Probably the most important text we have by Theophilus on Origenism is his letter concerning the Alexandrian Synod of 400.[i] This is because, among other things, his accusations against Origen were fresh and he had not yet been distracted by political disputes. In it, we find several charges made against the teachings of Origen. Central to Theophilus’ concern was On First Principles, but it is clear it was not the only text he was criticizing. For the sake of accuracy, Theophilus often quoted directly from Origen’s writings, as for example when he quotes from On the Resurrection, where it says that magic, if real, is not to be considered evil or wretched, “Ars magica non mihi uidetur âlicuius rei subsistentis uocabulum, sed et, si sit, nequaquam est operis mali nec quod haberi possit contemptui.”[ii] He wanted his readers to be assured that the errors being denounced were legitimately those of Origen and not just his followers.
Theologically, the most important charge was that Origen subordinated the Son to the Father. Through his reading of Origen, Theophilus showed how he did not meet the basic requirements for Trinitarian orthodoxy. We find three separate but related criticisms concerning this point within the synodical letter. First, Origen said that the Son, in relation to us, is to be seen as the truth or “ueritas,” but when compared to the Father, he is like a lie, “patri conlatu mendacium.”[iii] Secondly, unlike the eternal reign of the Father, he believed that Christ’s kingdom will have an end, “Christi regnum finietur aliquando.”[iv] Finally, Origen suggested that our prayers should not be directed towards Christ: they should be given to the Father alone, “non debemus orare filium, sed solum patrem.”[v]
Theophilus also believed that Origen held a deficient understanding of the efficacy of Christ’s work. One way he pointed this out was by examining Origen’s beliefs about the resurrection: he claimed that Origen believed we would have perishable bodies after being resurrected from the dead.[vi] This, of course, was because Origen did not hold the body in high esteem. Rather, he believed that the body is something that will one day be discarded once it was no longer of use.[vii]
Origen’s cosmology was also criticized. Three important charges against Origen’s view of angels and demons are worthy of note. They are 1) Origen believed that all angels were, to one degree or another, fallen, and their ranking within the celestial hierarchy was based upon how great a fall they had. The greater the fall, the less rank they held.[viii] 2) Origen believed that at least some of the angels ate from the sacrifices of the Jewish temple.[ix] 3) Is a very controversial charge, for in it Theophilus said that Origen believed that “pro daemonibus quoque et spiritalibus nequitiis“, Christ would one day be crucified again.[x]
We must understand that Origen’s theodicy was based upon his peculiar notions of the cosmic fall. After our souls also had fallen from a heavenly bliss they came to be attached to earthly bodies. This theodicy, however, would make the possession of the body not something which was good, as Scripture had indicated, but rather a perversion of the original order of nature. Thus questions developed such as how could Christ come and take flesh and not be a fallen creature as well. We consistently find in Theophilus’ later writings questions surrounding this aspect of Origen’s theology.[xi] Also, Origen seemed to teach that even after returning to heaven, we could fall again once again. Thus, Theophilus wrote that Origen did not believe our salvation was securely established by Christ.[xii]
In the synodical letter of 400, Theophilus attributed some of these errors to be from how Origen mixed Christian doctrine with idolatry.[xiii] But, in a more interesting and telling description, Theophilus’ paschal letter from 402 made the connection between Origen’s teachings and Hellenistic philosophy. Origen is said to have taken on the “philosophorum pannos“ instead of the shining new and firm clothing of the Church.[xiv] Having taken these “rags of the philosophers,” Origen (and his later disciples), try to bring into the Church errors which, not only are incompatible with the Christian faith, but are outright blasphemous.
Certainly Theophilus is reading into Origen’s teachings what developed out of them by subsequent Origenists.[xv] Yet, he is also clearly addressing Origen, and his perception is that one of Origen’s mistakes is that he had borrowed erroneous teachings from the philosophers. Thus it must be said that Theophilus’ complaint is not with the borrowing of philosophy, but with doing it poorly (hence, taking the worst of philosophy, that is, its rags). By looking at the different criticisms stated above, we can see how Origenistic teachings, at least concerning these points, do have parallels in Hellenistic philosophy. Origen’s theology at its base has strong ties to Platonic metaphysics.[xvi] Origen’s subordination of the Son to the Father looks extremely like Platonic theories concerning the relationship between the Logos and the First Principle.[xvii] We must remember that in Origen’s time, the Trinitarian doctrine had not been fully developed. It is understandable that, when he tried to demonstrate the relationship of the three persons with one another, that Origen would develop his Trinitarian doctrine along Platonic lines. However, this does not explain everything about Origen’s theology. For example, by saying a Christian should only pray to the Father and not to the Son, he held a belief which would not go well with the Platonists, but does go well with the monotheistic tradition from which the Church sprung (if one admits that Origen is a subordinationist).[xviii]
Origen’s theology of the resurrection clearly shows the kinds of concern someone educated within Hellenistic philosophy would have, and did have, with Christianity. Within Hellenism there is a long strain of thought, going back before Plato, which treats the body as a tomb for the soul.[xix] Plato saw death as something good. Philosophy was a preparation for death – a time when the soul will finally cast off its body.[xx] Thus, when Christianity said – to the horror of many within the classical world – that the soul would be reunited with the body, the immediate question that an educated Hellene would ask is — why? What would be the point?[xxi] There was also a strand of thought, similar to what we find in Origen, which suggested that the soul’s union with the body was an indication of some sort of fall.[xxii] Thus, not only did Christians find ridicule for their belief in the resurrection, they were also asked: if Jesus is God, how could he be incarnated without being tainted by it? Origen’s cosmology, with a mark of genius, tried to take all of these concerns together. He tried to create a theological system which could answer such demanding questions. His belief that the body would be perishable even after the resurrection was tied to his belief that we would one day overcome the need for a body in our spiritual ascent, or “reversion.”[xxiv] Yet, as Theophilus points out, such a view does call into question the value of the resurrection, and with it, Jesus’ incarnation. Was it, as Christianity taught, a union never to be dissolved? In this way, we can also understand why, in the writings of Theophilus, “the Eucharist is brought forward as an argument for the reality and meaningfulness of corporeal nature.”[xxv] The goodness of the material universe needed to be defended, and Theophilus was willing to bring into the discussion all that he could muster, including Christian liturgical beliefs.
Origen was, despite all of this, highly critical of philosophy (more so than, for example, Clement of Alexandria).[xxvi] Nonetheless, he was a man of his times, and he was influenced by the philosophical milieu he lived in.[xxvii] Origen, like several others before him, indicated that Christians could legitimately take views from philosophy, but only in a limited sense.[xxviii] When looking at these condemnations against Origen and how they relate to philosophy, one can still wonder what connected the theology of Origen with the anthropomorphic controversy? Elizabeth Clark quite reasonably shows us that these concerns actually came from the Origenism of the late 4th century, especially from the teachings of Evagrius.[xxix] There were two monastic spiritualities that were being developed in the desert: one, with Evagrius, following strands of Origen’s thought, sought a spirituality which slowly moved itself into a prayer that transcended the use of images and the imagination. Taking for granted that the divinity was “invisible” and “incorporeal,” Evagrian monasticism saw the ascent to the divine would require us to put off all things of the flesh behind us.[xxx] Yet, for many of the monks, who were simpler in their faith, and probably of less mental capacity, this kind of spirituality was not something they could follow. And, as we have seen, they believed it went too far because it seemed to reject the Biblical portrait of God.[xxxi]
In looking at how Theophilus portrayed Origen, we can see a hint of his own relationship with Hellenistic philosophy. While there is another piece of evidence which we need to explore next, it is fitting to consider how carefully worded Theophilus’ criticism of Origen was — of how Theophilus said it was the rags of philosophy that Origen had used for his theology. This would suggest that Theophilus, like many Christians, would not find a difficulty in adapting certain aspects of philosophy for Christian theology, but, following de Vogel’s model, would require an extremely critical adaptation in order to make sure what was received truly fits with Christian theology. While Origen followed this model as well, Theophilus might respond that Origen and his followers were not as critical as they needed to be. This, surprisingly enough, is supported by Jerome, who, in a letter of praise, compliments Theophilus’ use of philosophy and rhetoric in his condemnation of Origen.[xxxii] Yet, this is still too simplistic an answer, and does not really explain the situation. For when we look into what happened after the Origenistic crisis, when he ordained his friend Synesius of Cyrene, we fill get a greater understanding of Theophilus, and it will raise questions about what he found acceptable and unacceptable within Hellenism.
Footnotes
[i] Because, outside of fragments, the text we have of this letter comes from Jerome’s Latin translation, I will be citing the letter as it is found in the collection of Jerome’s letters. To connect the letters which I will use with the years in which they were written, Jerome’s Epistle 92= Theophilus’ Synodical Letter of 400; Jerome’s Epistle 96 = Theophilus Ep. Paschalis 401; Jerome’s Epistle 98= Theophilus Ep. Paschalis 402.
[ii] Jerome, Epistle 92 (CSEL 55, 152).
[iii] Jerome, Epistle 92 (CSEL 55, 148-149).
[iv] Jerome, Epistle 92 (CSEL 55, 149).
[v] Jerome, Epistle 92 (CSEL 55, 149).
[vi] That is, “resurgens corpus non solum corruptible sed mortale erit,“ Jerome, Epistle 92 (CSEL 55, 149).
[vii] See Paul Crego, “Theodoret of Kyros on the Relationship of the Body and the Soul Before Birth,” in Greek Orthodox Theological Review 41, no.1 (1996):25 to see how this continues to be criticized in current theological research.
[viii] Jerome, Epistle 92 (CSEL 55, 149).
[ix] Jerome, Epistle 92 (CSEL 55, 149-150).
[x] Jerome, Epistle 92 (CSEL 55, 152).
[xi] For example, if the body is to be seen as something evil, how could marriage and reproduction be considered good, as Paul had written in the Scriptures? To this Theophilus said, “audiat nos cum Paulo suis auribus inclamentes: honorabiles nuptiae et cubile inmaculatum. Et quomodo inmaculatum, si anima uitiis sordidata carne circumdatur ?” Jerome, Epistle 96 (CSEL 55, 178). This theme was central in Theophilus subsequent criticisms of Origen. Scripture attests to the goodness of the created order, and with it, of reproduction. If the soul has to fall in order to join with the body, how can reproduction be good, or why would God command it in Genesis? See Jerome, Epistle 100 (CSEL 55, 225-226).
[xii] Jerome, Epistle 96 (CSEL 55, 167).
[xiii] Jerome, Epistle 92 (CSEL 55, 153).
[xiv] Jerome, Epistle 98 (CSEL 55, 193-194).
[xv] Thus, Elizabeth Clark makes the point that with many of Theophilus’ criticisms were “veiled references to Evagrius,” Clark, Origenist, 7. This is not too surprising, since the opponents which Theophilus had in mind, the Tall Brothers, were at one time associates of Evagrius. It is also very important to note that when this controversy started, Evagrius was already dead.
[xvi] About this Henry Chadwick writes, “He takes for granted the Platonist’s conception of the metaphysical structure of the world..,” Henry Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), 111.
[xvii] For a discussion of Middle Platonic thought on the “One,” the Logos, and the World Soul and their relationships to each other, see John M. Dillon, The Middle Platonists: 80 B.C. to A.D. 220. (Rev. ed. Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996), 45 – 49.
[xviii] Especially in the Platonic Academy of Athens we see the philosophical development of the Platonic hierarchy of being into a hierarchy of mediation. Probably the most succinct example of this is found in Iamblichus’ On the Mysteries. Even though Iamblichus wrote after Origen, and they disagreed on the question of mediation, we can still see how Theophilus’ concerns with Origen were also concerns Christians could have with elements of Athenian Neoplatonic philosophy. Thus, condemning Origen for stating angels were fed from the altar of the Temple could also be a not-so-veiled attack on Iamblichus’ defense of paganism. Criticizing the value of magic certain serves as a criticism of theurgy. See A.A. Barb, “The Survival of Magic Arts,” in The Conflict Between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century (ed. Arnaldo Momoigliano: Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 114 – 116.
[xix] N. Clayton Groy, “Hellenistic Philosophers and the Preaching of the Resurrection (Acts 17:18, 32),” Novum Testamentum 39, no. 1 (1997): 29.
[xx] Nicholas P. Vassiliades, “The Mystery of Death,” Greek Orthodox Theological Review 29, no.3 (1984): 270.
[xxi] Porphyry, a contemporary of Origen, leaves us one of many ways this question was asked. “For what purpose should God intervene in this way, completely and arbitrarily overturning a course of events that had always been held good – namely, the plan ordained by him at the beginning….? ” Porphyry, Porphyry’s Against the Christians: The Literary Remains (ed. and trans. R. Joseph Hoffman; Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1994), 90.
[xxii] Platonists struggled with this; they tried to find a way to explain our existence in the world without agreeing with the gnostics, because they disagreed with the gnostic suggestion that the universe was evil. John Dillon explains what this meant to Plotinus. “Plotinus, for instance, though he does give us in one tractate (4.8; and cf. 5.1.1) a rather vivid portrayal of the fall of the soul, also argues both elsewhere and in the same tractate, that the world has developed to its present state by a natural progression. There is nothing actually wrong. Since the first principle, the One, is supremely perfect, anything it produces, must, since must be different from it, necessarily be ‘worse’ that it, and the process of creation once begun […] must proceed through all possible stages of inferiority to the ultimate depth nonbeing, which is unformed Matter,” John Dillon, “The Descent of the Soul in Middle Platonic and Gnostic Theory,” in The Rediscovery of Gnosticism, Volume 1 (ed. B. Layton; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1980), 357.
[xxiii] Celsus asked this question in the following way. “A god who comes down to men undergoes change – a change from good to bad; from beautiful to shameful; from happiness to misfortune; from what is perfect to what is wicked. Now what sort of a god would chose to change like that ?” Celsus, Celsus, On the True Doctrine: A Discourse Against the Christians (trans. R. Joseph Hoffman; New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 78.
[xxiv] For a thorough discussion on the spiritual circuit – procession and reversion, and the possibility of a transformation of the body into spirit, see A.C. Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990; repr. 1998), 123 – 139.
[xxv] Clark, Origenist, 113.
[xxvi] Henry Chadwick thus tells us, “Origen always writes as a member of a martyr church, and his attitude towards pagan philosophy and culture is less sympathetic than Clement’s, passing at times into ice-cold disparagement. For Clement Plato enjoyed high authority. In Origen’s eyes he enjoyed none whatever. Origen recognized, of course, that Plato had said many wise things, and that his dialogues contain much that is true. But with Origen one feels that he believed it to be true almost despite Plato, not because of him,” Henry Chadwick, The Early Church (London: Pelican Books, 1967; repr., London: Penguin Books, 1990), 100-101.
[xxvii] Chadwick, Early Christian Thought, 111.
[xxviii] Origen compared the Christian use of pagan philosophy to the ransacking of Egyptian treasures by the Israelites in the Exodus. See Origen, A Letter from Origen to Gregory 2 (ANF 4).
[xxix] See Clark, Origenist, 61 – 63. Also, in the very opening of On First Principles, we find Origen rejecting the idea that God is corporeal.
[xxx] “The worship experience cherished by the Egyptian monks was that of mystic contemplation and the vision of God, achieved by stringent self-mortification in order to free the spirit from all distractions of earthly concerns and entanglements in sensual delights so that it might occupy itself fully with heavenly things […] Such mystical worship presupposed a conception of God as utterly alien to all material and earthly things, totally invisible, immaterial, unbegotten, ineffable, and, of course, incorporeal.” Shepherd, “The Anthropomorphic Controversy,” 265-6.
[xxxi] “No doubt, there were in Egypt also rustic monks who were addicted to literal interpretation of Scriptural images – simplicitate rustica, in the phrase of St. Jerome, which refers, however, to the situation in Palestine,” Florovsky, “Theophilus of Alexandria and Apa Aphou of Pemdje,” 306.
[xxxii] “In principiis philosopharis et generaliter agens, dum omnes erudis, unum iugulas; in reliquis autem, quod uel difficillimum est, rhetoricae eloquentiae iungis philosophum et Demosthenen atque Platonem nobis consocias,” Jerome, Epistle 96 (CSEL 55, 212).
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