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According to Stephen Duffy, Philip, Chancellor of the University of Paris, was responsible for elaborating the theorem of the supernatural. He claims that during the Pelagian controversy Augustine had left various problems hanging: \u201cHow can one be bound to do something not in one\u2019s power? Can the virtues of unbelievers be so facilely discounted as splendid vices? Do not the Scriptures and the Fathers furnish evidence of unbelievers preparing themselves for justification by their own activity? If God does not deny grace to unbelievers who do what is in their power, can what unbelievers do without grace be necessarily sinful and valueless? Why is everything not grace, for what is there that is not God\u2019s free gift?\u201d <\/p>\n
Philip clarified the gratuity of grace by insisting that grace is supernatural \u201cbecause it brings humans to a fulfillment far beyond anything human nature could ever achieve left to itself.\u201d Thus, through Philip \u201cthe medievals came to view meritorious acts as radically beyond the abilities of humans and the grace making them possible as a supernatural, elevating grace ( gratia elevans <\/em> ).\u201d But what he really contributed was \u201cnot the supernatural character of grace, something already known, but the validity of a line of reference termed nature.\u201d The whole system thus underwent a significant adjustment: \u201cwhereas meritorious activity was viewed as supernatural, good, non-meritorious activity was viewed as connatural, i.e., within the range of human powers. And the general moral impotence whereby one cannot avoid sin for long without grace is now considered in its ontological dimension. Humans cannot achieve even their connatural fulfillment without healing grace ( gratia sanans <\/em> ). Habitual grace thus came to be viewed as healing as well as elevating.\u201d <\/p>\n This appears to be a move in the right direction \u2013 all moral achievement is assisted by grace. But I\u2019m suspicious. The whole premise here appears to be a human nature that might, theoretically, be able to achieve something on its own, \u201cleft to itself.\u201d In fact, in the post-lapsarian situation, even \u201cconnatural\u201d moral actions require some sort of gracious assistance. Of course, this is true; but this inability to do something on its own power is a result of sin. A sinless human could, apparently, achieve natural virtue \u201cby its own powers.\u201d But human beings cannot achieve any sort of action, virtuous or otherwise, except by the power of God working in us. Further, though the \u201celevation\u201d might be taken as a medieval version of eschatological glorification, the import of Duffy\u2019s discussion seems to be other than this. It appears that the elevation achieved by grace is not a completion and fulfillment of humanity, but an elevation to something slightly above humanity. As Duffy says, the premise of the supernatural theorem is that \u201cTo be fully human one must become more than human.\u201d Not at all: To be fully human is simply to be fully human. This can be achieved only by the gracious gift of God, but then even minimal humanity can be achieved by the gracious gift of God. <\/p>\n<\/body><\/html>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" According to Stephen Duffy, Philip, Chancellor of the University of Paris, was responsible for elaborating the theorem of the supernatural. He claims that during the Pelagian controversy Augustine had left various problems hanging: \u201cHow can one be bound to do something not in one\u2019s power? Can the virtues of unbelievers be so facilely discounted as […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3021,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[47],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2103","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-theology-creation"],"yoast_head":"\n
By the 13th century, distinctions were being made between meritorious and non-meritorious works, as well as between the \u201chealing grace of justification, which enables one to act meritoriously, and an assistance not a grace in the strict sense ( gratia gratis data <\/em> ), which enables one to do what is in one\u2019s own power.\u201d <\/p>\n