It is always good to read, whenever possible, arguments from the “other side” of where one’s sentiments tend to exist. One scholar of political science who has been throwing buckets of cold water on the work of political theorists for years is George C. Edwards. His book On Deaf Ears: The Limits of the Bully Pulpit is a formidable and worthwhile endeavor. The author defines the effects of what we might term presidential rhetoric somewhat narrowly. Here are his three “fundamental and widely shared premises about presidential leadership:” 1). Public support is a crucial political resource for the president 2). The president must not only earn public support by performance, but by actively taking a case to the people 3). Through the permanent campaign, there can be successful mobilization of the public. Yet he is skeptical of the premise that the power of the presidential pulpit is strong: we should not assume that presidents, even skilled presidents, will be able to lead the public (or that Congress will follow the public if the president succeeds). If even the most rhetorically skilled presidents find it difficult to move the public, he writes, then studying variations in those skills does not reveal explanations for difficulties. If all kinds of messages fail to resonate with an electorate, then the question is broader than the nature of messages themselves. On Deaf Ears is a quantitative investigation into what he believes to be the absence of relationships in models of messenger/message, audience, and response.
Edwards analyzed hundreds of public opinion polls. He found little evidence to suggest that a presidential strategy of moving legislation through Congress by appeals to public support will be successful and concludes that public opinion is very difficult to move.
“Going public” is a central strategy for governing: without public backing they lack the influence to influence Congress, and presidents believe this is the case – for good reason. (Other governing strategies include party leadership, interest group mobilization, and legislative skills – strategic and tactical.) In looking at studies of presidential leadership and at a variety of polls since the rise of modern polling in the late 50’s to late 60’s, he concludes that even able communicators like Reagan and Clinton could not move the public much on their own. In their policy successes, they enjoyed the support of sympathetic audiences. And each knew the dangers of using the “bully pulpit” to try move the public when they were not already so inclined.
Edwards is unable to find any systematic evidence of some special form of leadership that might be termed “charismatic.” Concepts cannot be employed, in other words, to identify those who possess charisma, nor to identify any consequence of it. Charisma and personality, as such, are not useful generalizations to better explain the relative success or failure of a president to obtain public support. He concludes that “systemic factors” such as political culture and the structure of the constitutional system work to determine that leaders since Washington had to be a facilitator, not a director, of change. They were unable to create opportunities for change through leadership alone, no matter how much the veneration.
Edwards believes that little can be done to limit the overall volume, and the content, of messages that citizens encounter. And little can be done to make the public more attentive to political affairs. But what can be done is repetition, so that messages will eventually break through noise, distraction, and disinterest. Times of crisis increase the possibility of reaching the public with messages, but even then only a small portion will connect and significant competition remains.
Here are some of my favorite quotes from the book:
1): “Chief executives are not directors who lead the public where it otherwise refuses to go, thus reshaping the contours of the political landscape. Instead, presidents are facilitators who reflect, and may intensify, widely held views. In the process, they may endow the views of their supporters with structure and purpose and exploit opportunities in their environments to accomplish their joint goals.”
2). “The final link in the chain of communication from the president to the public is a weak one. The president must overcome the predispositions of his audience if he is to change their minds about his policies or his performance. This is very difficult to do. Most people ignore or reject arguments contrary to their predispositions.”
Questions: Does charisma exist in reality, or only in our perceptions once a candidate has “made it” by hard work, luck, talent, and the right issues at the right time? Why is it so elusive? Does the president have more success than other elected officials in breaking through public inattentiveness?
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