In comments on \u201cOn What Evidence?\u201d<\/a> Crowhill and Charles got into a disagreement about human morality and evolution that I exerpt below.<\/p>\n Crowhill<\/strong>:<\/p>\n Does there have to be some sort of \u201cobjective morality\u201d for a dog to know how he\u2019s supposed to behave towards other dogs? Isn\u2019t it entirely possible that dogs simply developed some set of arbitrary social rules that happened to work decently well for them?<\/p>\n Why can\u2019t something similar be true of humans? Why couldn\u2019t we have developed some set of social rules that helped our species survive?<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Charles<\/strong>:<\/p>\n You a fatal flaw when you discuss social behavior evolving or \u2018developing\u2019 \u2013 first you use the word \u2018develop\u2019 as if to make it insignificant, second you repeatedly say that they are arbitrary, etc\u2026<\/p>\n If rules exist within a social group because they helped the survival of a social species \u2013 they are ANYTHING but arbitrary!<\/p><\/blockquote>\n I think it\u2019s actually both reasonable and important to use the term arbitrary to describe evolutionarily guided social systems, but to explain why, I need to switch mathematical subfields to game theory<\/a>. \u00a0Game theory can be\u00a0loosely\u00a0summarized as the study of how to make choices. \u00a0Researchers talk about strategies to adopt to try and get the best payoff possible and also characterize common snarls and situations.<\/p>\n A Nash equilibrium<\/a> occurs when, for each player, the current outcome is optimal assuming that no other player changes his\/her strategy<\/em>. This means that no player has an incentive to change their behavior. A Nash Equilibrium is absolutely not a guarantee that the current state is actually the best for all concerned.<\/p>\n The best known example of a game where the Nash Equilibrium solution sucks and the best solution is unstable is the Prisoner\u2019s Dilemma<\/a> (click the link for explanation if you\u2019re not familiar). If both players keep mum, either benefits from changing strategy. In the case that they both rat, neither benefits from changing strategy. Even though both being silent is clearly preferable to both snitching, there\u2019s no way to escape from a Nash Equilibrium without finding a way to coordinate action.*<\/p>\n I think it\u2019s reasonable to assume that social behavior represents, if not a perfect Nash Equilibrium, at least something close to one. In that respect, it certainly is not arbitrary. However, I would bet that there are a variety of sets of social norms that are stable enough to be close-enough Nash Equilibria, just like our current situation. This certainly seems to be the case in other aspects of evolution. Think of Darwin\u2019s finches<\/a>. Each beak configuration is advantageous and distinct, but the choice of which stable configuration prevailed was pretty much arbitrary.<\/p>\n If we thought the structure of our society carried as little moral weight as the structure of a bird\u2019s beak, there would be no reason to be troubled by the fact that some of the values or practices of our society was arbitrary. However, it\u2019s easy to imagine plenty<\/a> of<\/a> stable<\/a> societies<\/a> that could be construed as Nash Equilibria but which we find to be abhorrent. This is another nail in the coffin of the idea that evolutionary fitness is a valid way to defend our actions. \u00a0We need to be aware of our social system as arbitrary at least in part and be attentive to ways it ought to be reformed.<\/p>\n *Unrelated to larger point about morality but still interesting:<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/2.bp.blogspot.com\/_b7Eh98KJ_qI\/TFsabBxZiUI\/AAAAAAAABBY\/uWVSiUGKhrU\/s1600\/finch.bmp\")
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