In the case of Utah v. Strieff,<\/a> the Supreme Court in a 5-3 decision, found that if an officer illegally stops an individual and then after the stop discovers an arrest warrant, any evidence from the stop may be used in court. The only restriction is when an officer engages in \u201cflagrant police misconduct,\u201d which the decision declines to define. This means that police now can stop anyone on at anytime, without any probable cause. In addition, this ruling nullifies any fruit of the\u00a0poisonous\u00a0tree <\/a>.\u00a0Dissenting from the position was Justice Sotomayor, with Justices Ginsburg and Kagan concurring in part. They start their three part dissent with this:\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n The Court today holds that the discovery of a warrant for an unpaid parking ticket will forgive a police officer\u2019s violation of your Fourth Amendment rights. Do not be soothed by the opinion\u2019s technical language: This case allows the police to stop you on the street, demand your identification, and check it for outstanding traffic warrants\u2014even if you are doing nothing wrong. If the officer discovers a warrant for a fine you forgot to pay, courts will now excuse his illegal stop and will admit into evidence anything he happens to find by searching you after arresting you on the warrant. Because the Fourth Amendment should prohibit, not permit, such misconduct, I dissent. <\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n However, Justice Sotomayor added a fourth part in which she alone dissented. We here at R3 print it in full here along with the embedded links of the law cases. \u00a0\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n Dissent of Justice Sonia Sotomayor: Part 4<\/strong><\/p>\n Writing only for myself, and drawing on my professional experiences, I would add that unlawful \u201cstops\u201d have severe consequences much greater than the inconvenience suggested by the name. This Court has given officers an array of instruments to probe and examine you. When we condone officers\u2019 use of these devices without adequate cause, we give them reason to target pedestrians in an arbitrary manner. We also risk treating members of our communities as second-class citizens.<\/p>\n Although many Americans have been stopped for speeding or jaywalking, few may realize how degrading a stop can be when the officer is looking for more. This Court has allowed an officer to stop you for whatever reason he wants\u2014so long as he can point to a pretextual justification after the fact. Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806, 813 (1996)<\/a>. That justification must provide specific reasons why the officer suspected you were breaking the law, Terry, 392 U. S<\/a>., at 21, but it may factor in your ethnicity, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 886\u2013887<\/a> (1975), where you live, Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 147 <\/a>(1972), what you were wearing, United States v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1, 4\u20135 <\/a>(1989), and how you behaved, Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U. S. 119, 124\u2013125<\/a> (2000). The officer does not even need to know which law you might have broken so long as he can later point to any possible infraction\u2014even one that is minor, unrelated, or ambiguous. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U. S. 146, 154\u2013155<\/a> (2004); Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U. S. ___ <\/a>(2014).<\/p>\n The indignity of the stop is not limited to an officer telling you that you look like a criminal. The officer may next ask for your \u201cconsent\u201d to inspect your bag or purse without telling you that you can decline. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429, 438<\/a> (1991). Regardless of your answer, he may order you to stand \u201chelpless, perhaps facing a wall with [your] hands raised.\u201d Terry, 392 U. S., at 17<\/a>. If the officer thinks you might be dangerous, he may then \u201cfrisk\u201d you for weapons. This involves more than just a pat down. As onlookers pass by, the officer may \u201c\u2018feel with sensitive fingers every portion of [your] body. A thorough search [may] be made of [your] arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin and area about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down to the feet.\u2019\u201d Id., at 17, n. 13<\/a>.<\/p>\n The officer\u2019s control over you does not end with the stop. If the officer chooses, he may handcuff you and take you to jail for doing nothing more than speeding, jaywalking, or \u201cdriving [your] pickup truck . . . with [your] 3-year-old son and 5-year-old daughter . . . without [your] seatbelt fastened.\u201d Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U. S. 318, 323\u2013324 <\/a>(2001). At the jail, he can fingerprint you, swab DNA from the inside of your mouth, and force you to \u201cshower with a delousing agent\u201d while you \u201clift [your] tongue, hold out [your] arms, turn around, and lift [your] genitals.\u201d Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, 566 U. S<\/a>. ___, ___\u2013___ (2012) (slip op., at 2\u20133); Maryland v. King, 569 U. S.<\/a> ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 28). Even if you are innocent, you will now join the 65 million Americans with an arrest record and experience the \u201ccivil death\u201d of discrimination by employers, landlords, and whoever else conducts a background check. Chin, The New Civil Death, 160<\/a> U. Pa. L. Rev. 1789, 1805<\/a> (2012); see J. Jacobs, The Eternal Criminal Record 33\u201351 <\/a>(2015); Young & Petersilia, Keeping Track, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1318, 1341\u20131357<\/a> (2016). And, of course, if you fail to pay bail or appear for court, a judge will issue a warrant to render you \u201carrestable on sight\u201d in the future. A. Goffman, On the Run 196 <\/a>(2014).<\/p>\n This case involves a suspicionless stop, one in which the officer initiated this chain of events without justification. As the Justice Department notes, supra, at 8, many innocent people are subjected to the humiliations of these unconstitutional searches. The white defendant in this case shows that anyone\u2019s dignity can be violated in this manner. See M. Gottschalk, Caught 119\u2013138<\/a> (2015). But it is no secret that people of color are disproportionate victims of this type of scrutiny. See M. Alexander, The New Jim Crow 95\u2013136<\/a> (2010). For generations, black and brown parents have given their children \u201cthe talk\u201d\u2014 instructing them never to run down the street; always keep your hands where they can be seen; do not even think of talking back to a stranger\u2014all out of fear of how an officer with a gun will react to them. See, e.g., W. E. B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk<\/a> (1903); J. Baldwin, The Fire Next Time<\/a> (1963); T. Coates, Between the World and Me <\/a>(2015).<\/p>\n By legitimizing the conduct that produces this double consciousness, this case tells everyone, white and black, guilty and innocent, that an officer can verify your legal status at any time. It says that your body is subject to invasion while courts excuse the violation of your rights. It implies that you are not a citizen of a democracy but the subject of a carceral state, just waiting to be cataloged. We must not pretend that the countless people who are routinely targeted by police are \u201cisolated.\u201d They are the canaries in the coal mine whose deaths, civil and literal, warn us that no one can breathe in this atmosphere. See L. Guinier & G. Torres, The Miner\u2019s Canary 274\u2013283 <\/a>(2002). They are the ones who recognize that unlawful police stops corrode all our civil liberties and threaten all our lives. Until their voices matter too, our justice system will continue to be anything but.<\/p>\n * * *<\/p>\n I dissent.<\/p>\n Donate to the Work of R3<\/b><\/p>\n