wrote about it at length back in February<\/a>.<\/p>\nIn any case, I figure that summarizing his book gives me an organizing framework for something of The Truth in 401(k) history.<\/p>\n
So:<\/p>\n
He starts with \u201cBefore the Swindle,\u201d in which he portrays the pre-401(k) days as a golden period. \u00a0Social Security saved the elderly from poverty \u2014 though he mentions the initial 1% payroll tax and fails to mention that, as benefits grew over time, the tax rate did, too. \u00a0And Defined Benefit plans \u2014 well, they were basically a foolproof method of providing retirement benefits, with public employers \u201ctaking the lead\u201d in retirement benefits. <\/p>\n
He says, \u201cuntil 1980, most public- and private-sector retirement plans, as well as Social Security, were techinically defined benefit<\/i>\u00a0plans. \u00a0In those plans, plans, participants pay into a collective pool from which benefits to retirees are paid.\u201d \u00a0Benefits were funded on a pay-as-you-go basis in private plans, until ERISA established minimum funding requirements in 1974, but even underfunded plans are OK because incoming contributions will fund current benefits.<\/p>\n
Need I say that this is very simplistic? \u00a0The first odd thing is that he refers to \u201cparticipant\u201d contributions but virtually no private-sector plans require employee contributions, because, unlike 401(k) contributions, they are taxed rather than being made pre-tax. \u00a0 Second, he mentions the Studebaker bankruptcy which was part of the impetus of the funding requirements in ERISA, but fails to truly recognize that, unlike state pensions where, let\u2019s face it, the state government isn\u2019t going anywhere, unfunded private-sector plans are not a trivial issue. \u00a0The PBGC protects pension participants but no one\u2019s particularly happy with the prospect of the government assuming large liabilities. \u00a0And it\u2019s not the magic of \u201cpooled\u201d funds that kept DB plans going, but employers who were required to pay benefits no matter what.<\/i>
<\/i>And Social Security and employer-sponsored plans both benefitted from the growth in the economy and the population in their heyday. \u00a0There are quotes from Social Security policymakers from its early days praising it as a \u201cgood\u201d pyramid scheme, and in the early days of employer-sponsored DB plans, they were seen as basically free money \u2014 promising benefits to workers that would be paid far into the future, to save on pay increases in the present, and expecting that the company would continue to grow, so that when benefits came due, they would be a trivial expense. \u00a0<\/i>
<\/i>Little did people imagine at the time that GM would one day be called a pension plan which makes cars, due to the size of its pension liabilities relative to the company itself!<\/i>
<\/i>Chapter 2, A Fix for What Wasn\u2019t Broken, starts with a detour into Milton Friedman and his devotees, then moves onto the advent of 401(k)s. \u00a0\u201cWhen the Republicans came into national office in 1981, 59 percent of people who had private employer-based retirement plans had defined benefit plans. \u00a0Section 401(k) had been part of Internal Revenue Code for just over two years. \u00a0In 1978, Ted Benna, a benefits consultant, convinced the Internal Revenue Service to add subsection (k) to section 401 of the code. . . \u00a0by 2010 . . . only 19 percent [of private-sector workers with retirement plans] had defined benefit plans, while 81 percent had defined contribution ones.\u201d<\/p>\n
Why did this happen? \u00a0Quite simply, because companies were greedy; they saw an opportunity to get rid of risk and to reduce their total compensation costs (by funding 401(k)s less generously than they previously had their DB plans), and they took it, deceiving their employees into believing they were getting a better deal than they actually were.<\/p>\n
Let\u2019s start with the fact that Benna did not \u201cconvince\u201d the IRS of anything. \u00a0The IRS code is law, passed by Congress. \u00a0Section 401(k) already existed. \u00a0What Benna did was realize that this existing provision could be used to allow employees to save money for retirement on a pre-tax basis \u2014 and, to clarify, the 401(k) plan refers to an employee\u2019s ability to defer compensation; employer contributions are a different story altogether, and various forms of \u201cDC\u201d plans had been around pre-401(k), including Money Purchase Pension Plans (a form of DC in which the employer commits to a fixed percent of pay contribution each year, and the default benefit form is an annuity), and more generic \u201ccapital accumulation\u201d plans. \u00a0<\/i>
<\/i>There are also two reasons for the shift from 59\/41 to 19\/81: \u00a0existing employers freezing DB plans, and newly established companies, or companies offering retirement plans for the first time, choosing a 401(k).<\/i>
<\/i>And employers weren\u2019t simply motivated by cost-cutting, and weren\u2019t tricking their employees. \u00a0Traditional defined benefit plans are designed to provide significant benefits to career employees, and much smaller benefits to job-hoppers, even if they stick around long enough to vest. \u00a0Consider a worker who leaves a job after 10 years, at age 32, with a pay of 30,000, and receives a benefit of 1% of pay x years of service x final pay. \u00a0His benefit for this period is 10% of 30,000 = 3,000 per year, at age 65. \u00a0If he had stuck around, and had annual pay raises of, conservatively, 3% per year, he\u2019d be getting, for just this 10-year period, about $8,000 per year. \u00a0This means that a worker who expects to work at many different companies is much better off with a 401(k) plan than a DB plan, even if they had the same vesting requirements, and that when employers modelled changes to 401(k)s or \u201ccash balance\u201d pension plans, they had to take into account that the benefit at retirement for a full-career employee would be lower, but benefits for workers who leave at a younger age would be higher than before. \u00a0<\/i>
<\/i>In the author\u2019s case, he chose a 401(k) when he started what turned into his \u201clifetime\u201d job, but he didn\u2019t know at the time that he would make his career there; hindsight is 20\/20.<\/i>
<\/i>Here\u2019s another Fun Fact: \u00a0in the UK, employers are moving to Defined Contribution plans at an even faster clip than in the U.S., and with the very clear intention of cutting costs. \u00a0He cites DC plans as having contribution rates of 5.8% of pay, compared to 14.2% for DB plans. \u00a0Well, guess what? \u00a0Perfectly ordinary DB plans became increasingly expensive as the government added increasing layers of requirements: \u00a0mandatory COLAs, spouses\u2019 and orphans\u2019 pensions, indexation of pensions for deferred vested employees, and more; and funding requirements became a lot stricter (including very conservative mortality assumptions projecting life expectancy improvement into the future) \u2014 so that pension costs grew out of control. \u00a0He says 14%. \u00a0My colleagues in the UK say it\u2019s more like 25% \u2014 which is just not sustainable.<\/i>
<\/i>Next Chapter: \u00a0Army Tanks and Think Tanks. <\/p>\n
So he starts with the Pinochet coup in Chile. \u00a0I get that Pinochet was a dictator, but I didn\u2019t realize the prior context, that the overthrown president, Allende, was a socialist who was busily expropriating businesses. \u00a0I haven\u2019t really studied this whole history and I suspect it\u2019s not as simple as the \u201cAllende good, Pinochet evil\u201d version that Russell tells (it\u2019s my understanding that the economic reforms of this period helped Chile become a middle-income country \u2014 and, unlike many of its neighbors, we can actually set discount rates for actuarial valuations using corporate bond rates). \u00a0In any event, Pinochet set about privatizing the Social Security system by replacing existing defined benefits with a 10% contribution to a pension fund, with a minimum benefit. <\/p>\n
Later, the World Bank developed its multipillar model, in which the largest portion of retirement benefits are from individual accounts, and this system was adopted, with variations, by multiple Latin American and Eastern European countries.<\/p>\n
But, he says, the World Bank is a bunch of hypocrites because World Bank officials themselves don\u2019t have DC, but rather, DB plans.<\/p>\n
So here\u2019s the bottom line: \u00a0the World Bank multipillar system was intended to meet dual purposes of providing retirement savings and to help countries which are trying to develop modern financial systems \u2014 especially Eastern European countries emerging from communism. \u00a0Is the World Bank a bunch of hypocrites for having a DB plan? \u00a0They never said that employers can\u2019t offer DB plans, but the reality of the countries they worked with is that no such employer-sponsored plans existed in the first place, except perhaps for executives, so that creating an environment with any sort of voluntary employer retirement provision is a big step in the first place.<\/i>
<\/i>Next up: \u00a0\u201cTargeting Social Security and Public Worker Pensions\u201d<\/p>\n
In which he finally gets to a favorite liberal trope and references the Koch brothers to be sure we know how nefarious Social Security privatizers are, mentioning a publication by the \u201cKoch brothers-financed Cato Institute\u201d (page 54). <\/p>\n
Russell starts with the Social Security proposals of David Stockman, which were too bitter a pill for the Soc Sec crisis of the early 80s and were thoroughly rejected, to be replaced by a mix of tax increases and benefit cuts, which he describes reasonably neutrally. \u00a0He then moves to further proposals for Social Security privatization, which he attributes to the profit motive: \u00a0\u201cThe more that Social Security can be privatized, the more new profit opportunities the financial services industry will have.\u201d <\/p>\n
Would any such privatization proposal have made any sense? Russell says no, but offers no other analysis than the fact that his annuitized TIAA-CREF benefit was lower, as a percent of contributions, than his Social Security benefit. <\/p>\n
Conservative think tanks continued to publish Social Security privatization proposals, and President George W. Bush tried to use his political capital to push such a program but the public wasn\u2019t buying it. \u00a0Other proposals consisted of what Russell calls \u201cadd-on\u201d privatization: \u00a0\u201cAn add-on proposal, like the USA accounts, would continue the same revenue base for Social Security, while giving citizens government subsidies to open private accounts in addition . . . Add-ons . . . choke off the possibility of expanding hte defined benefit character of Social Security.\u201d<\/p>\n
Subsequent to this proposal, in 2010, the Simpson-Bowles commission on deficit reduction recommended significant cuts in Social Security, all of which Russell opposes. \u00a0Raising the retirement age? \u00a0It would hurt manual workers who are worn out from their work sooner than white-collar workers. \u00a0Reducing the COLA? \u00a0Squeezes the elderly. \u00a0Reducing benefit accruals for upper earners? \u00a0\u201cThe long-term effect, if not a stated goal, would be to reduce Social Security to an elderly poverty-reduction program only, eventually possibly even a means-tested one.\u201d<\/p>\n
Time to jump in again. \u00a0<\/i>
<\/i>The key idea behind any privatization proposal is that a funded Social Security system has more stability than an unfunded one, and that having a clear relationship between benefits and contributions minimizes political trickery. \u00a0When Social Security was taking in more in taxes than it was paying out, the money just went to offset deficits in the federal budget. \u00a0If there had been funded accounts, the excess contributions wouldn\u2019t have been \u201clost.\u201d \u00a0of course, the same goal could have been accomplished by a \u201cSovereign Wealth\u201d-type fund, in which the Social Security Administration invests in the private market, but there was a quite reasonable fear that pressure would be too great for such a fund to truly be run in an apolitical way, vs. investing in favored industries.<\/i><\/p>\n
Next item: \u00a0his claim that Social Security is the better deal based on contributions vs. annuities. \u00a0I can\u2019t check his math, but he refers to the \u201ctotal accumulation\u201d in the TIAA-CREF statement, and it\u2019s not clear to me whether he truly differentiates between the account balance and the split between contributions and investment earnings; he also fails to recognize that, as an older worker, he\u2019s benefitted greatly from the fact that Social Security contributions were originally much lower than now. \u00a0There are plenty of studies that discuss the actuarial \u201cfairness\u201d or lack thereof, of Social Security vs. private plans, but he doesn\u2019t cite any of them in his text except to make a blanket claim that any projection that makes private accounts look good uses unrealistic assumptions.<\/i>
<\/i>But it becomes clear at this point that he rejects any manner of private saving for retirement. \u00a0He\u2019s also now beginning to speak quite contradictorily: \u00a0Social Security functions on individual contributions, and everybody pays their own way (though he acknowledges this isn\u2019t really true), but yet there\u2019s nothing about Social Security\u2019s actuarial position that a nice healthy tax increase won\u2019t solve, especially by removing caps on taxable income (which would, of course, make this a \u201cwelfare\u201d program for the middle class, and whether Russell gets this and doesn\u2019t want to acknowledge it, or not, I\u2019m not sure).<\/i><\/p>\n
Finally, a lengthy section on public pensions. \u00a0He discusses campaigns to move state workers to 401(k)s , and claims that this is wholly unnecessary because public pensions are, on average, well-funded, and, even those that aren\u2019t, are not in any real danger because they can continue to pay benefits on a pay-as-you-go fashion.<\/p>\n
He doesn\u2019t really get it. \u00a0The issue with public pensions isn\u2019t their funding level. \u00a0It\u2019s the corruption \u2014 legislators increasing benefit levels beyond all reason, with early retirement ages, substantial pay replacement, and full COLAs, because they\u2019ll get union support without the bill coming due until long after they\u2019ve left power. \u00a0Pensions which are generally untouchable for existing employees, even for future accruals. \u00a0Local officials and administrators who can play games with pension spiking to maximize benefits, with fat raises just before retirement for teachers, for instance. \u00a0<\/i>
<\/i>What\u2019s more, whether pension plans are \u201cfully funded\u201d means something different for public vs. private plans; for accounting purposes, a state plan\u2019s actuarial valuation is based on a discount rate derived from their expected asset return (invest in risky assets and magically your liabilities drop) where a private plan is required to use a high-quality corporate bond rate.<\/i>
<\/i>Fundamentally, a 401(k) or any similar plan ensures that the State can\u2019t cheat but has to pay its obligations to its employees when they are earned, rather than deferring them to far in the future.<\/i><\/p>\n
Chapter 5, How 401(k)s are supposed to work and why they don\u2019t<\/p>\n
This is taking forever, and I\u2019m only halfway through is book, so I\u2019ll summarize this chapter very briefly: \u00a0401(k)s aren\u2019t an adequate replacement for pensions because the financial services industry charges too much in fees. \u00a0That\u2019s his bottom line.<\/p>\n
There\u2019s more to it than that in his story \u2014 participants spend their balances between jobs rather than rolling them over (which is no different than participants spending their small-amount lump sums from DB plans), and employers don\u2019t contribute as much to DC plans as they had to DB plans. \u00a0But that\u2019s basically it.<\/p>\n
I don\u2019t have the data in front of me to directly address his statement about investment fees in DC accounts. \u00a0He is certainly correct that DC accounts earn less and are more expensive, fee-wise, than a proportional share of an employer\u2019s pension fund. \u00a0His discussion of the price-gouging of annuity providers misunderstands how insurance annuities work, though, and I\u2019ll address that later because he returns to the subject.<\/i>
<\/i>Chapter 6, A Model Unravels<\/p>\n
Was the Chilean model the solution to everything? \u00a0People discovered that it wasn\u2019t providing returns as high as hoped, and that many Chileans would be receiving very low incomes from their accounts. \u00a0The solution was not to return to a traditional DB system, but to top-up the DC accounts. <\/p>\n
Russell then discusses the private accounts in Argentina, and praises the Kirchner nationalization of these accounts in 2008, 15 years after the private account system was begun. Was it an expropriation of private funds to shore up a struggling (to put it nicely) government? \u00a0In Russell\u2019s view, this was nothing other than the government \u201cprotect[ing] victims of a financial swindle.\u201d<\/p>\n
Chapter 7, Turmoil in the Land of Steady Habits<\/p>\n
Here Russell tells his personal story. \u00a0In 1986, he joined the faculty at Eastern Connecticut State University, and had the option to join the public pension plan or the TIAA-CREF 401(k); he chose the latter without much understanding of the difference between the two, and was shocked, when he reached retirement age, at how little a benefit this had earned him, so he asked nicely to be let back into the public DB plan, then found out that they had grounds for a lawsuit: \u00a0\u201cthe state was guilty of wrongdoing by not providing ARP members with adequate inforamtion. \u00a0Their officials had not told new employees that the ARP and SERS plans rendered unequal benefits. \u00a0Nor had they told new employees that their decisions would be irrevocable.\u201d \u00a0As a result of their lawsuit and union negotiations, the DC participants were given the opportunity to return to the DB plan by transferring back their accrued balances, though he doesn\u2019t detail the mechanics of the transfer.<\/p>\n
Last Chapter, What We Can Do<\/p>\n
In which he moves on to his prescriptions.<\/p>\n
1. \u00a0Strengthen and Expand Social Security<\/p>\n
I mentioned before his twin statements that Social Security benefits are earned, fair and square, but at the same time, the cure for Social Security\u2019s actuarial imbalance is to remove the cap on wage income and to begin to tax non-wage income; in other words, to make the Social Security \u201cFICA contributions\u201d into a component of ordinary income tax.<\/p>\n
2. \u00a0Supplementary Social Security Accounts<\/p>\n
\u201cSocial Security could be expanded so that employers could begin eliminating their employee retirement plans and redirecting contributions into new supplementary Social Security accounts. \u00a0The accounts would increase Social Security benefits for participants.\u201d<\/p>\n
Look, I get that he\u2019s not an actuary. \u00a0But he has no business proposing ideas such as this without any clue as to what this would mean in terms of the numbers or any mechanics of how it would work. \u00a0<\/i><\/p>\n
He also proposes supplementary IRAs which would allow participants to add to their average wage (by filling in years with low pay in the 35-year average) to increase their Social Security benefit at retirement. <\/p>\n
3. \u00a0Social Security Annuities<\/p>\n
For existing DC accounts, mandate annuitization at retirement, and, because they are \u201cunfairly\u201d priced, set up Social Security as a public at-cost annuity provider. \u00a0\u201cEssentially, this would represent a nationalization of the annuity business \u2013 the creation of public options that would be so attractive that for-profit companies could not compete.\u201d<\/p>\n
This is where is failure to understand annuity pricing really comes into play. \u00a0A public retirement plan is able to offer annuities that are a \u201cbetter deal\u201d than an insurance company for a number of reasons:<\/i>
<\/i>The insurance company bears full responsibility for the payment of annuities years into the future, and accordingly needs to invest conservatively, in fixed-income securities. \u00a0A public provider such as the state faces no such need. \u00a0Likewise a private employer can make up shortfalls over time from its own funds, or from the PBGC in the worst case. \u00a0Private and public pension funds also don\u2019t face the sort of reserve requirements as an annuity provider.<\/i>
<\/i>The insurance company is generally much more conservative in its assumptions about life expectancy, assuming a fair amount of improvement in the future; pension plans use the current government-mandated table which, while it is becoming more conservative, is still more of a \u201cbest estimate\u201d of current life expectancy, with no margin for conservatism.<\/i>
<\/i>A retirement plan which uses annuity factors as a conversion factor for mandatory annuitization doesn\u2019t have the same issue with adverse selection as annuities purchased in the individual market (that is, sickly old people are less likely to buy annuities). \u00a0<\/i>Here Russell is right that mandatory annuitization would be cheaper, in the same way as, when large employers like GM have been making the news lately by buying annuities for all their retirees, they get a better deal than an individual would. \u00a0But Russell had better think long and hard about whether he really wants to mandate that the 65-year-old construction worker be required to annuitize his benefit with the same terms as a white-collar worker.<\/p>\n
4. \u00a0Take Control of Your Retirement Plan<\/p>\n
This is less interesting because it\u2019s the same generic information about maximizing benefits at retirement on a personal level. \u00a0yadda, yadda, yadda.<\/p>\n
But he says this, \u201cIf, as in my case, your employer has a defined benefit plan, you should try to get into it. \u00a0If your employer does not have such a plan, you could suggest it switch to one\u201d \u2014 or work with your union to achieve this.<\/p>\n
Here\u2019s the bottom line:<\/b><\/p>\n
Employers are not going to switch back to DB plans. \u00a0Yes, pooled investments professionally managed improve outcomes, and some of the consulting my firm does is around helping employers find low-fee funds, and encouraging them to set up and standardize target-date funds, in an effort to improve investment outcomes for employees. \u00a0But employers want out \u2014 in none of our consulting around improving employees\u2019 retirement funds is it even a consideration for employers to increase their contributions.<\/p>\n
What\u2019s more, DB plans were such a great deal for employees (or, more narrowly, full-career employees) because the employer bore all the risk. \u00a0Employers are much more risk-conscious, and the particular watchword now is, \u201cdon\u2019t take risks without quantifying them\u201d and \u201cdon\u2019t take risks in areas that are outside your core business expertise.\u201d \u00a0With few exceptions, private sector employers aren\u2019t going to continue to shoulder the risk of pension plans any longer, and that\u2019s just a simple fact.<\/p>\n
That\u2019s why I support pooled pension plans, which aim to recreate some of the advantages of the traditional DB plan in our changed world. \u00a0But one has to understand that risk doesn\u2019t disappear here, either \u2014 in various models, participants ultimately bear the risk that their benefits could drop, and there may be a role for a PBGC-like entity guaranteeing pensions, with a need for a very careful balancing of risk while allowing funds to be return-seeking.<\/p>\n
Sigh. . . . I could write a book about it.<\/p>\n<\/body><\/html>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
This one falls into the category of, \u201cif this\u00a0book can get published, why can\u2019t I write a book, too?\u201d \u00a0 Because I don\u2019t have the resume and the connections, of course. \u00a0The author is a sociology professor, with eight prior publications in his actual field of expertise, but with no particular expertise in the field […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2209,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[450],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-318","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-actuarial"],"yoast_head":"\n
From the Library: Social Insecurity: 401(k)s and the Retirement Crisis, by James J. Russell<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"This one falls into the category of, "if this book can get published, why can't I write a book, too?" Because I don't have the resume and the\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/2014\/08\/from-the-library-social-insecurity-401ks-and-the-retirement-crisis-by-james-j-russell.html\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"From the Library: Social Insecurity: 401(k)s and the Retirement Crisis, by James J. Russell\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"This one falls into the category of, "if this book can get published, why can't I write a book, too?" Because I don't have the resume and the\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/2014\/08\/from-the-library-social-insecurity-401ks-and-the-retirement-crisis-by-james-j-russell.html\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Jane the Actuary\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2014-08-19T15:36:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2016-08-16T15:46:23+00:00\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Jane the Actuary\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Jane the Actuary\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"19 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/2014\/08\/from-the-library-social-insecurity-401ks-and-the-retirement-crisis-by-james-j-russell.html\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/2014\/08\/from-the-library-social-insecurity-401ks-and-the-retirement-crisis-by-james-j-russell.html\",\"name\":\"From the Library: Social Insecurity: 401(k)s and the Retirement Crisis, by James J. Russell\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"2014-08-19T15:36:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2016-08-16T15:46:23+00:00\",\"author\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/#\/schema\/person\/ed9b99e0bd58c5eeeebae6b82fa5a77a\"},\"description\":\"This one falls into the category of, \\\"if this book can get published, why can't I write a book, too?\\\" Because I don't have the resume and the\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/2014\/08\/from-the-library-social-insecurity-401ks-and-the-retirement-crisis-by-james-j-russell.html#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/2014\/08\/from-the-library-social-insecurity-401ks-and-the-retirement-crisis-by-james-j-russell.html\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/2014\/08\/from-the-library-social-insecurity-401ks-and-the-retirement-crisis-by-james-j-russell.html#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"From the Library: Social Insecurity: 401(k)s and the Retirement Crisis, by James J. Russell\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/\",\"name\":\"Jane the Actuary\",\"description\":\"\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":\"required name=search_term_string\"}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/#\/schema\/person\/ed9b99e0bd58c5eeeebae6b82fa5a77a\",\"name\":\"Jane the Actuary\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/8d6a493d380e87d49599d5487691c9fc?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/8d6a493d380e87d49599d5487691c9fc?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Jane the Actuary\"},\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/author\/actuaryjane\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"From the Library: Social Insecurity: 401(k)s and the Retirement Crisis, by James J. Russell","description":"This one falls into the category of, \"if this book can get published, why can't I write a book, too?\" Because I don't have the resume and the","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/2014\/08\/from-the-library-social-insecurity-401ks-and-the-retirement-crisis-by-james-j-russell.html","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"From the Library: Social Insecurity: 401(k)s and the Retirement Crisis, by James J. Russell","og_description":"This one falls into the category of, \"if this book can get published, why can't I write a book, too?\" Because I don't have the resume and the","og_url":"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/2014\/08\/from-the-library-social-insecurity-401ks-and-the-retirement-crisis-by-james-j-russell.html","og_site_name":"Jane the Actuary","article_published_time":"2014-08-19T15:36:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2016-08-16T15:46:23+00:00","author":"Jane the Actuary","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Jane the Actuary","Est. reading time":"19 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/2014\/08\/from-the-library-social-insecurity-401ks-and-the-retirement-crisis-by-james-j-russell.html","url":"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/2014\/08\/from-the-library-social-insecurity-401ks-and-the-retirement-crisis-by-james-j-russell.html","name":"From the Library: Social Insecurity: 401(k)s and the Retirement Crisis, by James J. Russell","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/#website"},"datePublished":"2014-08-19T15:36:00+00:00","dateModified":"2016-08-16T15:46:23+00:00","author":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/#\/schema\/person\/ed9b99e0bd58c5eeeebae6b82fa5a77a"},"description":"This one falls into the category of, \"if this book can get published, why can't I write a book, too?\" Because I don't have the resume and the","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/2014\/08\/from-the-library-social-insecurity-401ks-and-the-retirement-crisis-by-james-j-russell.html#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/2014\/08\/from-the-library-social-insecurity-401ks-and-the-retirement-crisis-by-james-j-russell.html"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/2014\/08\/from-the-library-social-insecurity-401ks-and-the-retirement-crisis-by-james-j-russell.html#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"From the Library: Social Insecurity: 401(k)s and the Retirement Crisis, by James J. Russell"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/","name":"Jane the Actuary","description":"","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":"required name=search_term_string"}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/#\/schema\/person\/ed9b99e0bd58c5eeeebae6b82fa5a77a","name":"Jane the Actuary","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/8d6a493d380e87d49599d5487691c9fc?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/8d6a493d380e87d49599d5487691c9fc?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Jane the Actuary"},"url":"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/author\/actuaryjane"}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/318","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2209"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=318"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/318\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=318"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=318"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.patheos.com\/blogs\/janetheactuary\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=318"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}