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<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
J. Craig Bradley<\/a> is an atheist, with a Master\u2019s degree in philosophy. He is interacting with my paper, The \u201cProblem of Good\u201d: Great Dialogue With an Atheist (the Flip Side of the Problem of Evil Argument Against Christianity) + the Nature of Meaningfulness in Atheism<\/a>. His words will be in blue<\/span>. My older words, cited from the above paper, will be in green<\/span>.<\/p>\n ***<\/p>\n I\u2019m now taking the time to read (and reply to) your lengthy exchange with Mike Hardie, what you call the \u201cProblem of Good\u201d dialogue.\u00a0I too will attempt to have a respectful dialogue with DA, and hope he returns the favor.\u00a0So Dave and Mike had a discussion about theism. Let\u2019s see how it went!<\/span><\/p>\n It went very well, and is my very favorite dialogue of all the multiple hundreds I\u2019ve been in.<\/p>\n The problem of good is not defined (as far as I can see), but if the POE [problem of evil] is the argument where evil disproves a perfectly loving being, the POG seems to be an argument where good disproves a perfectly evil being.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n No; I would say that it strongly suggests that atheism is a less plausible position than theism, and that the problem of good is at least as big of a problem for atheism, as the problem of evil is for theism (it\u2019s a classic turn-the-tables argument). I think the following statement of mine, near the beginning, serves as a definition of the [atheist] problem of good:<\/p>\n Simply put (but I will defend this at the greatest length once we discuss particular moral questions), atheist justifications for morality (i.e., logically carried through) will always be either completely arbitrary, relativistic to the point of absurdity, or derived from axiomatic assumptions requiring no less faith than Christian ethics require.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n If so, yes, both arguments work: our universe shows there to not be either of those beings, as far as we know. <\/span><\/p>\n I deny that your evidential problem of evil works to either disprove God\u2019s existence, or suggest that His nonexistence is probable; and you have misunderstood the nature and purpose of my problem of good (at least in the way I<\/em> use it).<\/p>\n Nothing about the lack of a perfectly evil being fails to disprove the EPOE [evidential problem of evil], which rightly shows that a perfectly good being probably doesn\u2019t exist.<\/span><\/p>\n Again, since you have misunderstood my argument, this is a non sequitur<\/em>.<\/p>\n DA claims that the EPOE (the only POE worth discussing, since the LPOE [logical problem of evil] is quickly a failure) fails, but he doesn\u2019t (yet) show that to be true. (I\u2019ve yet to see anyone come close to refuting the EPOE, but that\u2019s for another day). The dialogue could have been about that, but DA indicates it will be about the nature of morality.<\/span><\/p>\n This particular dialogue was a critique of atheism, in response to the atheist problem of evil critique of Christianity. I was saying, in effect, \u201cyou say we<\/em> have a problem? I say that you<\/em> have a far more<\/em> difficult problem to grapple with.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n DA thinks there are worrisome moral implications for atheism. There aren\u2019t, at least not intellectually. That is, nothing about existing morality disproves atheism or proves theism. DA is right that an atheist truth seeker would examine apparent shortcomings to atheism. Are there problems (\u201cshortcomings\u201d) with atheism? That remains to be shown.<\/span> \u201cThe atheist:<\/span><\/p>\n 1) Can\u2019t really consistently define \u201cevil\u201d in the first place;<\/span> The first is false: many atheists can easily define \u201cevil\u201d consistently. Nothing shows that if God doesn\u2019t exist, atheists can\u2019t take the word \u201cevil\u201d and define it consistently. Nothing shows that if atheists don\u2019t or can\u2019t define \u201cevil\u201d consistently then God exists. Typically, by \u201cevil\u201d I am referring to actions that aren\u2019t for the greater good, and by that I mean actions like rape (but there are others).<\/span><\/p>\n The essence of my statement #1 is in the word consistently<\/em>. I show how atheist use is inconsistent throughout my dialogue. It is well\u00a0 summarized in Dostoevsky\u2019s statement, \u201cIf there\u2019s no God\u00a0and no life beyond the grave, doesn\u2019t that mean that\u00a0men will be allowed to do whatever they want?\u201d [see more on this quotation<\/a> from\u00a0The Brothers Karamazov<\/i>\u00a0(1880)]. To my knowledge, the way I used the argument (back in 2001) was not to assert that it proves God exists. Rather, I think it helps to establish that theism (considered as a whole) is more coherent and plausible than atheism.<\/p>\n The second is also false. Even though there is no god, atheists can hope for mean people to be punishing \u201cin the end\u201d, and for kind people to be rewarded \u201cin the end\u201d. But if the author means, atheists typically don\u2019t have any strong evidence for such justice, that\u2019s true, but so too true for the theist. If the author means atheists never hope that there is such justice, that\u2019s false.<\/span><\/p>\n Again, the key here lies in the word eschatological<\/em>, which is a fancy theological 50-cent word for \u201clast things.\u201d It refers to judgment after death, and specifically the Last Judgment: where the scales will be weighed and divine \/ cosmic justice will be applied. Evil people will be judged and sent to hell, and those who are saved by God\u2019s grace will be allowed to enter heaven. Atheism obviously has no such scenario, since it denies the existence of God, the afterlife, human immortality, heaven, and hell, so my statement is absolutely true, as to atheism. It has no such thing, and cannot<\/em>, by definition<\/em>. And from where we stand, this is a huge problem. It\u2019s central to the problem of good.<\/p>\n The 3rd one is also false, depending on what \u201cobjective\u201d means here. If \u201cobjective\u201d means something like \u201cgodly\u201d or \u201csupernatural\u201d then DA is right. Atheists have no godly basis for condemning evil. But atheists do have a grounds for trying to stop it, condemning it, etc. It typically does harm and is typically unwanted (or as I defined it above: it\u2019s not for the great good: it\u2019s not maximally loving). Nothing shows that an atheist can\u2019t criticize evil, or cheating, etc., if that criticism is to point out that such things are indeed not maximally kind.<\/span><\/p>\n \u201cObjective\u201d in this context means a binding, non-arbitrary standard of absolute morals within the framework of atheism. I\u2019m not denying that individual atheists have such moral \/ ethical standards for themselves. Of course they do. What I\u2019m saying is that they are all ultimately<\/strong> arbitrary and relativistic without a God to ground them in<\/em>, and that large atheist systems act in accordance with this moral relativism and\/or amorality (Mao, Lenin, Stalin et al): and we see<\/em> what they produced.<\/p>\n Number 4 is true if it means this: \u201catheists who believe no gods exist don\u2019t believe in a place called Heaven made by a god\u201d. But 4 is false if it means this: \u201catheists can\u2019t believe in a future state of everlasting bliss\/happiness\u201d. <\/span><\/p>\n It\u2019s obvious what it means. Its true for all materialistic atheists. There are dualist atheists, but I am unaware of any who believe in human immortality, and a blissful afterlife. Of course, that is no disproof that they exist. So this curious claim will have to be unpacked and elaborated upon.<\/p>\n Regardless, the author is right that for many\/most atheists, they believe that there are no (known) gods, no (known) Heaven, no eternal (a billion years from now) happiness that some humans here today will experience. Since the atheist is right about such things, this causes no problem.<\/span><\/p>\n It causes a problem for ultimate justice and morality, and ultimate meaningfulness for morality.<\/p>\n Number 5 is basically true: For the typical atheist who listens to science and reason, all the known evidence shows (so far) shows that in a trillion years (\u201cultimately\u201d) there be no life, and this nothing that \u201cmatters\u201d (is \u201cmeaningful\u201d) to anyone. Of course, one can still hope for eternal life. But yes, given that there is no god, and no other evidence of eternal life, atheists typically conclude that \u201cultimately\u201d there is no eternal life (as far as we know). Nothing about this is a problem (intellectually) for the atheist. Those are just facts, truths, likelihoods.<\/span><\/p>\n I\u2019m not talking about the end of the universe. I\u2019m talking about meaningful purpose here and now<\/em> in our human lives. We would claim that any good and noble impulses within atheist consciences are there because they are innate in human beings: put there by God in the first place. If there were no God, they wouldn\u2019t be there and evil would be far, far greater than it is now (and it is a huge and troubling problem now).<\/p>\n DA says that 1 and 3 basically claim \u201catheists cannot have objective morality\u201d. Oddly, there seems to be no definition of \u201cobjective morality\u201d. <\/span><\/p>\n An ethical system of moral absolutes (over against moral relativism). This ain\u2019t rocket science.<\/p>\n If it means \u201cactual values\u201d, then it\u2019s false. Atheists do actually value things. <\/span><\/p>\n Of course<\/em> they do, but that has no bearing upon my argument.<\/p>\n If it means something \u201cgodly\u201d then yes, atheists don\u2019t have godly\/objective morality (and neither does anyone else).<\/span><\/p>\n Those who believe in a God in Whom right and wrong and love are grounded, do possess such a system (especially if that God in fact exists!). Atheists ultimately cannot have it, because the next person can always say, \u201cwho cares what you<\/em> think about morality; that\u2019s just you, and your view is no more worthy of belief or assent than the next<\/em> guy\u2019s . . .\u201d<\/p>\n DA thinks that something here \u201crules out these non-theistic ethics in one fell swoop\u201d<\/span> [that was my opponent\u2019s words], but I see no evidence of this. DA says,<\/span> \u201caccording to the atheist\u2019s presuppositions, taken to their ultimate logical (and above all, practical, in concrete, real-world, human terms) consequences, cannot be carried through in a non-arbitrary manner, and will always end up incoherent and morally objectionable. \u201c<\/span> What does this mean? It\u2019s not clear from the get-go.<\/span><\/p>\n Well, that\u2019s what I unpack in the very lengthy dialogue. The key word is ultimate<\/em>: it\u2019s a \u201clogical reduction to<\/em> . . .\u201d argument.<\/p>\n DA says if there is no god, then morality<\/span> \u201cwill always be either completely arbitrary, relativistic to the point of absurdity, or derived from axiomatic assumptions requiring no less faith than Christian ethics require.\u201d<\/span> Yes, nothing shows this to be true. What is true is that if one continues to ask questions about things we will always get to an arbitrary point (the point in which we don\u2019t have an answer for something). Some of our knowledge is already like that! But DA was wrong to say that it is<\/span> \u201ccompletely arbitrary\u201d<\/span>, unless he meant, \u201cat rock bottom\u201d and was just repeating the point I just made. <\/span><\/p>\n Yes, I meant \u201cat rock bottom\u201d or \u201cultimately.\u201d The Christian \u201crock bottom\u201d is God. The atheist rock bottom is like peeling an onion: it\u2019s nothing<\/em>.<\/p>\n So, basically, an atheist morality is ultimately arbitrary (as is any known morality), <\/span><\/p>\n I deny that Christian morality is arbitrary at all.<\/p>\n but nothing about that proves God.<\/span><\/p>\n I didn\u2019t say it did<\/em> prove God (let\u2019s not get ahead of ourselves). I argued that it was an internal difficulty of atheism<\/em>: specifically for atheist morality and ethics.<\/p>\n So far the author hasn\u2019t done anything to show that this atheistic \u201crelativistic\u201d morality leads to any absurdity that falsifies it. Nor has the author shown that an atheistic morality requires Christian ethics (\u201cGod\u201d) to be true.<\/span><\/p>\n That\u2019s what the dialogue was about. I would have to be shown point-by-point that I supposedly did not succeed in my aim. Overarching statements like this<\/em> prove nothing<\/em>. They are not even rational arguments.<\/p>\n God doesn\u2019t exist, but that doesn\u2019t show that we permit any and all things, thus it is false to say \u201cif God doesn\u2019t exist, anything is permissible\u201d. A better phrasing would be \u201cif God doesn\u2019t exist, then God doesn\u2019t stop anything\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n Many atheists (at least those in power) did indeed conclude that any evil was possible in a godless universe. If there is no ultimate morality and justice, of course this is true. It comes down to raw power and \u201cmight makes right\u201d and reducing human beings to the \u201cred in tooth and claw\u201d state of primal nature and the animal kingdom, where the strong rule, in an amoral state of affairs.<\/p>\n DA wrongly equates the evils done in the name of Christianity with the evils done by Stalin, who was an atheist, but his evils were not done \u201cin the name of\u201d Atheism.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n It\u2019s irrelevant what they were done in the name<\/em> of (although \u201corthodox\u201d \/ classic Communism is by definition atheistic). What\u2019s relevant is what was done and what was the worldview of the person doing it.<\/p>\n Regardless, nothing here is relevant to the issue of whether God exists.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n I agree!<\/p>\n \u00a0Assuming Christians did \u201cevil\u201d doesn\u2019t prove or disprove god (except that, technically, Rapes disprove Evil), but assuming Atheists did \u201cevil\u201d wouldn\u2019t prove or disprove God.<\/span><\/p>\n Yep. That\u2019s why I wasn\u2019t arguing for those things. I was pointing out the difficulties for atheism, of the problem of good (see the brief definition above).<\/p>\n It may be true that some atheists \u201cfeel\u201d themselves to be the measure of all things. But those atheists are wrong. <\/span><\/p>\n On what absolute moral basis can you say<\/em> they are \u201cwrong\u201d?<\/p>\n They aren\u2019t the measure of how long a football field is, the measure of how painful and hurtful rape is, etc. <\/span><\/p>\n What is the measure? And how and why would all human beings be bound<\/em> to it, in a godless ethical system?<\/p>\n But nothing about this proves God\/disproves atheism.<\/span><\/p>\n Yep. If we can ever get beyond these non sequiturs<\/em>, maybe we\u2019ll get<\/em> somewhere.<\/p>\n Here\u2019s probably the major thing overlooked in this discussion: DA wonders how the kind atheist would respond to the unkind atheist. We kind atheists would say, we hope you act kindly!\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n On what absolute \/ objective basis do you define \u201ckindly\u201d and how and why would all human beings be bound<\/em> to it?<\/p>\n And we probably would throw unkind atheists (like rapists) in jail.<\/span><\/p>\n Yes, folks like you would do that, no doubt. It has no bearing on my overall argument. I seems that you have no fully comprehended<\/em> the latter.<\/p>\n But DA wants to know how atheists can show \u201cwhy and how the other person should be \u201cbound\u201d to the moral observations\u201d. And there\u2019s the mistake. Atheists can\u2019t show, automatically, that all persons (including the unkind atheists) are \u201cbound\u201d to be kind, other than to say \u201cif you are mean, we will try to throw you in jail!\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n Exactly! Thanks for conforming a major component of my argument.<\/p>\n Here the theist DA imagines that all atheists have to believe in what\u2019s often called an \u201cObjective Moral Law\/Duty\u201d, which usually is spelled out as saying \u201cAll people, regardless, MUST be kind\u201d. But this is false. All people, regardless, do not have to be kind. Those who desire to be kind must be kind (if they are trying to satisfy that desire).<\/span><\/p>\n You certainly believe (or act<\/em> like you believe) that rape<\/em> is a thing that is essentially a moral absolute in all times and places. It\u2019s presupposed in your arguments regarding the EPOE. You apply that and assume it to be true. If you didn\u2019t, the force of your EPOE argument against God would be weakened to almost nil. But Japanese troops during the Rape of Nanking<\/a> (not particularly religiously observant) did not<\/em> do so, did<\/em> they?:<\/p>\n In the mere six weeks during which the Japanese perpetrated the Nanking Massacre starting on Dec. 13, 1937, an estimated\u00a020,000-80,000 Chinese women<\/a>\u00a0were brutally raped and sexually assaulted by the invading soldiers. They sometimes went door-to-door, dragging out women and even small children and violently gang-raping them. Then, once they\u2019d finished with their victims, they often murdered them. . . .<\/p>\n The invaders, though, didn\u2019t even stop at simply murder. They made these women suffer in the worst ways possible. Pregnant mothers were cut open and rape victims were sodomized with bamboo sticks and bayonets until they died in agony.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n You don\u2019t think that rape is a moral absolute, and that it is wrong at all times? If you don\u2019t, then you just justified the Rape of Nanking, or at least provided the \u201cethical\u201d basis for someone else<\/em> (in power) to justify and rationalize it. In atheist \u201ceschatology there is\u00a0 no ultimate justice for perpetrators of monstrous crimes such as these. In Christian cosmology there is ultimate justice and hell awaiting those who do such things and who do not repent of them.<\/p>\n I think you would agree with me, on the other hand that the nuclear bombing of Japan was immoral insofar as it killed innocent civilians (the US then became as evil as their enemy). But in an atheist world of morality, there is no compelling reason to explain why it is immoral, and must never be violated.<\/p>\n Of course, it is Catholic (and to a large extent, larger Christian) binding moral teaching on just war that provides that rationale.<\/p>\n And that is the solution that refutes (apparently) all of these theistic attempts to use morality to disprove atheism.<\/span><\/p>\n It\u2019s no solution at all. This amounts to saying (to paraphrase your words): \u201cAll people do not have to refrain from rape. Those who desire not to rape must not rape (if they are trying to satisfy that desire to not do so).\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n DA claims that the atheism will result in something that is \u201cincoherent and morally objectionable\u201d. The truth of that depends on how he is defining those terms. <\/span><\/p>\n The same way the logician and the one arguing the problem of evil does. The latter presupposes that there are things that are indisputably wrong, and agreed to be so by all, as virtually self-evident. Otherwise, his indictment against God (which fails, even as is) could not even begin<\/em> to succeed. In other words, he has to tacitly admit that the problem of good is a problem for atheism, in order to proceed against God and theism; and that is incoherent and self-contradictory. He winds up arguing as much for<\/em> God as against<\/em>, by utilizing such weak arguments.<\/p>\n The issue here is whether atheism is false. <\/span><\/p>\n It\u2019s one of the issues in the \u201clong run\u201d but not primarily in my mind (if at all) when making the problem of good argument. I\u2019m saying, \u201cthese are the consequences on the ground of atheism, taken consistently to its logical extreme.\u201d That argument can be made wholly apart from whether God exists or not.<\/p>\n If there is no God and there are rapes, then we live in a world that is \u201cmorally objectionable\u201d if one means by that \u201cfrustrating to kind people\u201d. <\/span><\/p>\n There you go again presupposing the absolute \u201crape is wrong.\u201d If you didn\u2019t<\/em>, you couldn\u2019t say that the world was\u00a0\u201cmorally objectionable\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n But nothing about that disproves atheism.<\/span><\/p>\n I don\u2019t think anything absolutely disproves it (if e want to get technical). I think it is thoroughly implausible and not worthy of belief, over against the far superior theistic alternative. But that\u2019s an altogether separate argument (or separate large set of arguments). I\u2019m simply stating my position on that,m since you keep bringing it up<\/em>, for some odd reason.<\/p>\n Those are again just the facts about the world we live in.<\/span><\/p>\n Which is neither here nor there, but it has some remote bearing on the present discussion . . .<\/p>\n DA is right about one thing: \u201cmorality\u201d is relative in one sense: people exist, and they often desire\/prefer\/like\/want different things. Thus, for those who prefer pizza, what is wise for them to do (what they \u201cought to do\u201d prima facie<\/em>) is eat pizza. For those who prefer hot dogs, prima facie<\/em>, what is wise for them to do (again what they \u201cought to do\u201d) is eat hot dogs. There is relativism in what we enjoy.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Subjective preferences related to taste buds hardly has anything to do with morality<\/em> . . .<\/p>\n Morality is fundamentally about values, which often differ. Thus moral relativism of the sort described here is true\/real\/exists. Yes, theists usually here try to say \u201cmorality\u201d is not like that. (But it is!) The burden is on the theist to show, even when person A says \u201cI want to be mean (more than anything else)\u201d and person B says \u201cI want to kind (more than anything else)\u201d that one of these people \u201cought\u201d to do something other than what they want more than anything else. I\u2019ve never seen anyone come close to showing this. What seems to be happening is that (typically) kind people want the mean people to be kind, so they try to trick the mean people by saying odd things like \u201cyou just have to be kind! Everyone Ought to be kind!\u201d But there\u2019s no evidence for this. People who want a kind world should be kind. What you \u201cought\u201d to do (even morally!) depends on what you want. (To be clear, by \u201cought\u201d I mean something like \u201cis sensible\/reasonable for you to do\u201d). What one person has a reason to do often doesn\u2019t apply to a different person with different values\/desires. Hence, there is no Objective (necessary, godly, necessarily universal) \u201cought\u201d (as far as we know).<\/span><\/p>\n Thanks for the description! What an utterly terrifying \u201cworld\u201d that is . . .<\/p>\n If you then say, but morality (i.e., what we value) is \u201carbitrary\u201d (we could value lots of different things, and we do!) that\u2019s again just a fact about the world<\/span><\/p>\n It\u2019s a fact about the atheist worldview, not the theistic one. What we believe makes a difference in how we act and how we construct moral and ethical systems.<\/p>\n It doesn\u2019t prove God or disprove atheism.<\/span><\/p>\n The mantra . . .<\/p>\n Nothing here is \u201cabsurd\u201d to the point of falsifying anything I\u2019ve said. And again, nothing here (or elsewhere) requires anything about God or its supposed ethics).<\/span><\/p>\n I agree; it\u2019s perfectly logical, according to your [false] premises. And it is perfectly terrifying in its consequences.<\/p>\n Returning to your \u201cimmoral atheist\u201d story, you are right about one thing: if the kind atheist says to the immoral atheist, \u201cI don\u2019t like your unkindness!\u201d that might not register\/affect the immoral atheist. The kind atheist can try to persuade (I\u2019ll give you donuts if you are kind!), threaten (I\u2019ll thrown you jail if you are mean!\u201d) but you are right: there isn\u2019t anything that guarantees this will work, that, regardless of its meanness, the immoral atheist just \u201cought\u201d or \u201chas to\u201d be kind. The theists mistake is in thinking that everyone really does have to be kind (and some atheists say this, which doesn\u2019t help), regardless of anything. But that\u2019s false. So, those who are kind live in a difficult world: mean people live here too! So, we can try to persuade or threaten them, or run from them. Or, as most people seem to have done, we can create a false narrative where we trick the mean people by saying \u201cyou\u2019ve just GOT to be kind!\u201d (end of story). If one continues this story, there\u2019s nothing that will show that claim to be true.<\/span><\/p>\n Of course, this is why societies construct legal systems, which hold that certain behaviors are wrong, and therefore, punishable by law. Law presupposes moral absolutes. And I would say that law in a given country will reflect its religious heritage, because that is what the views of right and wrong, and what should be illegal are ultimately based on: that and natural law.<\/p>\n So, the mistake you made it seems is in thinking that \u201catheism is incompatible with such reprehensible behavior\u201d. As I\u2019ve shown, atheism is quite compatible with reprehensible behavior (mean people). <\/span><\/p>\n Yes, I fully agree (with the second<\/em> sentence)! But of course, what is \u201creprehensible\u201d and \u201cmean\u201d? You have to casually assume moral absolutes to discuss morality at all (i.e., if you condemn any particular behaviors).<\/p>\n Whereas of course, the theist hasn\u2019t shown that rapists (mean people) probably are for the greater good (and thus allowed by a perfect in all ways being).<\/span><\/p>\n We can get to that in due course. One thing at a time. You have so far concentrated on the problem of good, and I don\u2019t see how you have overthrown it at all.<\/p>\n DA says, \u201cwhy and how [should] the other person\u2026be \u201cbound\u201d to the moral observations\u201d<\/span>. I\u2019ve now answered that: they aren\u2019t \u201cbound\u201d in any sense other than worldly, human ways, like jails.<\/span><\/p>\n And, as I just argued, jails and judges and laws all presuppose an absolute system of morals and right and wrong. Otherwise, there could be no laws at all, and \u201ceverything would be permitted\u201d (legal and moral anarchy). We would be back to Dostoevsky.<\/p>\n DA then says, the reason that all people are bound (\u201cought\u201d, are required regardless of desires\u2026) to be kind is \u201cbecause God provides the over-arching \u201cabsolute\u201d and principle of right and wrong which allows for coherent ethics and non-arbitrary determination of good and evil.\u201d As I\u2019ve shown, people aren\u2019t all bound. Secondly, if you look closely (at words like \u201cright\u201d and \u201cwrong\u201d), you won\u2019t find anything here that proves \u201cGod provides an absolute principle of right and wrong\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n Technically, I likely (without looking at it again) wasn\u2019t trying to prove that God was. I was simply saying, \u201cthis is the coherent Christian alternative.\u201d<\/p>\n DA is honest when he says, \u201cChristians believe that God put this inherent sense in all human beings, so that they instinctively have a moral compass, and therefore largely agree on right and wrong in the main\u201d. This is a belief, but it isn\u2019t knowledge: it\u2019s not shown to be probable.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n
\nDA says that atheists have 5 problems:<\/span><\/p>\n
\n2) Has no hope of eventual eschatological justice;<\/span>
\n3) Has no objective basis of condemning evil;<\/span>
\n4) Has no belief in a heaven of everlasting bliss;<\/span>
\n5) Has to believe in an ultimately absolutely hopeless and meaningless universe.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n