I saw your post on objective goods and it till doesn’t work for me. I still get back to the question of what an objective good is, and from that, this dialogue about morality.
Given that the physical universe doesn’t care about any of us, or what we do, or whether we all go crazy and become genocidal murderers, or whether we are angels, how do you discuss any kinds of “objective” morality at all?
The physical universe—taken as a unitary thing—does not care about anything. Nothing could be true if its truth hinged on the physical universe caring about it. Something’s being true, and objectively demonstrably true, has to do with our abilities to make a coherent and logically consistent sense of our manifold experience when we believe it to be true.
So why would anyone worry about what the universe did or did not care about when deciding whether there was an objective morality? My guess is that several dubious assumptions about the nature and justification of morality are at work. The most basic assumption is that morality’s objectivity could only stem from a subjective authority with legitimate right to lay down a law. For example, whether we like America’s laws or not, we can say objectively what they are because we can identify the authorized subjective lawgivers, consult the nation’s constitution, study the history of American legislation, consult the law books, etc. Some laws are hard to interpret and so Justices are authorized to be either an authoritative subjective source of commands themselves as they interpret what legislators left unclear or they are merely clarifiers of the subjective will of legislators that make the legislators’ commands specific and effective with their rulings. In either case, objectively identifiable law comes from an act of duly authorized, widely obeyed, and regularly enforced subjective acts of will by lawgivers. Such laws can be acknowledged as objectively binding commands for a community, whether you agree with their wisdom or not, as long as they come from those duly authorized to give binding commands and are, in practice, efficacious in guiding community behavior.
So the assumption is often made that for there to be an objective morality, there would need to be an equivalent moral lawgiver, or lawgivers, that regulates our private moral lives in a comparable way to how governments’ laws regulates our public lives. The moral lawgivers would regulate what would be too infeasible for the governmental lawgivers to regulate, either by punishing legal infractions that went unnoticed by authorities, by punishing harms too common or trivial in kind for the government to reasonably punish every instance of, and/or by assessing and punishing even inner wrongdoing (such as evil thoughts) that had no outward manifestation. For the moral lawgivers to enforce the moral laws as effectively as human governments enforce civil laws, the moral lawgivers were often thought to have to be divine. There would have to be either gods or a single god.
There could be human moral lawgivers even if they were inadequate at enforcing their laws. But for there to be any moral laws that were cross-cultural you would need a common moral lawgiver that bound societies despite their differing values. The source of these laws has been conceived of as, again, divine agents or a monotheistic god who makes a universally binding morality. We might also be Kantian or prescriptivist and conceive of rationality itself as legislating a universal morality. In this way the objective, cross-culturally binding moral law is what the ideal rational agent would legislate. Each of us, insofar as we are rational, could discern this for ourselves.
The appeal to the indifference of the universe seems to be made by people who think that without universal enforcement powers, agents cannot lay down universal (or otherwise objective) morality. Presumably only gods or something else having sufficient power to punish wrongdoing could give an objectively binding morality. Without efficacious enforcement a morality has no objective force. So if there are no gods and the universe indifferently gives fortune and misfortune to both the allegedly moral and the allegedly immoral alike, then it is inferred that there is no normative force to morality. With no lawgiver or no law enforcer, there can be no objectively identifiable moral law.
Presumably the idea that rationality itself or humans themselves could be legitimate subjective legislators that could make objective laws is either not considered by those who look to the universe to care or they dismiss the option for some reason. The arguments against rationality being legitimate subjective legislators could be the familiar charges that rationality itself would come to inconclusive results, that it would have no binding authority, that it would vary too much from one rational agent or rational culture to another, or that it would inadequately be able to enforce its laws and so be ineffective at making imposing itself on reality. Parallel problems would arise in allowing humanity to be the source of morality as human judgments, feelings, and desires vary and their enforcement powers are limited.
In my view however, all of this is wrongheaded. Moralities are not justified by coming from sanctioned legitimate authorities. They are justified by whether or not they are conducive to the flourishing of the agents who are subjected to them. A morality is relatively objectively good for each agent and for the total culture to the extent that it maximizes the agent and the culture’s overall flourishing in power. Moralities are just complicated instruments for achieving flourishing. They are objectively justified as such by their regular, or rationally projectable, contributions to human prosperity according to as many powers and powerful combinations of human powers as they can enhance.
The good is distinguishable from the moral. The moral is a means to the good. Our good is maximal flourishing. The good in general is just effectiveness relationships that exist throughout the universe. The universe, taken as a totality, has no feelings of course. But nonetheless it consists throughout of functional relationships in which several things combine and either make up a more complicated functional pattern of existence (i.e., a more complicated, distinctly identifiable being which emerges out of the combination of its parts, from which it is distinguishable) or they contribute to another being’s flourishing according to its characteristic nature and powers.
In this context, human goods emerge as simply effectiveness relationships which constitute our being. Without effectively thinking, willing, emoting, socializing, etc., human being as we understand it would not exist. We effectively emerge out of these powers. They are our constitutive goods. The good of their maximal overall flourishing is identical with our maximal overall flourishing. Moralities can be objectively assessed as relatively good or relatively bad for each individual and each culture on a case by case basis for how they in fact do, or could be projected to, enhance our maximal overall flourishing.
The universe may remain completely indifferent to effectiveness relationships but they nonetheless exist throughout the universe and are the meaning of “goodness” in the naturalistic, objective sense of the term. Moralities are objectively good for us to the extent they effectively contribute to our achieving our fundamental natural powers through which we have our being. They are bad to the extent to which, on the long run, they harm this.
Morality has long been misinterpreted in absolutist, authoritarian, and superstitious terms. But it is foolish to still demand that moralities meet the bogus criteria of being absolute or come from an absolute lawgiver or be dismissed as illegitimate, arbitrary, or unfounded. Such moves retain theistic and superstitious attitudes towards morality rather than understand it within the naturalistic, pluralistic, empirical, situational, objective terms available to us. There is no God. There need be no God for moralities of various stripes to have demonstrable value to us. Requiring the universe to fulfill the “personal moral lawgiver” role that God used to be assumed to fill, which is clearly impossible, in order for morality to be legitimated is to refuse a priori to think naturalistically, realistically, or constructively about one of the most vital, indispensable, and ineradicable features of our lives, and instead to be hypocritically incoherent and unnecessarily surrender all moral authority and all moral clarity.
The considerations spelled out in the above post should offer a greater context and justification for the ideas in the following, roughly logically ordered, posts. Listed below are some of the most salient posts I have written on problems in value theory, metaethics, moral psychology, practical ethics, and normative moral theory. There are a lot of them but you do not need to read them all to understand any of them whose titles interest you in particular. So don’t avoid all of them for fear you cannot read all of them.