It is a summarized reference to conclusions drawn by the majority of experts after engaging in arguments spanning decades and often longer. Those arguments cannot be repeated every time a subject comes up, and should not need to be, although it is a common internet debate tactic to pretend that this is the same thing as either an appeal to authority or argumentum ad populum. It is neither. The former refers to treating one expert as though they must be right, the latter to popular opinion which is not the same as expert opinion.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The experts can of course be wrong. But it is less likely that they are wrong and a poorly-informed googler is right, than that they are right. And if the majority of experts are wrong, it is more likely that the right conclusion will emerge as a result of ongoing investigation and debate by those experts or their successors.<\/p>\n
Do you agree? What are your thoughts on this?<\/p>\n
Of related interest, Christoph Heilig has been trying to engage with mythicism, and specifically Richard Carrier\u2019s misuses of Bayes\u2019 Theorem, over on the Vridar blog<\/a>. Since I avoid getting caught up in that morass over there, having learned from past experience, let me share here what Christoph wrote, beginning with his explanation of his use of Bayes\u2019 Theorem in his recent book Hidden Criticism?<\/em><\/a>, and about which he blogged in March in response to a review of that book<\/a>:<\/p>\n I then adduced Carrier in a footnote because I was afraid that somebody might have taken a look at his work, disliked it, and might now think that he or she also had to reject my approach. To them I wanted to signal that I do not think that Carrier\u2019s argument is compelling at all and that his adaptation of Bayes\u2019s theorem should not be taken as an indicator of what could and couldn\u2019t be done with Bayesian reasoning.<\/p>\n By the way, of course it is entirely appropriate to use Bayesian reasoning to ask questions about the historicity of a certain figure \u2013 be that Moses, David, Jesus, Paul, Homer, Brutus, etc. To the contrary: my most basic claim defended towards my colleagues was that as soon as you say things like \u201cevidence X confirms hypothesis Y, which is thus the most probable explanation,\u201d etc. you automatically have to follow Bayes\u2019s theorem in updating your subjective beliefs, whether you do so intentionally or not.<\/p>\n I should probably not made the comment on Carrier\u2019s \u201chorrible\u201d analysis, because I completely understand that this automatically causes the wish for further elaboration, something I have consciously not offered so far in my writing. I will mention, but not discuss in detail, a single example that everybody who\u2019s interested in the matter can look at for him- or herself. Carrier translates \u1f38\u1f71\u03ba\u03c9\u03b2\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03b4\u03b5\u03bb\u03c6\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03c5\u03c1\u1f77\u03bf\u03c5 as \u201ca certain \u2018brother James.\u2019\u201d To say that this wording might actually \u201cfavor\u201d the myth-hypothesis must be very surprising to anybody who has a working knowledge of Greek and knows the texts in question. (Again, it\u2019s not that I would not \u201cpermit\u201d the hypothesis to be considered \u2013 discussions about the identity of people with the same names in antiquity are common, also among biblical scholars, btw.) It is in any case completely beyond me how anybody who\u2019s familiar with Bayes\u2019s theorem might come up with the likelihoods he suggests. There is absolutely no other context, in which Bayesian reasoning is used, where anybody would be willing to use a data set of 2 (!) items to give a likelihood without specifying the uncertainty. If Carrier actually wanted to use actual numbers, fine. Just go through the early Christian literature and see how often the phrase is used for physical relatives on the one hand and believers on the other \u2013 and how often\u00a0other<\/em>\u00a0formulations are used for both concepts! It\u2019s just completely wrong to make any claim about how \u201cexpected\u201d a certain word choice for a given meaning is if alternative lexical realisations of that meaning are not even taken into account. To say: \u201cSo my most sceptical estimate is that this is just what we\u2019d expect on mythicism (for Paul to occasionally, and in contexts most demanding it, refers to other Christians as \u2018brothers of the Lord\u2019).\u201d How often Paul used this phrase or not for other Christians unfortunately does not tell one at all whether you\u2019d \u201cexpect\u201d this wording if the author wanted to refer to other\/another Christian\/s. That\u2019s just not how we estimate likelihoods. Period. I don\u2019t know what else to say about that. It\u2019s demonstrably wrong and I actually still can\u2019t really believe that Carrier is serious about that. Plus, the whole discussion of course displays astonishing ignorance concerning the secondary literature \u2013 Carrier even seems to assume that since\/if James of 1:19 is the same as the one in chapter 2, he must be the brother of the apostle John (who, of course, had been executed in 44 CE), etc. There\u2019s just so much wrong in this short discussion, such a disregard for Greek syntax and semantics, relevant secondary literature, even very foundational historical information that can be found in every encyclopaedia, and of course an utter misunderstand of how likelihoods are to be determined that I don\u2019t think the work deserved to be taken seriously at all. In any case, I didn\u2019t feel comfortable that what I was trying to establish \u2013 paying attention to Bayes\u2019s theorem \u2013 might have been discredited among some of my colleagues, who by any chance might have come across Carrier\u2019s strange meanderings.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n That\u2019s not the entirety of his earliest comments, but the part that seems most straightforward to excerpt.<\/p>\n I\u2019ll provide more of his comments from there on separate pages here, for those who may be interested in reading further.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Christoph goes on to tackle the main theme of this post, i.e. the attempts of some to contrast expert consensus with crowdsourcing on the internet, characterized as the \u201cdemocratization of knowledge.\u201d Christoph continues in response (with the relevant quotes given):<\/p>\n \u201cWelcome to the democratization of information and knowledge sharing, along with the opportunity to contribute specialist skills and insights.\u201d<\/p>\n I appreciate that sentiment. (I really do!) I just found that for myself it is too time-consuming to get into these kinds of things and I try to find other opportunities for advancing the same cause. So please accept my apologies that I can\u2019t respond in as much detail to your comment as would actually be necessary. That I spoke of \u201ctranslation\u201d is also such a case of too less time for this kind of comment. This was not the best way to put it. Let me try to summarise my position as succinctly as I can: you are right, I did not offer evidence on syntax and lexical semantics. In fact, it was my aim not to comment on the evidence itself at all because if I did I would actually have to offer quite a bit of details and that\u2019s just too time-consuming (frustrating statement, I know). But let me just say that if you look at the relevant passages in modern grammars of Koine, you\u2019ll notice that Carrier does not do justice to the article, nor does he actually get the nature of the exceptive clause. He doesn\u2019t even seem to have understood the issue in the secondary literature (i.e. what is confusing and what is not). But I don\u2019t want to go into more detail concerning the lack of interaction with secondary literature. What I meant is something like this statement: \u201cCertainly in Gal. 1.19 Paul meant either James the Pillar or another James. And if he meant James the Pillar, then he did not mean he was literally the brother of Jesus\u2014as that James appears to have been the brother of John, not Jesus.\u201d The idea that James the Pillar might be James, the brother of John (i.e. son of Zebedee), is something that isn\u2019t discussed in commentaries for the reason of the wide consensus, that this James had already died at that point in time. (For a good overview over some of the relevant issues concerning James, I\u2019d suggest you consult Bockmuehl\u2019s \u201cJames, Israel and Antioch\u201d.) If a student of mine wrote a sentence like the one I\u2019ve just quoted, I\u2019d have the suspicion that he or she has failed to understand the secondary literature on the subject. In other words: you just can\u2019t write on the possibility that one of possibly two James is the brother of John without there also discussing the consensus view that he had already died at that point in time. But that\u2019s just a very minor and random observation on Carrier\u2019s interaction with the secondary literature \u2013 even though it\u2019s the kind of problematic interaction that I would not accept from a student. But again: not substantial at all compared to Carrier\u2019s much deeper problem (see below). It might be the main reason why many of my colleagues don\u2019t think his work can be taken seriously \u2013 and in consequence that Bayes\u2019s theorem too is of no value for historical studies \u2013 and it\u2019s indeed below any standard of a publishable contribution to biblical studies, but it\u2019s not at all the biggest problem I have with Carrier.<\/p>\n \u201cUnderstood. In one sense, though, and I suspect you would agree, Bayesian reasoning is not really a \u2018new method\u2019 at all but rather a symbolic representation of valid reasoning processes at their best.\u201d<\/p>\n Absolutely. Perfectly put. But it might have the appearance to others and so I try to emphasise what you say here while also pre-emptively reacting to such a position. Sometimes (!), Bayes\u2019s theorem can also cover invalid reasoning, however. Our brains have difficulties to follow Bayesian lines of thought in real time and in the past I\u2019ve made mistakes in applying the theorem myself in presentations before people with degrees in Maths and they didn\u2019t even notice. So I think it\u2019s great to have Bayes\u2019s theorem in mind when doing research but I think one should be very careful how one incorporates it in the actual written product, in that it can also be a distraction. I think that\u2019s exactly what happened in Carrier\u2019s case. The way he updates the priors is not legitimate because of the way he estimates the likelihoods. But that can easily be overlooked. The danger with reference to Bayes is that whenever someone says \u201cand here\u2019s my likelihood\u201d and \u201chere\u2019s my prior\u201d we are so occupied with thinking about whether the calculation behind that number might be correct that we can miss the fact that the calculation itself might be coherent but simply not leading to the goal in question (see below).<\/p>\n \u201cCarrier does not argue that the Greek expression \u1f38\u1f71\u03ba\u03c9\u03b2\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03b4\u03b5\u03bb\u03c6\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03c5\u03c1\u1f77\u03bf\u03c5 itself favours mythicism.\u201d<\/p>\n I was quite deliberate in how I put it, but again it\u2019s possible that the way I expressed myself lent itself to be misunderstood: \u201cTo say that this wording might actually \u201cfavor\u201d the myth-hypothesis \u2026\u201d I used \u201cmight\u201d because he says (as you quote, p. 591): \u201cMy own conclusion is that there is at best no difference in probability and at worst a difference favouring myth\u2026\u201d Next page: \u201cI actually think this evidence is twice as likely on mythicism\u2026\u201d For the purpose of my comment I didn\u2019t care about how in the end he factors it in, what I found shocking was even the fact that someone with a basic knowledge of Greek and Bayes might think the favouring might go in this direction. It clearly doesn\u2019t and it not even does so on the basis of Carrier\u2019s own interpretation of the other passages (on this below). \u201cI may be mistaken but it appears to me that your view of Carrier\u2019s argument is limited to his final paragraph which he begins: So the question at hand is how likely it is that Paul would use the phrase \u2018brothers of the Lord\u2019 on the two occasions he does . . . . (p. 591) But the context of the preceding argument (587ff) is clearly about far more than the simple wording or translation of the phrase \u201cbrother of the Lord\u201d.\u201d<\/p>\n Well, the whole section clearly is about the fact \u201cthat twice Paul mentions \u2018brothers of the Lord\u2019\u201d (p. 582). So we are dealing here with a piece of evidence \u2013 an expression, a genitive construction with two specific nouns \u2013 and the question of which of two hypothesis it favours. This classical Bayesian confirmation. I\u2019ve done that for a single word \u03b8\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd (and it took me a whole monograph). Nothing easier than that. However, all Carrier does is to argue that it was indeed possible to use this expression to refer to fellow Christians without a physical link to a person called Jesus. Now, let me be even clear: even if of the two passages he discusses in detail, the expression would clearly refer to this latter category (which I think is not the case), this doesn\u2019t tell us anything about P (\u201cbrother[s] of the lord\u201d I reference to believers in general). That\u2019s also wrong in the blogpost you linked to, by the way (\u201cSo how expected is the evidence if our hypothesis were not true? I have to say it is \u201cextremely probable\u201d: that is, 0.99.\u201d). The ratio of attestations of different meanings of one lexeme\/phrase doesn\u2019t tell us anything about the likelihood. Or, rather, at best, a single attestation proves that the likelihood can\u2019t be zero. So it tells us something (but it\u2019s never zero anyway because of how language works anyway, so that\u2019s not such a great insight). But it certainly doesn\u2019t tell us how the likelihood-ratio looks like. It\u2019s entirely possible that most occurrences of the phrase \u201cbrother of X\u201d means \u2018fellow Christian\u2019 and not \u2018son of the same mother\u2019 but the likelihood still being clearly in favour of the latter! For example: the verb \u03b8\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd almost always or always occurs with a specific meaning X. But that doesn\u2019t mean that P (\u03b8\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd I X) = 1! Rather, I have to look at the concept of X and how it is usually realised lexically. On that basis I might find that the likelihood is more like 0.2 or so because there are other lexical solutions that are more \u201cexpected\u201d (such as \u03c0\u03bf\u03bc\u03c0\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u03bd \u03c4\u03c9 \u03b8. \u03ba\u03c4\u03bb.). The expression still favours interpretation X because the likelihood of \u03b8\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd given interpretations Y and Z is even lower because there are many much better ways of expressing that thought (\u03b1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b8. \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03ba\u03c4\u03bb.). The fact is: I can\u2019t know unless I look at the frequency of these alternative word choices. If I don\u2019t want to do that, I just can\u2019t comment on the likelihood. It\u2019s outright impossible.<\/p>\n So in order to determine the two likelihoods Carrier is interested in he would have to ask the two questions: Unless one has done this very hard work, it\u2019s simply impossible to estimate likelihoods. Everything else is fundamentally mistaken. So I actually don\u2019t care whether in the end \u2013 after examinations of the different ways to say \u2018believer\u2019 and \u2018physical relative\u2019 \u2013 the ratio of likelihood turns out to be 2:1, 1:2, 10:1 (as you suggest) or 1000:1 (which seems much more realistic to me on the basis of my reading of ancient Greek texts). The basic problem is that it\u2019s logically impossible to come up with an estimation of the likelihood on the basis of the evidence that Carrier discusses. That\u2019s the kind of problem that I mentioned above that might come from relying too much on Bayes, i.e. trusting that it will guide us to the right result: if we make a mistake in applying the different factors, the whole things just blows up. That happens, to be sure. In fact, Carrier\u2019s mistake is one my students like to make when they are asked to apply Bayes\u2019s theorem for the first time. It\u2019s not a big deal. But it shouldn\u2019t be published and it can\u2019t be taken seriously as a scholarly argument in my opinion.<\/p>\n Ok, I hope this helps a bit. Please understand that I can\u2019t comment on this any further due to lack of time. It\u2019s not a cheap excuse. I do feel bad about it because I like the way you approach these issues. If my comment is still unclear to you, perhaps you might profit from taking a look at \u201cPaul\u2019s Triumph.\u201d There you can see a demonstration of how a likelihood can be estimated (though I refrain from using numbers even in this well-studied example) and what Carrier would have had to do in order to come up with his estimations in my opinion.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Still more on the page that follows\u2026<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Christoph also wrote:<\/p>\n Perhaps I should indeed stick to writing books not blog post comments since I am apparently not able to communicate effectively in that context. I wholeheartedly agree.<\/p>\n \u201cI have yet to see you give a fallacious example of his estimation of likelihoods. A sentence taken out of context and made to mean the opposite of what the context makes clear he is arguing is not a valid example.\u201d<\/p>\n![](\"\/\/ws-na.amazon-adsystem.com\/widgets\/q?_encoding=UTF8&ASIN=3161537955&Format=_SL160_&ID=AsinImage&MarketPlace=US&ServiceVersion=20070822&WS=1&tag=jamefmcgrshom-20&language=en_US\")
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\n\u201cAgain, having had another quick look at Carrier\u2019s argument here I don\u2019t believe he claims the actual \u2018word choice\u2019 or phrase itself is the grounds for his argument about its significance. (Carrier does address other Greek phrases found in Paul to support his argument, by the way.)\u201d<\/p>\n
\n(1) How can one refer to fellow believers (\u201cthose in Christ,\u201d \u201cthose of the faith, etc.\u201d)? And how frequent are these solutions?
\n(2) How can one refer to physical relatives (\u201cthe other son of mother Mary, etc.\u201d)? And how frequent are these solutions?<\/p>\n
\n\u201cChris, you are surely ripping Carrier\u2019s qualification statement out of context. You have totally disregarded the sentences either side of the one sentence you have addressed and into which you impute thoughts that are contrary to the clearly stated context. In the previous sentences Carrier makes it clear that he does not believe the James in Gal.1:19 is the brother of John \u2014 I even quoted that section in my previous comment.\u201d
\nI know what he says. My point was that if someone writes the conditional clause \u201cif he meant James the Pillar, then he did not mean he was literally the brother of Jesus\u2014as that James appears to have been the brother of John, not Jesus,\u201d he demonstrates that he hasn\u2019t read or is not willing to engage with the relevant literature on the subject. I am sorry for apparently implying something about Carrier\u2019s actual position that I never intended to do.
\n\u201cIf you are basing this assertion on a sentence taken out of context and impute to it a meaning that contradicts Carrier\u2019s clear argument in the sentences either side, then your justification for your assertion is invalid.\u201d<\/p>\n