![\"Allan](\"https:\/\/wp-media.patheos.com\/blogs\/sites\/572\/2015\/10\/HumeDavid.jpg\")
<\/a><\/p>\nDavid Hume (1711-1776): portrait (1754) by Allan Ramsay (1713-1784)<\/span> [public domain \/ Wikimedia Commons<\/a>]<\/p>\n He was\u00a0not<\/i>, according to his own words, or in the opinion of many Hume scholars:<\/span><\/p>\n The order of the universe proves an omnipotent mind.\u00a0(Treatise<\/i>, 633n)<\/p>\n Wherever I see order, I infer from experience that\u00a0there<\/i>, there hath been Design and Contrivance . . . the same principle obliges me to infer an infinitely perfect Architect from the Infinite Art and Contrivance which is displayed in the whole fabric of the universe.\u00a0(Letters<\/i>, 25-26)<\/p>\n [Found in Capaldi, see below]<\/p>\n The whole frame of nature bespeaks an intelligent author; and no rational enquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine Theism and Religion . . .<\/p>\n Were men led into the apprehension of invisible, intelligent power by a contemplation of the works of nature, they could never possibly entertain any conception but of one single being, who bestowed existence and order on this vast machine, and adjusted all its parts, according to one regular plan or connected system . . .<\/p>\n All things of the universe are evidently of a piece. Every thing is adjusted to every thing. One design prevails throughout the whole. And this uniformity leads the mind to acknowledge one author.\u00a0(Natural History of Religion<\/i>, 1757, ed. H.E. Root, London: 1956, 21, 26)<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n All of the characters in the\u00a0Dialogues<\/i>\u00a0speak for Hume, and the message of the\u00a0Dialogues<\/i> is that morality is independent of religion.\u00a0(David Hume<\/i>, Boston: G.K. Hall & Co., 1975, ch. 9, 188-97; Capaldi is an internationally-known Hume expert and founder of the Hume Society)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Capaldi states in the above section:<\/span><\/p>\n Hume believed in the existence of God. He rejected the ontological argument. He accepted in one form the argument from design. God exists, but his properties are unknown and unknowable by us . . . In none of his writings does Hume say or imply that he does not accept the existence of God. On the contrary, Hume says in several places that he accepts the existence of God . . .<\/p>\n Guided by basic misunderstandings of Hume\u2019s position on causality or at the very least the negative aspects of Hume\u2019s skepticism, most readers assume that the central question is one concerning God\u2019s existence.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n Thus we have, e.g., Sir Isaiah Berlin of Oxford falsely assert:<\/span><\/p>\n In 1776 he died, as he had lived, an atheist . . .\u00a0(The Age of Enlightenment: The 18th Century Philosophers<\/i>, New York: Mentor, 1956, 163)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n This shows that \u201cexperts\u201d (this is from a very famous series on the history of philosophy) can often get things \u2013 in this case, straightforward factual matters \u2013 dead wrong by not examining closely enough a person\u2019s thought, and by often extrapolating their own beliefs and premises onto the other person (long one of my own contentions in discourse). It\u2019s also a function of the over-compartmentalization of knowledge, in my opinion.<\/span><\/p>\n Many atheists who write on Patheos (where my own blog is posted) fall prey to the same myth:<\/span><\/p>\n From: James Fieser:\u00a0\u201cHume\u2019s Concealed Attack on Religion and His Early Critics,\u201d<\/a>\u00a0<\/i>Journal of Philosophical Research<\/i>, 1995, Vol. 20, pp. 83-101.<\/p>\n Fieser is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Tennessee (see\u00a0his publications<\/a>):<\/p>\n Given Hume\u2019s notorious reputation as an enemy of religion, it is interesting that questions remain about Hume\u2019s precise views on the subject. Capaldi argues that Hume accepted the design argument for God\u2019s existence.(2) O\u2019Higgins and Gaskin argue that Hume was a qualified deist.(3) For Noxon, Hume is an agnostic.(4) Mossner and Livingston argue that Hume advanced his own humanistic religion.(5) Kemp Smith and Williams argue that Hume\u2019s religion consisted of merely holding open the possibility of an intelligent creator.(6) Most of this debate traces back to passages in the\u00a0Natural History of Religion<\/i>, and the\u00a0Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion<\/i>\u00a0in which Hume seems to endorse the design argument.(7)<\/p>\n . . . we can never show with certainty that Hume was a strict atheist: we have no record of a direct denial by Hume of God\u2019s existence, either anecdotally or in his philosophical writings.<\/p>\n FOOTNOTES<\/p>\n 2. Nicholas Capaldi, \u201cHume\u2019s Philosophy of Religion: God Without Ethics,\u201d\u00a0International Journal for Philosophy of Religion<\/i>, 1970, Vol. I, pp. 233-240.<\/p>\n 3. For [James] O\u2019Higgins, Hume accepted the rationality of the design argument, but remained skeptical about the entire enterprise of reasoning. Hume, then, reluctantly concedes to God\u2019s existence, yet denies that God concerns himself with governing the world. See \u201cHume and the Deists: a Contrast in Religious Approaches,\u201d\u00a0Journal of Theological Studies<\/i>, 1971, Vol. 23, pp. 479-501. In\u00a0Hume\u2019s Philosophy of Religion<\/i>\u00a0(Atlantic Highlands, 1988), J.C.A. Gaskin describes Hume\u2019s attenuated deism as a weak probability that natural order results from an intelligence remotely analogous to our own. This unites with our subjective feeling that natural order springs from a designer, hence we assent to the existence of a designer (although this being has no moral claim on us).<\/p>\n 4. James Noxon argues that no one of the characters speaks consistently for Hume, and this expresses Hume\u2019s view about the limits of human understanding. For Noxon, this suggests that Hume was agnostic. \u201cHume\u2019s Agnosticism,\u201d in\u00a0Hume: A Collection of Critical Essays,<\/i>\u00a0ed. V.C. Chappell (New York, 1966), and \u201cIn defence of \u2018Hume\u2019s Agnosticism,'\u201d\u00a0Journal of the History of Philosophy<\/i>, 1976, Vol. 14, pp. 469-473.<\/p>\n 5. Ernest C. Mossner argues that Hume denied all supernatural and conventional religion, but advanced a \u201creligion of man\u201d insofar as he optimistically believed that the enlightened determine the fate of humanity and are the measure of all things. See \u201cThe Religion of David Hume,\u201d\u00a0Journal of the History of Ideas<\/i>, 1978, Vol. 39, pp. 653-663. Donald Livingston argues that Hume offers a \u201cphilosophical theism\u201d which is an historically determined natural belief, yet one which eschews the writings and rituals of the theistic tradition. See \u201cHume\u2019s Conception of True Religion,\u201d in\u00a0Hume\u2019s Philosophy of Religion\u00a0<\/i>(Winston-Salem, 1986), pp. 33-73. Even if Mossner and Livingston have captured Hume\u2019s views, it is difficult to see how this could qualify as a religion by 18th century standards, and it is hard to believe that Hume would want to classify it as such.<\/p>\n 6. Norman Kemp Smith argues that religion for Hume consists exclusively in an intellectual assent to the proposition \u201cGod exists.\u201d He concludes, though, that religion for Hume ought not to have any influence on human conduct (Dialogues concerning Natural Religion<\/i>, p. 24). Kemp Smith bases his view on the conclusions to the \u201cNatural History\u201d and Dialogues, and Hume\u2019s 1743 letter to William Mure. B.A.O. Williams argues that Hume did not reject the possibility of a creator with something like human intelligence; see \u201cHume on Religion,\u201d in\u00a0David Hume: A Symposium<\/i>, e.d. D.F. Pears, London, 1963, pp. 77-88.<\/p>\n 7. Although the \u201cNatural History\u201d is antagonistic to revealed and popular religious belief, in no less than nine passages Hume seems to defend the design argument. Although the Dialogues is antagonistic to natural religion, Cleanthes, the defender of natural religion, wins the debate, and Philo, the religious skeptic, eventually concedes that \u201cthe cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence.\u201d Thus, at face value, both the \u201cNatural History\u201d and the Dialogues support the belief in God through the design argument, yet destroy all other aspects of religious belief.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n In another article,\u00a0\u201cHume\u2019s Solution to the Necessitarian Problem of Evil<\/i>,\u201d<\/a><\/span>\u00a0<\/a>Fieser states:<\/span><\/p>\n Although it is popular now in Hume scholarship to interpret Hume as a type of theist, I believe that we should resist this approach, principally because Hume\u2019s contemporaries did not interpret him this way.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n In the Oxford University Press publication,\u00a0Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings<\/a><\/i>, Third Edition, Edited by John Perry and Michael Bratman (both of Stanford), 1998, we find these remarks about Hume, in a section entitled\u00a0\u201cHume\u2019s Religious Orientation\u201d<\/a>:<\/span><\/p>\n If we take Philo\u2019s pronouncements in\u00a0Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion<\/i>\u00a0(1776) as a guide, the mature Hume was a theist, albeit of a vague and weak-kneed sort. He seems to have been convinced by the argument from design of the proposition \u201cThat the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence\u201d\u2018 (227). But he was also convinced that the argument does not permit this undefined intelligence to be given further shape or specificity, and certainly not the specificity that would be needed to support any inference \u201cthat affects human life, or can be the source of any action or forbearance.\u201d Hume\u2019s inconsequential theism was combined with an abhorrence of organized religion, which Hume saw as composed of superstitions that have had almost uniformly baneful effects for mankind.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n In lecture notes from the Philosophy Dept. at the University of Durham (author not given),<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>\u201cLecture 7: Interpreting the\u00a0Dialogues<\/i>,\u201d<\/a>\u00a0we find the following analysis (completely reproduced):<\/span><\/p>\n THE PROBLEM OF INTERPRETATION<\/p>\n Two closely related textual questions can be raised with regard to theDialogues<\/i>. Firstly, who speaks for Hume (and when)? Secondly, how do the\u00a0Dialogues<\/i>\u00a0fit into Hume\u2019s other published discussions of religion, and what do they tell us about the reasonableness or otherwise of religious belief? One source of evidence in answering both questions is to see who comes out as the \u2018winner\u2019 in theDialogues<\/i>; another is to compare the claims of Philo, Cleanthes and Demea with Hume\u2019s own philosophy.<\/p>\n WHO SPEAKS FOR HUME?<\/p>\n Commentators have taken different lines here. Let us weigh up the textual evidence for each of the main characters:<\/p>\n Demea<\/i>\u00a0puts forward relatively weak arguments, except when joining Philo in his criticism of Cleanthes. His main positive argument is thea priori<\/i>\u00a0demonstration of God\u2019s existence set out in Part IX, which is swiftly demolished by Cleanthes. Cleanthes\u2019 argument-that\u00a0no<\/i>particular existence is necessary-strongly resembles a point made by Hume elsewhere, that no matter of fact is demonstrable\u00a0a priori\u00a0<\/i>(see the\u00a0Enquiry<\/i>, Sections IV Part 1, and Section XII Part 3). Hume has Cleanthes quoting Samuel Clarke as the source of the kind of reasoning employed by Demea, which indicates that Demea\u2019s argument is modelled on Clarke\u2019s (although Demea is certainly not Clarke). The serious choice for Hume\u2019s mouthpiece must either be Philo or Cleanthes.<\/p>\n Cleanthes<\/i>\u00a0puts forward the central argument of the\u00a0Dialogues<\/i>, and his views are proclaimed to approach nearest to the truth by Pamphilus in the last paragraph (note, however, that Pamphilus is Cleanthes\u2019\u00a0pupil<\/i>). Also, Cleanthes is the mouthpiece for Humean criticisms of Demea\u2019s\u00a0a priori\u00a0<\/i>argument (see above). Other commentators point out that although Philo consistently criticises Cleanthes\u2019 argument, he\u00a0never replies\u00a0<\/i>to Cleanthes\u2019 basic point that the presence of order in the world causes the presence of a designer to \u2018flow in upon you with the force like that of a sensation\u2019 (Part III, para. 7). On these grounds, Noxon, for instance, argues that while the views of\u00a0none\u00a0<\/i>of the interlocutors\u00a0entirely<\/i>\u00a0represents Hume\u2019s views, Hume intended Cleanthes to do so most closely.<\/p>\n Philo<\/i>\u00a0is the most common choice for Hume\u2019s mouthpiece: Ayer (Hume<\/i>, p.93) on the grounds that Philo says the most, Kemp Smith on the grounds that Philo\u2019s criticisms of the design argument closely resemble Hume\u2019s discussion in Section XI of the\u00a0Enquiry<\/i>, and elsewhere. Against this, we have Philo\u2019s concession in Part XII that \u201cA purpose, an intention, a design strikes everywhere the most careless, the most stupid thinker\u201d (Part XII, para.2). Philo also suggests that his sceptical stance was adopted\u00a0only for the sake of argument<\/i>, and that he felt safe to do so only because on the subject of religion, he is never likely to \u2018corrupt the principles of any man of common sense\u2019 (Part XII, para.2). Noxon argues that Hume would not have the character representing his own views recant them in so flippant a way. Kemp Smith, however, put Philo\u2019s admission-along with Hume\u2019s own ritual profession of faith-down to Hume\u2019s regard for the conventions of his time (there is evidence for this in Hume\u2019s correspondence). Noxon replies that Hume was often happy to flout other conventions of his time, and in any case planned the\u00a0Dialogues<\/i>for posthumous publication. However, that Hume was sympathetic to Philo\u2019s position is supported by his correspondence (see his letter of 10 March 1751).<\/p>\n WHAT SHOULD WE CONCLUDE FROM THE DIALOGUES?<\/p>\n It is unlikely that Hume\u2019s intention was to convince readers to believe in the non-existence (or\u00a0<\/i>the existence) of God. Rather, Hume perhaps intended the\u00a0Dialogues\u00a0<\/i>to invite us to reflect on the relation between our belief (either way) and: (i) any relevant evidence we have; (ii) our behaviour. Looking at the arguments presented in theDialogues<\/i>\u00a0(and elsewhere), it is evident (from the drubbing received by the design argument) that Hume contends that we\u00a0don\u2019t know<\/i>(from the design argument) very much at all about the\u00a0nature\u00a0<\/i>of God. We certainly should not conclude that the Designer with whom the \u2018remote analogy\u2019 of the design argument presents us can be identified with the God of any organised religion: given the available evidence, we cannot know that this Designer is omnipotent, or benevolent, for instance. Putting this together with Hume\u2019s other arguments concerning religion: (i) his rejection of the argument\u00a0a priori<\/i>; and (ii) his rejection of miracles as a source of evidence for the truth of any revealed religion, we have a powerful critique of the role of\u00a0reason\u00a0<\/i>in supporting religious belief, and a call for caution inacting<\/i>\u00a0on any such belief. Hume does, however, leave open the possibility that God might directly cause individual believers to have faith (see Noxon).<\/p>\n However, given Philo\u2019s (and Hume\u2019s) frequent protestations of the obviousness of God\u2019s existence, perhaps we could (with Noxon and Penelhum) draw a parallel with Hume\u2019s position on (for instance) induction (in the\u00a0Enquiry<\/i>, Sections IV and V).\u00a0Reason\u00a0<\/i>cannot furnish us with a justification for believing: (i) that there is an external world that is independent of our perception; (ii) that past regularities of our experience will continue to hold in future; and (iii) that the senses are (usually<\/i>) reliable sources of information about the world around us. However, Hume argues that only\u00a0excessive\u00a0<\/i>(philosophical) scepticism could lead a reasonable enquirer to doubt these beliefs, for they are beliefs which underpin ordinary life, without which it would be impossible to act in the world. The parallel suggests that refusing to believe in God merely because\u00a0this\u00a0<\/i>belief is not grounded in reason would be inconsistent (this is Penelhum\u2019s \u2018parity\u2019 argument): belief in God just as naturally suggests itself to the human mind as belief in the external world. This interpretation is disputed by Gaskin. Firstly, belief in God is\u00a0not\u00a0<\/i>in fact universal, and the mechanisms that produce belief in an external world and the other natural beliefs are\u00a0quite different<\/i>\u00a0from the processes that produce belief in God (as investigated by Hume in the\u00a0Natural History of Religion<\/i>), for the latter belief is the product of fear of the unknown, and it may be absent in those who inhabit \u2018civilised\u2019 societies. Secondly (and crucially), belief in God is not a prerequisite for rational action in the world (see Gaskin chapters 6 and 7).<\/p>\n What we can conclude, however, is that it is quite wrong for religious beliefs to have the effects on behaviour, morals and politics that, according to Hume in the\u00a0Natural History<\/i>, they typically do have. \u2018True religion\u2019, for Hume, is plain philosophical assent, rather than self-denial or religious activism.<\/p>\n READING<\/p>\n J. Gaskin\u00a0Hume\u2019s Philosophy of Religion<\/i>\u00a0(Chs. 6, 7 and 12)<\/p>\n J. Gaskin \u2018Hume on Religion\u2019 in D.F. Norton (ed.)\u00a0The Cambridge Companion to Hume<\/i><\/p>\n N. Kemp Smith\u00a0Introduction<\/i>\u00a0to the Kemp Smith edition of theDialogues<\/i><\/p>\n G. Nathan \u2018Hume\u2019s Immanent God\u2019 in V. Chappell (ed.)\u00a0Hume<\/i><\/p>\n J. Noxon \u2018Hume\u2019s Agnosticism\u2019 in V. Chappell (ed.)\u00a0Hume<\/i><\/p>\n T. Penelhum\u00a0God and Skepticism<\/i>\u00a0Chapters 2, 5 and 6<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n Mark G. Spencer, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of History, The University of Western Ontario, writes in his paper,\u00a0\u201cThe\u00a0Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion<\/i>: Hume\u2019s Response to the Dogmatic and Intolerant,\u201d<\/a>\u00a0The Western Journal of Graduate Research<\/i>\u00a02000, Vol. 9 (1), 1-19<\/span>:<\/span><\/p>\n Sorting through this ever-expanding mountain of commentary reveals that scholars have tended to read the\u00a0Dialogues\u00a0<\/i>in two basic ways. The\u00a0Dialogues\u00a0<\/i>is read either with the presupposition that Hume intended primarily to make a philosophical point about religion (2), or alternatively, it is read with the aim of showing that Hume\u2019s intentions therein were primarily literary. (3)This distinct interpretive divide, moreover, is often commented on explicitly in the literature where it has become an entrenched characteristic. (4)<\/p>\n Proponents of both readings, however, have been of a single mind in their concern to ask one (seemingly) fundamental question: who in the\u00a0Dialogues<\/i>\u00a0speaks for Hume? (5) In answer, most interpreters argue that Hume is represented by one of the characters in theDialogues<\/i>. Many of Hume\u2019s contemporaries and near contemporaries, for example, thought that Hume spoke through Cleanthes. As Dugald Stewart put it, \u201c[i]t must always be remembered that Cleanthes is the hero of the\u00a0Dialogues<\/i>, and is to be considered as speaking Mr. Hume\u2019s real opinions\u201d (1854: I, 605). (6)<\/p>\n In 1935, Hume scholar Norman Kemp Smith challenged this \u201cstandard interpretation\u201d of the time, arguing instead that \u201cPhilo, from start to finish, represents Hume\u201d(1959: 47). Kemp Smith has often restated his interpretation which has remained influential, with many scholars following his lead but adding their own variations. (7) Others, however, have thought that Philo\u2019s scepticism is different from Hume\u2019s (Noxon, 1964). For others still, Hume is represented by Pamphilus, the\u00a0Dialogues<\/i>\u2018 narrator (Hendel, 1963). More recently, the trend is to argue that none of the characters wholly represents Hume \u2014 either because Hume is thought to be speaking wherever something intelligent is said (8), or because Hume meant the dialoguers to be \u201cphilosophical types\u201d (Pakaluk, 1984), or because the\u00a0Dialogues\u00a0<\/i>themselves are thought to speak for Hume (9), or finally, because the characters are thought to be part of Hume\u2019s more basic concern with \u201cthe structures of consciousness\u201d (Smitten, 1991; see also White, 1988).<\/p>\n FOOTNOTES<\/p>\n 5 See almost any of the secondary literature. Basu (1978) sums up the concern of much of the literature in his title: \u201cWho is the Real Hume in the\u00a0Dialogues<\/i>?\u201d. The ubiquitous issue is also stated clearly by Noxon (1964: 248): \u201cWho speaks for Hume? Unless this question can be answered, Hume\u2019s last philosophical testament provides us with no clue to his own religious convictions\u201d; and Mossner (1977: 4): \u201cWho, then, represents Hume in the\u00a0Dialogues<\/i>?\u201d<\/p>\n 6 Many of Hume\u2019s contemporaries also thought Hume spoke through Philo.<\/p>\n 7 Mossner (1977): \u201cHume is Philo and Philo alone\u201d(4), \u201cPhilo and Philo alone is\u00a0Hume\u2019s spokesman\u201d(12); Penelhum (1979: 270): \u201cI must state at the outset that I agree with those scholars, from Kemp Smith on, who identify Hume with Philo\u201d; Wadia (1987: 211): \u201cIncidentally, I will assume throughout the sequel that Kemp Smith\u2019s identification of Hume with Philo is essentially correct\u201d. See also Coleman (1989: 179): \u201cI will support the traditional thesis that Philo represents Hume\u2019s views on religious belief\u201d. Some have also tried to identify the other speakers in the\u00a0Dialogues<\/i>. Mossner (1936) argued that Philo is Hume\u2019s voice, Cleanthes represents Joseph Butler, and Demea is best thought of as Samuel Clarke.<\/p>\n 8 Bricke (1975: 17): \u201cone must assume that, no matter who the speaker, those arguments which are presented in the most persuasive and compelling way, those arguments which seem most cogent, are probably to be ascribed to Hume\u201d. See also Gaskin (1978): \u201cI shall take it that Hume in the\u00a0Dialogues<\/i>\u00a0is any speaker who appears to be making a good philosophical point\u201d.<\/p>\n 9 Livingston (1984 :44): \u201cNo character may be taken to represent Hume\u2019s views\u201d. See also Yandell (1990: 37): \u201cNone of the actual participants in the\u00a0Dialogues<\/i>\u2013 Cleanthes, Philo, and Demea \u2013 always represents Hume. All of them sometimes represent him\u201d. Tweyman (1993: 174) disagrees: \u201cThat the\u00a0Dialogues<\/i>\u00a0is filled with dramatic and literary elements is beyond question. However, that these elements can be so construed as to reveal that, in addition to Demea, Cleanthes, and Philo, there is a fourth main speaker, Hume, is extremely doubtful\u201d.<\/p>\n REFERENCES (selective)<\/p>\n Andre, Shane, 1993. Was Hume an Atheist?<\/a>,\u00a0Hume Studies\u00a0<\/i>19: 141-166.<\/p>\n Austin, W. 1985. Philo\u2019s Reversal.\u00a0Philosophical Topics<\/i>\u00a013: 103-112.<\/p>\n Basu, D. K. 1978. Who is the Real Hume in the Dialogues?\u00a0Indian Philosophical Quarterly<\/i>\u00a06: 21-28. Bricke, J. 1975. On the Interpretation of Hume\u2019s Dialogues.\u00a0Religious Studies\u00a0<\/i>11: 1-18.<\/p>\n Clarke, B. L. 1980. The Argument from Design.\u00a0American Journal of Theological Philosophy<\/i>\u00a01: 98-108.<\/p>\n Coleman, D. P. 1989. Interpreting Hume\u2019s Dialogues.\u00a0Religious Studies<\/i>\u00a025: 179-190.<\/p>\n Gaskin, J. C. 1993b. Hume on Religion. In D.F. Norton, ed.\u00a0The Cambridge Companion to Hume<\/i>: 313-344. New York: Cambridge University Press.<\/p>\n Gaskin, J. C. 1978.\u00a0Hume\u2019s Philosophy of Religion<\/i>. London: MacMillan.<\/p>\n Hendel, C. 1963.\u00a0Studies in the Philosophy of David Hume<\/i>\u00a0(1st ed. 1925). Princeton: Princeton University Press.<\/p>\n Kemp Smith, N. 1947. The Argument of the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. In N. Kemp Smith, ed.,\u00a0David Hume: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion<\/i>\u00a0(1st ed. 1935). New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company.<\/p>\n Livingston, D. 1984.\u00a0Hume\u2019s Philosophy of Common Life<\/i>. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Mossner, E. C. 1936. The Enigma of Hume.\u00a0Mind<\/i>\u00a014: 335-349.<\/p>\n Mossner, E. C. 1977. Hume and the Legacy of the Dialogues. In G. P. Morice, ed.\u00a0David Hume: Bicentenary Papers.<\/i>\u00a0Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.<\/p>\n Mossner, E. C. 1954.\u00a0The Life of David Hum<\/i>e. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press.<\/p>\n Noxon, J. 1964. Hume\u2019s Agnosticism.\u00a0Philosophical Review\u00a0<\/i>73: 248-261.<\/p>\n Pakaluk, M. 1984. Philosophical Types in Hume\u2019s Dialogues. In V. Hope, ed.\u00a0Philosopher of the Scottish Enlightenment<\/i>, 116-132. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.<\/p>\n Penelhum, T. 1979. Hume\u2019s Skepticism and the Dialogues. In D.F. Norton, N. Capaldi, and W.L. Robison, eds.\u00a0McGill Hume Studies<\/i>: 253-278. San Diego, California: Austin Hill Press.<\/p>\n Smitten, J. R. 1991. Hume\u2019s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion as Social Discourse, in J. Dwyer and R. B. Sher, eds.,\u00a0Sociability and Society in Eighteenth-Century Scotland<\/i>, 39-56. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, published in association with the Eighteenth-Century Scottish Studies Society.<\/p>\n Stewart, D. 1854.\u00a0The Collected Works of Dugald Stewart<\/i>. In W. Hamlton, ed. 1854-1860. Edinburgh: T. Constable and Co.<\/p>\n Tweyman, S. 1987. Hume\u2019s Dialogues on Evil.\u00a0Hume Studies\u00a0<\/i>13: 74-85.<\/p>\n Tweyman, S. 1993. Hurlbutt, Hume, Newton and the Design Argument.\u00a0Hume Studies\u00a0<\/i>19: 167-176. Tweyman, S. 1986.Scepticism and Belief in Hume\u2019s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion<\/i>. The Hague.<\/p>\n Wadia, P. S. 1987. Commentary on Professor Tweyman\u2019s `Hume on Evil\u2019.\u00a0Hume Studies<\/i>\u00a013: 104-112.<\/p>\n Wadia, P. S. 1979. Philo Confounded. In. D.F. Norton, N. Capaldi, and W.L. Robison, eds.\u00a0McGill Hume Studies<\/i>: 279-290. San Diego, California: Austin Hill Press.<\/p>\n Wadia, P. S. 1978. Professor Pike on Part III of Hume\u2019s Dialogues.Religious Studies\u00a0<\/i>14: 325-342. White, R. 1988. Hume\u2019s Dialogues and the Comedy of Religion.\u00a0Hume Studies<\/i>\u00a014: 390-407.<\/p>\n Yandell, K. E. 1990.\u00a0Hume\u2019s \u2018Inexplicable Mystery\u2019: His Views on Religion.<\/i>\u00a0Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Temple University Press.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n \n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/body><\/html>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" David Hume (1711-1776): portrait (1754) by Allan Ramsay (1713-1784) [public domain \/ Wikimedia Commons] He was\u00a0not, according to his own words, or in the opinion of many Hume scholars: The order of the universe proves an omnipotent mind.\u00a0(Treatise, 633n) Wherever I see order, I infer from experience that\u00a0there, there hath been Design and Contrivance . […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2331,"featured_media":3803,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[124,112],"tags":[267,1048,258,619,1044,1045,119,979,763,1047,1046,253],"class_list":["post-3801","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-atheism-agnosticism","category-philosophy-science","tag-agnosticism","tag-argument-from-design","tag-atheism","tag-christian-epistemology","tag-david-hume","tag-deism","tag-philosophy-of-religion","tag-religious-epistemology","tag-skepticism","tag-teleological-argument","tag-theism","tag-theistic-arguments"],"yoast_head":"\n\n