In a recent post of mine, Morning’s Minion offered the following comment:
I’m afraid Alex, well intentioned as he is, simply does not understand what proximity to the evil act means. Voting for a politician who supports abortion when you clearly do not share that intention, and when that politician’s influence on the actual incidence of abortion is strictly limited, is perfectly licit. The non-negotiability applies to the specfic act of directly-procured abortion itself, and formal cooperation with it, Especially given the circumstances in the US, the voter’s cooperation is of the remote material nature, nothing close to formal (assuming the intent is not there, of course). And yes, a voter’s assessment of the abortion issue does entail prudential judgment. Making a decision to vote for X because X will nominate judge Y who will overturn Roe v. Wade which will lower the abortion rate involves a number of steps that lie in the realm of uncertainty. It’s a valid position, but it’s not the only one.
Well, apparently, I am in pretty good company in my “misunderstanding” as to the meaning of “proportionate reasons.”
When it is not possible to overturn or completely abrogate a pro-abortion law, an elected official, whose absolute personal opposition to procured abortion was well known, could licitly support proposals aimed at limiting the harm done by such a law and at lessening its negative consequences at the level of general opinion and public morality. This does not in fact represent an illicit cooperation with an unjust law, but rather a legitimate and proper attempt to limit its evil aspects.
What are “proportionate reasons”? To consider that question, we must first repeat the teaching of the church: The direct killing of innocent human beings at any stage of development, including the embryonic and fetal, is homicidal, gravely sinful and always profoundly wrong . . . .
What evil could be so grave and widespread as to constitute a “proportionate reason” to support candidates who would preserve and protect the abortion license and even extend it to publicly funded embryo-killing in our nation’s labs?
Certainly policies on welfare, national security, the war in Iraq, Social Security or taxes, taken singly or in any combination, do not provide a proportionate reason to vote for a pro-abortion candidate.
What is a proportionate reason to justify favoring the taking of an innocent, defenseless human life? That’s the question that has to be answered in your conscience. What is the proportionate reason? . . . It is difficult to imagine what that proportionate reason would be.
When a Catholic does not share a candidate’s stand in favor of abortion and/or euthanasia, but votes for that candidate for other reasons, it is considered remote material cooperation, which can be permitted in the presence of proportionate reasons strictly defined.
Since abortion and euthanasia have been defined by the Church as the most serious sins prevalent in our society, what kind of reasons could possibly be considered proportionate enough to justify a Catholic voting for a candidate who is known to be pro-abortion? None of the reasons commonly suggested could even begin to be proportionate enough to justify a Catholic voting for such a candidate. Reasons such as the candidate’s position on war, or taxes, or the death penalty, or immigration, or a national health plan, or social security, or aids, or homosexuality, or marriage, or any similar burning societal issues of our time are simply lacking in proportionality.
There is only one thing that could be considered proportionate enough to justify a Catholic voting for a candidate who is known to be pro-abortion, and that is the protection of innocent human life. That may seem to be contradictory, but it is not.
Consider the case of a Catholic voter who must choose between three candidates: candidate (A, Kerry) who is completely for abortion-on-demand, candidate (B, Bush) who is in favor of very limited abortion, i.e., in favor of greatly restricting abortion and candidate (C, Peroutka), a candidate who is completely against abortion but who is universally recognized as being unelectable.The Catholic voter cannot vote for candidate (A, Kerry) because that would be formal cooperation in the sin of abortion if that candidate were to be elected and assist in passing legislation, which would remove restrictions on, abortion-on-demand. The Catholic can vote for candidate (C, Peroutka) but that will probably only help ensure the election of candidate (A, Kerry). Therefore the Catholic voter has a proportionate reason to vote for candidate (B, Bush) since his vote may help to ensure the defeat of candidate (A, Kerry) and may result in the saving of some innocent human lives if candidate (B, Bush) is elected and introduces legislation restricting abortion-on-demand. In such a case, the Catholic voter would have chosen the lesser of two evils, which is morally permissible under these circumstances.
If one had a properly formed conscience admitting the grave evil of abortion and euthanasia, as the Church teaches, and does not share a candidate’s stand in favor of abortion and euthanasia, but votes for the candidate for other reasons, it is considered remote material cooperation which can be permitted, Cardinal Ratzinger states, if proportionate reasons are present, e.g., the candidate would limit abortions.
Note that [“proportionate reasons’] does not mean simply weighing a wide range of issues against abortion and euthanasia and concluding that they cumulatively outweigh the evil of taking an innocent life. Rather, for there to be proportionate reasons, the voter would have to be convinced that the candidate who supports abortion rights would actually do more than the opposing candidate to limit the harm of abortion or to reduce the number of abortions.
“Proportionate reasons” has a very specific meaning in Catholic moral teaching. A proportionate reason [to vote for pro-abortion candidates] would be the desire to avoid supporting an equally grave or graver intrinsic evil, and not just for any reason at all. An intrinsic evil is an evil that cannot be morally justified for any reason or set of circumstances. So, for example, capital punishment is not a proportionate reason. A candidate’s stand on economic issues is not a proportionate reason.
This could not mean . . . that support for a pro-abortion . . . candidate could be justified by his support for economic proposals, whether of a ‘conservative’ or ‘liberal’ character. The protection of life is greater than the protection or redistribution of wealth [CCC #2197-2198]. Cardinal Ratzinger had already affirmed the priority of protecting innocent life when he stated that ‘not all moral issues have the same moral weight as abortion and euthanasia.
Cardinal Ratzinger’s remark would have to mean that support for a pro-abortion or pro-euthanasia candidate could only be licit where the alternative was more detrimental to the defense of innocent life. A candidate who supports legal abortion with a number of restrictions would be proportionately better than a candidate who supports abortion “on demand.”
But the crucial questions – largely missing from press coverage of the cardinal’s letter – remain: When is this morally justifiable? What are the “proportionate reasons” that would lead a pro-life voter to conclude that a pro-abortion candidate’s unacceptable position on the life issues can, in effect, be bracketed?
I can imagine one such situation: when the choice is between two pro-abortion candidates, and a voter opts for the pro-abortion candidate of a pro-life party in order to keep that pro-life party in control of Congress. That was the case in my own Congressional district for years. But that is not the situation that Catholic voters face in the current presidential contest or in most Congressional races.
When Cardinal Ratzinger’s comments are viewed within the general context of all his declarations, it’s clear that he thinks few justifications would suffice to outweigh participation in the evil of the politician’s pro-choice position and votes. In an address to European politicians on March 30th of this year, Pope Benedict stated, “As far as the Catholic Church is concerned, the principal focus of her interventions in the public arena is the protection and promotion of the dignity of the person, and she is thereby consciously drawing particular attention to principles which are not negotiable. Among these the following emerge clearly today: the protection of life in all its stages, from the first moment of conception until natural death; recognition and promotion of the natural structure of the family — as a union between one man and one woman based on marriage…; and the protection of the rights of parents to educate their children.”
Oh, and I can produce more quotes if need be.
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