We all need to understand that the bravery of all the people- the police,
\nthe NSG, MARCOS, the Army etc etc needs to be saluted. But in
\nthe process of saluting the bravery of these men and women, we should
\nnot forget to highlight the total ill preparedness of the forces- and
\nfor that matter even of what we call the elite special service forces-
\nthe NSG and MARCOS. In my opinion these forces went into the action as
\nif fighting a urban war and not a rescue or hostage situation. Do not
\nget me wrong. The bravery is applauded, not the tactics.<\/p>\n
There are so many weapons and stealth tactics- like gas bombs,flash
\nbombs, pepper bombs, chloform bombs etc- and any military or defence
\nexpert will give you a big list which could have been used to
\nneutralise (not kill) the terrorists and maybe also save hostages. The
\namount of firepower that was used in the Nariman House encounter right
\nfrom the beginning indicated that the NSG was acting as if there was
\nno hostage situation. It was for 3 nights, so stealth night tactics
\ncould have also been used. Cut off electricity to the building, make
\nit pitch dark- use night vision goggles, thermal cameras (things that
\nyou see being abundantly used in nighttime wildlife videography) so
\nthat the terrorist sees nothing and you have a much better view. I did not
\nsee a single gas mask or a singe night vision goggles in any NSG commando.
\nYou would know better from your sources. No such tactic was used. There
\nare so many stealth techniques that could have been used to help save
\nhostages and if the hostages had already been killed you could have
\ngot the terrorist alive- that would have been a prized catch- to help
\nyou finish the investigations quickly and learn more from them, gather
\nintelligence so that future attacks could be prevented. I think this
\naspect of the operation was totally mishandled and we have lost a
\ngreat opportunity in terms of saving us from future attacks. In the
\nheat of the moment, the knee jerk reaction to kill rather than capture
\nwill be something that we may regret later.<\/p>\n
And when you had the terrorist cornered during the last stages of the
\naction, such incapacitating tactics could have been used. The Taj
\nbeing a five star had centralised air conditioning. Which means that
\nincapacitating gases- tear gas, chloroform etc etc could have been
\ninjected through the ducting. The NSG being a elite force should
\nobviously been trained in such tactics- there must have been mock
\ndrills carried out in urban buildings, hotels situations etc.The
\nquestion being raised is why were such strategies not employed. The
\nattack on an urban building was not something that would not been
\nenvisaged in the training manuals. So accordingly strategy and tactics
\nwould also have been studied, trained, practiced and perfected. From
\nthe visuals of the operation it seems that no such tactics or strategy
\nwas used.<\/p>\n
Look at the NSG themselves. They came in a bus from the airport- which
\nmeans that 1 hour was lost in that travel- in which time they could
\nhave been properly briefed about the hotel layout, etc etc had they
\nbeen carried in a more relevant vehicle having TV screens, projectors,
\ndrawing boards and such modern briefing equipments. It was pathetic to
\nsee that precious time was lost to brief them properly after they had
\nreached the encounter site only. And that one hour journey from the
\nairport was only a bus ride!!<\/p>\n
Secondly look how the hostages were simply let go once they had come
\nout of the hotel premises. Some went away by public transport, some
\nwith the police, some with their friends and relatives. Every hostage
\nrescued was a wealth of information about the encounter. Each needed
\nto be debriefed and information collected in a professional manner and
\nthe same relayed back to the commandos. That did not seem to have
\nhappened from what i could understand.<\/p>\n
Thirdly, look at the use of communication equipment being used by the
\ncommandos- walkie talkies- these are of 70 vintage. Nowadays, each
\ncommando had to have had earpieces and microphones strapped on to the
\nhead\/helment so that hands are free and he is in constant touch with
\nhis team and superiors. The way the commandos went in and came out
\nfrom the operation \u2013 it did not look that they were using modern
\ncommunication tools.<\/p>\n
Also look into the Nariman House encounter- i saw commandos going in
\nwith rocket launchers and bazookas. You definitely do not fight a
\nhostage situation that way. In fact in my opinion what differentiated
\nthe NSG from the army was the dress- one in black and the other in
\nolive green. The equipment was the same- nothing elite and modern to
\ntackle such a situation. And don\u2019t get me wrong- the tactics and
\nstrategy of using brute force to eliminate the enemy was also the
\nsame.<\/p>\n
Therefore the notion that the NSG is a elite force to tackle such
\nsituations need to be looked into again. The training, the equipments
\nprovided, the tactics etc has to be seriously looked into. We need to
\nhire or take the services of the Americans and the Israelis to train
\nour people in urban anti-terror and hostage situations. More
\nimportantly we need to have modern equipments etc to tackle such
\nhostage situations and our elite forces should be trained to use them.
\nNot just firepower and lots of bravery. More of technology,
\nequipments, and tactics. For in the end the objective of any such
\nsituation should be as follows- first the hostages, second the
\ncapturing of the terrorists alive and finally if all else fails (after
\nuse of the modern available options), the killing of the terrorist.
\nFor the final kill is a given- it is only a matter of time. And that
\nshould be the last objective- for there is no incentive to kill the
\nterrorist. With him dies the entire chain of events- the support base,
\nthe masterminds, the training methodologies, the logic of choosing
\ntargets and locations etc etc. A host of information and intelligence-
\nintelligence that would otherwise have taken lots of time and effort
\nto garner, is lost with the death of the terrorist. And such
\ninformation is invaluable when it come to preventing future attacks.<\/p>\n<\/body><\/html>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
We all need to understand that the bravery of all the people- the police,
\nthe NSG, MARCOS, the Army etc etc needs to be saluted. But in
\nthe process of saluting the bravery of these men and women, we should
\nnot forget to highlight the total ill preparedness of the forces- and
\nfor that matter even of what we call the elite special service forces-
\nthe NSG and MARCOS. In my opinion these forces went into the action as
\nif fighting a urban war and not a rescue or hostage situation. Do not
\nget me wrong. The bravery is applauded, not the tactics.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1531,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[33,76],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-6948","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-india","category-terrorism"],"yoast_head":"\n