<\/p>
Murphy offers an amusing discussion of the question, Assuming a Cartesian dualism of mind and body, how can the mind cause a physical object like the body to move? If one assumes that physicists are correct that physical energy can be transferred to a physical system, it has to arise from a physical system, then a mind-body division like that of Descartes becomes inexplicable. She quotes Owen Flanagan: <\/p>\n
\u201cIf we accept the principle of the conservation of energy we seem committed either to denying that the nonphysical mind exists, or to denying that it could cause anything to happen, or to making some very implausible ad hoc adjustments in our physics. For example, we could maintain that the principle of the conservation of energy hols, but that every time a mind introduces new energy into the world \u2013 thanks to some mysterious capacity it has \u2013 an equal amount of energy departs from the physical universe \u2013 thanks to some perfectly orchestrated mysterious capacity the universe has.\u201d <\/p>\n<\/body><\/html>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Murphy offers an amusing discussion of the question, Assuming a Cartesian dualism of mind and body, how can the mind cause a physical object like the body to move? If one assumes that physicists are correct that physical energy can be transferred to a physical system, it has to arise from a physical system, then […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3021,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2260","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-philosophy"],"yoast_head":"\n