Mill v. Durkheim

Jonathan Haidt has a very worthwhile piece that seeks to explain a root of differing political visions in contemporary American politics. A psychologist who studies morality, he generalizes about “two rules:” a) feelings come first and tilt the mental playing field on which reasons and arguments compete, and b) moral domain varies across culture. A liberal, Enlightenment morality of justice and rights does not capture the concerns of all groups – those inclined to justify judgments with talk about respect, duty, and family roles. Thus morality is not just about how humans treat each other. It is also about binding groups together, supporting essential institutions, and living in a sanctified and noble way. Many tend to operate not under the social vision of Mill, but Durkheim: a stable network composed of many overlapping groups that “socialize, reshape, and care for individuals who, if left to their own devices, would pursue shallow, carnal, and selfish pleasures.” This vision values self-control over self-expression, duty over rights, and loyalty to group. If people do operate as ever-changing group members in the struggle of obtaining and exercising political power, Haidt’s characterizations are, I think, useful.