the knowability of its premise.)<\/span><\/p>\nI don\u2019t think OA proves God\u2019s existence, so I want to make it clear what I think it accomplishes. I agree with Plantinga that it shows that\u00a0theism is equally as rational and plausible as atheism<\/i>. I think that about several of the best theistic arguments, considered individually. It is the\u00a0cumulative evidence and plausibility\u00a0<\/i>of all taken together which I feel makes theism\u00a0practically compelling<\/i>, if not logically so, in strict terms. This has been my opinion for many years now, and I haven\u2019t changed much in that regard.<\/p>\n
So what premise one tells us is that there is a possible world where a necessary being exists. What does that mean? What it is to be necessary is to exist in all possible worlds. So, in that possible world where God exists, it is the case that God exists in all possible worlds. In that world, God not only exists, but exists necessarily\u2014in that world, it is not possible for God to fail to exist.<\/span><\/p>\nBut what is possible does not vary from world to world. Things are either possible or not possible. Similarly, what is necessary does not vary from world to world. Things are either necessary or not necessary. This is a vital point, and you seem to waffle a little bit on it, apparently endorsing the notion that possible worlds are not \u201caccessible\u201d from one another.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\nI think whatever confusion here arises from my use of the concept of epistemic possibility and the distinction between \u201ccontingently possible in actuality\u201d and \u201clogically possible in p-worlds,\u201d etc. I know I am probably not using the terms with precision (I\u2019m very conscious of that, especially in dealing with a trained philosophical mind such as yours), but hopefully you can follow what my reasoning is, whether I am expressing it poorly or not. I am very much the empiricist and always want to talk about actual realities, and this is why I never liked OA nearly as much as the more empirical arguments.<\/p>\n
But if you deny accessibility, then the OA simply fails. Fortunately, there is no good reason to deny accessibility, and every reason to believe in it. It just seems obvious that if X is possible, then it really is possible no matter what. One way to conceptualize metaphysical possibility, as I said above, is by asking, \u201ccould God bring it about that\u2026\u201d But obviously, God\u2019s power does not change from world to world. Even if he hadn\u2019t created angels\u2014even in a p-world where angels do not exist at all\u2014angels are still possible. God could have created them. (As an interesting aside: when great scholastics like Suarez talk about possibility and necessity, they don\u2019t talk about p-worlds. Rather, they talk about what God could do by the \u201cabsolute power.\u201d I tend to think they were getting at just this point.) Possibility and necessity are invariable across worlds.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\nIf you are talking about logical possibility, yes. I agree.<\/p>\n
So, premise one tells us that in one possible world, God exists\u2014and exists necessarily. But if he exists necessarily in that world, that means he exists in all possible worlds. But guess what\u2014the actual world is one of the possible worlds. And that means God exists in the actual world. (The \u201cactual world\u201d is, just like any other p-world, a maximal consistent proposition: it happens to correctly describe every single detail in the universe. So the actual world is not the universe\u2014it\u2019s a complete and true description of it. But part of the description is \u201cGod exists,\u201d and the description is true. So from knowing that God exists in the actual world, we can infer that God exists.)<\/span><\/p>\nBut how do we absolutely know that He exists, using only philosophy and not revelation? :-) I don\u2019t think it is possible \u2014 not by philosophy alone. I do think, however, that we can achieve practical certainty by virtue of other kinds of knowledge, including supernatural.<\/p>\n
So if premise one is true, it is not possible that God not exist. That means the argument is valid. Is premise one true? Yes, I think so.<\/span><\/p>\nOkay.<\/p>\n
But now we come back to the point with which I opened this section: my criticism of your account of the OA. If someone is deeply committed to atheism, he might simply say that because he knows that God does not in fact exist, he can learn from the OA that God is not possible.<\/span><\/p>\nAnd I would immediately ask him (being the Socratic in method that I am), \u201chow do you\u00a0know<\/i>that God does not in fact exist?\u201d And in trying to prove that \u201cknowledge\u201d he would run into all kinds of absurdities and inadequate claims that make it very difficult for him to be dogmatic about his atheism, and to claim that it is more rational and plausible than theism.<\/p>\n
Look, that\u2019s a very simple argument to make. The OA proves that if God is possible, then he exists. But if one denies the conclusion: if one claims that God does not exist, then one has to conclude that God is not possible.<\/span><\/p>\nBut they have to show us why they reject the conclusion in the first place, and how the logic of OA fails. They need to show us, particularly, why the premise is false. Methinks that would be quite difficult to do.<\/p>\n
That might be what you \u201clearn\u201d from the OA, for you might approach it this way: \u201cof course God is possible: who could hope to prove he\u2019s impossible? I\u2019m not saying anything about what could possibly be the case: I\u2019m just saying that in fact God does not exist. In the actual world, there\u2019s no such thing as God.\u201d If that\u2019s your approach, then your first encounter with the OA will force you to either (1) change your mind about God\u2019s actual existence, or (2) change your mind about God\u2019s existence being possible. If you pick (1), that\u2019s great. You\u2019ve learned something\u2014something vitally important. If, however, you pick (2), them you\u2019ve just given up a piece of knowledge. You\u2019ve become dumber.<\/span><\/p>\nYes, but not (i.e., #2) because of OA; because of illogical and non-coherent atheist reasoning.<\/p>\n
But, to be fair, many people find the argument from evil pretty impressive. They might think that the argument from evil shows that God does not exist.<\/span><\/p>\nI think it is the strongest argument against Christianity, and have believed this for a long time also.<\/p>\n
The argument from evil, incidentally, doesn\u2019t show that God is impossible, for it relies on the premise that evil exists. But it is a merely contingent truth that evil exists: in a world without evil, you could not run the argument from evil. So a person in this position might endorse exactly the line of thought I mentioned last paragraph\u2014and it wouldn\u2019t exactly be unreasonable dogmatism. It would just reflect on the force of the argument from evil. At any rate, all of this is to say that there are indeed grounds available to the atheist to deny the sheer possibility of God\u2019s existence.<\/span><\/p>\nYes; I think they fail, but I agree that there are halfway-reasonable grounds, at least\u00a0prima facie<\/i>. I don\u2019t think all atheists think the way they do because they are terrible people, utterly illogical, or because they are consciously rebelling against God. I do think sin affects reasoning in profound ways, however, as a general rule of thumb.<\/p>\n
This leads me to a brief discussion of another area where I think you make a mistake. You appear to conflate conceivability, imaginability and possibility, and I think this conflation leads you to some trouble.<\/span><\/p>\nYes, because I was not being technically precise in my use of those terms. I trusted that my meaning would be more clear in context, but that doesn\u2019t cut it for trained minds, because they will always note the imprecision of terminology.<\/p>\n
You write, for example, that theists should be willing to grant that a world without God is possible. But to grant this is to fall into disaster. If there is a p-world without God, then God is impossible: this is simply the reverse of the OA. Theists absolutely cannot grant that there are any p-worlds without God.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\nI disagree, because, again, I am almost always concentrating on actual worlds. There is a possible actual world, such that God (the necessary being) does not exist. That is\u00a0conceivable<\/i>\u00a0by a theist without for a moment being accepted as true. One can argue this for the sake of argument, without adopting it, just like any other proposition. I don\u2019t think this is a disaster at all; it is simply how reasoning works.<\/p>\n
If we disallow all contrary propositions as even possible or conceivable under all conceivable circumstances, it seems to me that we make it very difficult to engage in the reasoning process. And we in fact do the same thing we often accuse the atheists of: we conclude that a state of affairs is absolutely impossible. We can\u2019t blame them for concluding this about God and then turn around and refuse to allow any conceivable possibility of an atheist universe. So yes, a theist and a Christian, by definition, and in one obvious sense, cannot deny that God exists, but they can step out of their own views for a second and conceive of an atheist world. If not, then we cannot (it seems to me) fully conceive of an atheist\u2019s argument, and we should not expect them to conceive of ours. We would and should, then, simply stop talking with them, as it would be literally meaningless and incomprehensible.<\/p>\n
But that doesn\u2019t mean that we have to say that when atheists talk about a world without God, they are just making meaningless noises.<\/span><\/p>\nThat\u2019s right. But that is a far lesser \u201cmethodological concession\u201d than the above.<\/p>\n
Let me reproduce a bit of your paper here, so that I can reply in a little detail:<\/span><\/p>\n(anti-A2) No such thing as God exists, and no such thing can possibly exist in any possible, imaginable, conceivable universe.<\/p>\n
Now, if that is true, then why is the topic of God and theism so prominent in philosophy? If indeed theism were as silly and foolish as belief in fairy tales, leprechauns, unicorns, mermaids, centaurs, or other fanciful, absurd mythologies, why does the question continue to occupy great minds (both in favor of theism, and opposed to it?). One doesn\u2019t devote any time to sheer nonsense: Alice-in-Wonderland worlds or linguistic gibberish, such as:<\/p>\n
$#%&^%&^%foolishness#$#@#&^&()*&_(^GH%^<><>FD786IVbunkUVR(&VB^$E)+=??\u201dFT _-_-_-_-V*TOUV&^RCV%&)*\u2014hooey\u2014-}}{}|||||||(&^$%#@!)(@j@u@n@k@+-+-!:-)x:;\\<\/p>\n
No one (with three brain cells) seriously considers as any possibility that the earth is flat, or that the moon is made of green cheese. If the notion of God is in that kind of immediately dismissible category, then it is quite strange that rational, thoughtful, intelligent people devote so much time and energy to it. Therefore, the rational person must (given all these considerations) grant the bare possibility of God in another possible world, and this is all that premise A of the argument requires.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
But your concerns here do not follow from (anti-A2). The atheist can easily grant that there are imaginable universes that include God: that we can talk meaningfully about things divine. (Not every atheist is a positivist!) But imaginability does not entail possibility. We can tell ourselves all kinds of stories without thinking them possibly true. I could write a science fiction story in which the cosmology is that the universe sprang into existence all by itself. That\u2019s not just nonsense on the order of the string of letters and symbols in the quotation from your paper. But it is, nevertheless, impossible. Indeed, anyone who wishes to endorse a cosmological argument in any form must claim that it is impossible. If it\u2019s possible that the universe simply have sprung into existence out of nothing, or that it be self-caused, then the cosmological argument simply cannot be successful.<\/span><\/p>\nI was (I think it is clear in context) putting the stress on \u201cconceivable\u201d and \u201cimaginable\u201d and, as you noted earlier, confusing those notions with \u201cpossibility.\u201d I was dealing mainly with the sort of atheist I have often dealt with, who think of God and Christianity in just these terms: as the intellectual equivalents of Santa Claus or the moon made of green cheese. Granted, that is not dealing strictly with OA, but it is dealing with certain widespread predispositions and prejudices.<\/p>\n
Here\u2019s another example where impossibility doesn\u2019t equal nonsense. \u201cGoldbach\u2019s Conjecture\u201d (going by memory here\u2014I might have this wrong) is that every even number is the sum of two primes. Now, this conjecture, if true, is necessarily true. And, if it is false, it is necessarily false. At present, the Conjecture remains a conjecture\u2014it has neither been proved nor disproved. But mathematicians are, I believe, working on it. Let us pretend that the Conjecture is, in fact, false. So the claim that \u201cevery even number is the sum of two primes\u201d is necessarily false. But it is not nonsense. It makes perfect sense. It\u2019s just not true. Indeed, genuine nonsense, of the kind in your random string of letters and symbols above, does not even bear a truth value: it makes no claim at all, and can be neither true nor false. The very fact that an atheist will assign a truth value\u2014\u201cnecessarily false\u201d\u2014to the claim that \u201cGod exists,\u201d shows that the atheist denies that claim is sheer nonsense.<\/span><\/p>\nOkay, but many seem to almost approach that negative view.<\/p>\n
Now, as I alluded to just above, there are positivists (or, at least, there were positivists) who would claim that \u201cGod exists\u201d is sheer nonsense.<\/span><\/p>\nWell, then those are the types I have too often run across.<\/p>\n
And they would be disgusted at the proliferation of internet discussion groups about God, since all such talk is entirely meaningless.<\/span><\/p>\nThe ones I have met often say that and then proceed to talk about it: an irony I have always richly appreciated. :-)<\/p>\n
But that positivist position is wildly implausible. (Not to mention self-defeating: the \u201cverifiability criterion of meaning,\u201d according to which sentences are meaningful only if they can be empirically verified, is not itself empirically verifiable, and, thus either false or nonsensical. But leave that aside.)<\/span><\/p>\nI totally agree.<\/p>\n
But most contemporary atheists have, I think, moved past the phase of trying to say that God-talk is all just nonsense, and have come to the phase where they think it is just all false.<\/span><\/p>\nThat\u2019s an improvement. A good sign!<\/p>\n
But once you arrive at a point where the claim is simply that theism is necessarily false, then the philosophical discussion of theism begins to make sense. There are theists out there who contend, with astounding rigor of argumentation, that their position is indeed philosophically defensible. The cosmological and ontological arguments (among others) have been with us for a long time. In addition to this, more recent work in religious epistemology has gone far towards undermining the claim of atheists to have the \u201cdefault\u201d position, or the atheist contention that belief in God is simply unjustifiable by means other than argument, or what have you.<\/span><\/p>\nThat\u2019s the truly exciting stuff. Some of what I have read of Alston is along those lines (I met him briefly, once).<\/p>\n
So there is a longstanding tradition of careful theistic argumentation which atheists, when they bother to try to defend their position, have to take into account: they can see that theism is not in the same \u201cimmediately dismissible\u201d category as the claim that the moon is made of green cheese, or that the earth is flat.<\/span><\/p>\nGood for them.<\/p>\n
Further, though, people do take some pains to convince certain people that the earth is round: they take pains to teach children this fact. Children, of course, would make the obvious assumption that the earth is flat, if the question were put to them. They have to be taught to ignore the way things appear, and think instead of a much bigger picture. Similarly, we might take pains to instruct people in a remote tribe who assume themselves to be living on a flat surface. These folks, by accident of birth, have never been instructed in the truth about the earth\u2019s shape, and we might see fit to try to teach them. The kind of people we wouldn\u2019t try to teach would be educated Americans who know all the evidence, but construct bizarre conspiracy theories to try to explain that evidence away. However, atheists might see certain educated Americans who were raised in the backwards tribes of the Bible belt as just in need of instruction about the non-existence of God as they would see the folks raised in remote tribes are in need of instruction about the roundness of the earth. That is, they might pity their theistic upbringing, and try to bring some light to the benighted.<\/span><\/p>\nYes.<\/p>\n
So even if the atheist thinks that belief in God is epistemically on par with belief in leprechauns, he might take some pains to help some poor idiot see that God does not exist\u2014especially since believers in God, unlike believers in leprechauns\u2014actually still exert considerable (and pernicious, from the perspective of many atheists) political pull in our culture.<\/span><\/p>\nSome few lower themselves to such a pitiable state in order to enlighten us \u201cdark ages\u201d types.<\/p>\n
So in saying that God\u2019s existence is impossible, the atheist does not commit himself to saying that the claim \u201cGod exists\u201d is nonsense; nor does he commit himself to saying that believers in God are not to be bothered with at all. He might grant that believers have interesting (though, ultimately, not compelling) philosophical support for their view. Or, he might deny that, but nevertheless want to try to convince theists of the error of their ways either out of pity, or out of something like a politicized desire to keep down the number of theists.<\/span><\/p>\nI think this is good to understand. Thanks.<\/p>\n
I think that having said what I\u2019ve now said, I\u2019ve come to the end of my comments on your discussion of the ontological argument. Initially, this paper was about twice as long, because it began with a long discussion about what counts as a \u201cproof.\u201d You seemed to agree with Plantinga\u2019s view\u2014I think that view is false. Perhaps at some point I will send along that bit, if you\u2019re interested, and we can chat about it.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\nI hope we will continue this on the blog. One round is certainly not enough for such a rich, challenging subject. Plantinga contended only that OA makes theism as rational as atheism; he did not claim that it proved God\u2019s existence. This is very much my own position. If you are of the opinion that Plantinga thinks OA proved God\u2019s existence, to my knowledge that is not his claim. But chances are you know more about it than I do.<\/p>\n
Thanks for the opportunity to write, and my best wishes for the success of your ministry.<\/span><\/p>\nThank\u00a0you<\/i>! It was my great pleasure, indeed, to interact with you. I hope we continue, and best wishes for your philosophical studies. I am excited to see any solid Christian enter the philosophical field. The more the merrier . . .<\/p>\n
***<\/p>\n
(originally 6-25-04)<\/p>\n
Photo credit:\u00a0<\/strong>Astronomer Copernicus, conversation with God<\/i> (1872), by Jan Matejko (1838-1893)<\/span> [public domain \/ Wikimedia Commons<\/a>]<\/p>\n***<\/p>\n<\/body><\/html>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Patrick is a Catholic graduate student in philosophy. He wrote to me, asking if I would like to discuss the Ontological Argument, which is one of the classic theistic arguments (for God\u2019s existence), first developed by St. Anselm. He was replying to my section of my paper (most of it was a compilation of philosophers\u2019 […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2331,"featured_media":20018,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[112],"tags":[983,1236,5753,1237,5756,1235,5759,5750,253],"class_list":["post-20015","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-philosophy-science","tag-alvin-plantinga","tag-anselm","tag-charles-hartshorne","tag-descartes","tag-norman-malcolm","tag-ontological-argument","tag-richard-taylor","tag-st-anselm","tag-theistic-arguments"],"yoast_head":"\n
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Formerly a campus missionary, as a Protestant, Dave was received into the Catholic Church in February 1991, by the late, well-known catechist and theologian, Fr. John A. Hardon, S. J. Dave\u2019s articles have appeared in many influential Catholic periodicals, including \\\"This Rock\\\" (now called \\\"Catholic Answers Magazine\\\"), \\\"Envoy Magazine\\\" (Patrick Madrid), \\\"The Catholic Answer,\\\" \\\"The Coming Home Journal,\\\" \\\"Gilbert Magazine\\\" (American Chesterton Society), and \\\"The Latin Mass.\\\" He also writes a featured column for every issue of \\\"The Michigan Catholic\\\": published by the archdiocese of Detroit, and was editor for most of the apologetics tracts published by the St. Paul Street Evangelization apostolate. Dave\u2019s apologetics and writing apostolate was the subject of a feature article in the May 2002 issue of \\\"Envoy Magazine.\\\" He served as the staff moderator at the Internet discussion forum for The Coming Home Network, from 2007-2010. Dave has been interviewed on many nationally syndicated Catholic radio shows, including \\\"Catholic Answers Live\\\" (twice), \\\"Faith and Family Live\\\" (Steve Wood), \\\"Kresta in the Afternoon,\\\" \\\"Son Rise Morning Show,\\\" \\\"Catholic Connection\\\" (Teresa Tomeo), and \\\"The Catholics Next Door.\\\" His large and popular website, \\\"Biblical Evidence for Catholicism,\\\" was online from March 1997 to March 2007, and received the 1998 Catholic Website of the Year award from \\\"Envoy Magazine.\\\" His blog of the same name (now transferred to Patheos), begun in February 2004, contains more than 1,500 papers, at least 500 debates or dialogues, and over 50 distinct \\\"index\\\" web pages. Unsolicited correspondence has indicated many hundreds of conversions (or returns) to the Catholic faith as a result, by God's grace, of these writings. Dave's conversion story was published in the bestselling book \\\"Surprised by Truth\\\" (edited by Patrick Madrid; San Diego: Basilica Press, 1994). Sophia Institute Press has published six of his books: \\\"A Biblical Defense of Catholicism\\\" (Foreword by Fr. John A. Hardon, S. J., 1996 \/ 2003), \\\"The Catholic Verses\\\" (2004), \\\"The One-Minute Apologist\\\" (2007), \\\"Bible Proofs for Catholic Truths\\\" (2009), \\\"The Quotable Newman\\\" (editor: 2012), and \\\"Proving the Catholic Faith is Biblical\\\" (2015). He is co-author (with Dr. Paul Thigpen) of the inserts for \\\"The New Catholic Answer Bible\\\" (Our Sunday Visitor: 2005), and editor for \\\"The Wisdom of Mr. Chesterton: The Very Best Quotes, Quips, and Cracks from the Pen of G. K. Chesterton\\\" (Saint Benedict Press \/ TAN Books: 2009). \\\"100 Biblical Arguments Against Sola Scriptura\\\" was published by Catholic Answers in May 2012. His \\\"Quotable Wesley\\\" compilation was published by (Protestant \/ Wesleyan publisher) Beacon Hill Press in April 2014. Several of his 49 books are bestsellers in their field. Dave maintains a popular personal Facebook page, a Facebook author page, and has a Twitter account as well. He offers almost all of his books in e-book form on his own Biblical Catholicism site (http:\/\/biblicalcatholicism.com\/), at a permanent deep discount: only $2.99 for ePub, mobi, and AZW, and $1.99 for PDF. His writing has been enthusiastically endorsed or recommended by many leading Catholic apologists, authors, and priests, including Dr. Scott Hahn, Fr. Peter M. J. Stravinskas, Marcus Grodi, Patrick Madrid, Steve Ray, Tim Staples, Devin Rose, Mike Aquilina, Al Kresta, Karl Keating, Fr. Dwight Longenecker, Brandon Vogt, Marcellino D'Ambrosio, and Fr. John A. Hardon, S. J. Dave has been happily married to his wife Judy since October 1984. 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Formerly a campus missionary, as a Protestant, Dave was received into the Catholic Church in February 1991, by the late, well-known catechist and theologian, Fr. John A. Hardon, S. J. Dave\u2019s articles have appeared in many influential Catholic periodicals, including \"This Rock\" (now called \"Catholic Answers Magazine\"), \"Envoy Magazine\" (Patrick Madrid), \"The Catholic Answer,\" \"The Coming Home Journal,\" \"Gilbert Magazine\" (American Chesterton Society), and \"The Latin Mass.\" He also writes a featured column for every issue of \"The Michigan Catholic\": published by the archdiocese of Detroit, and was editor for most of the apologetics tracts published by the St. Paul Street Evangelization apostolate. Dave\u2019s apologetics and writing apostolate was the subject of a feature article in the May 2002 issue of \"Envoy Magazine.\" He served as the staff moderator at the Internet discussion forum for The Coming Home Network, from 2007-2010. Dave has been interviewed on many nationally syndicated Catholic radio shows, including \"Catholic Answers Live\" (twice), \"Faith and Family Live\" (Steve Wood), \"Kresta in the Afternoon,\" \"Son Rise Morning Show,\" \"Catholic Connection\" (Teresa Tomeo), and \"The Catholics Next Door.\" His large and popular website, \"Biblical Evidence for Catholicism,\" was online from March 1997 to March 2007, and received the 1998 Catholic Website of the Year award from \"Envoy Magazine.\" His blog of the same name (now transferred to Patheos), begun in February 2004, contains more than 1,500 papers, at least 500 debates or dialogues, and over 50 distinct \"index\" web pages. Unsolicited correspondence has indicated many hundreds of conversions (or returns) to the Catholic faith as a result, by God's grace, of these writings. Dave's conversion story was published in the bestselling book \"Surprised by Truth\" (edited by Patrick Madrid; San Diego: Basilica Press, 1994). Sophia Institute Press has published six of his books: \"A Biblical Defense of Catholicism\" (Foreword by Fr. John A. Hardon, S. J., 1996 \/ 2003), \"The Catholic Verses\" (2004), \"The One-Minute Apologist\" (2007), \"Bible Proofs for Catholic Truths\" (2009), \"The Quotable Newman\" (editor: 2012), and \"Proving the Catholic Faith is Biblical\" (2015). He is co-author (with Dr. Paul Thigpen) of the inserts for \"The New Catholic Answer Bible\" (Our Sunday Visitor: 2005), and editor for \"The Wisdom of Mr. Chesterton: The Very Best Quotes, Quips, and Cracks from the Pen of G. K. Chesterton\" (Saint Benedict Press \/ TAN Books: 2009). \"100 Biblical Arguments Against Sola Scriptura\" was published by Catholic Answers in May 2012. His \"Quotable Wesley\" compilation was published by (Protestant \/ Wesleyan publisher) Beacon Hill Press in April 2014. Several of his 49 books are bestsellers in their field. Dave maintains a popular personal Facebook page, a Facebook author page, and has a Twitter account as well. He offers almost all of his books in e-book form on his own Biblical Catholicism site (http:\/\/biblicalcatholicism.com\/), at a permanent deep discount: only $2.99 for ePub, mobi, and AZW, and $1.99 for PDF. His writing has been enthusiastically endorsed or recommended by many leading Catholic apologists, authors, and priests, including Dr. Scott Hahn, Fr. Peter M. J. Stravinskas, Marcus Grodi, Patrick Madrid, Steve Ray, Tim Staples, Devin Rose, Mike Aquilina, Al Kresta, Karl Keating, Fr. Dwight Longenecker, Brandon Vogt, Marcellino D'Ambrosio, and Fr. John A. Hardon, S. J. Dave has been happily married to his wife Judy since October 1984. They have three sons and a daughter, and reside in southeast Michigan (metro Detroit).","sameAs":["https:\/\/biblicalcatholicism.com\/","https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/dave.armstrong.798","https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/@LuxVeritatisApologetics"],"url":"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/davearmstrong\/author\/davearmstrong"}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/davearmstrong\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/20015","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/davearmstrong\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/davearmstrong\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/davearmstrong\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2331"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/davearmstrong\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=20015"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/davearmstrong\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/20015\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/davearmstrong\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/20018"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/davearmstrong\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=20015"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/davearmstrong\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=20015"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/davearmstrong\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=20015"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
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