<\/p>
Evaluating Levinas and his criticisms of Husserl, Derrida probes the coherence of Levinas\u2019 notion of \u201cinfinitely other.\u201d Contrary to Levinas, who argues that we are incorrectly seduced by everyday life to think of the other as an \u201calter ego,\u201d Derrida says: \u201cThe other as alter ego signifies the other as other, irreducible to my ego, precisely becauase it is an ego, because it has the form of the ego, The egoity of the other permits him to say \u2018ego\u2019 as I do; and this is why he is Other, and not a stone, or a being without speech in my real economy. This is why, if you will, he is face, can speak to me, understand me, and eventually command me. Dissymmetry itself would be impossible without this symmetry.\u201d <\/p>\n
Again, \u201cThe movement of transcendence toward the other, as invoked by Levinas, would have no meaning if it did not bear within it, as one of its essential meanings, that in my ipseity I know myself o be other for the other.\u201d <\/p>\n
Again: \u201c(1) The infinitely other . . . can be what it is only if it is other, that is, other than <\/em> . Other than <\/em> must be other than <\/em> myself. Henceforth, it is no longer absolved of a relation to an ego. Therefore, it is no longer infinitely, absolutely other. It is no longer what it is. If it was absolved, it would not be the other either, but the Same. (2) The infinitely other cannot be what it is \u2013 infinitely other \u2013 except by being absolutely not the same. That is, in particular, by being other than itself (non ego). Beither other than itself, it is not what it is. Therefore, it is not infinitely other, etc.\u201d <\/p>\n In conclusion, \u201cthe expression \u2018infinitely other\u2019 or \u2018absolutely other\u2019 cannot be stated and thought simultaneously; that the other cannot be absolutely exterior to the same without ceasing to be other . . . .\u201d And \u201cthe other is absolutely other only if he is an ego, that is, in a certain way, if he is the same as I. Inversely, the other as res is simultaneously less other (not absolutely other) and less \u2018the same\u2019 than I. Simultaneously more and less other, which means, once more, that the absolute of alterity is the same.\u201d <\/p>\n<\/body><\/html>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Evaluating Levinas and his criticisms of Husserl, Derrida probes the coherence of Levinas\u2019 notion of \u201cinfinitely other.\u201d Contrary to Levinas, who argues that we are incorrectly seduced by everyday life to think of the other as an \u201calter ego,\u201d Derrida says: \u201cThe other as alter ego signifies the other as other, irreducible to my ego, […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3021,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1769","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-philosophy"],"yoast_head":"\n