One of my new best friends on Facebook, Chana Messinger has written a very good post about the reasons to “steelman” others’ arguments. I had never heard this word before but I love it. It means to figure out even better arguments for your opponents’ positions while arguing with them and to beat those arguments rather than only their actual arguments or their weakest arguments (weak-manning) or caricatures of their arguments (straw-manning). And I am especially pleased to read her mention this reason to give our opponents the benefit of a best formulation of their position:
I think steelmanning makes you a better person. It makes you more charitable, forcing you to assume, at least for a moment, that the people you’re arguing with, much as you ferociously disagree with them or even actively dislike them, are people who might have something to teach you. It makes you more compassionate, learning to treat those you argue with as true opponents, not merely obstacles. It broadens your mind, preventing us from making easy dismissals or declaring preemptive victory, pushing us to imagine all the things that could and might be true in this beautiful, strange world of ours. And it keeps us rational, reminding us that we’re arguing against ideas, not people, and that our goal is to take down these bad ideas, not to revel in the defeat of incorrect people.
I couldn’t agree more. Read More.
For posts where I argue that it is more important that rationalists focus on embodying rationalist virtues than winning arguments at any costs, see posts like I’m a Rationalist, Not a Tribalist, No Hate, and Stop Calling People Stupid. For a post where I explain my own take on the virtues of “steelmanning” see this post where I wrote specifically about how to apply the tactic in debates with religious believers:
I want to add to this a call to specifically figure out the best possible cases for their views and target them. Even where believers themselves are so ignorant or incoherent that they cannot present their religions’ positions with any rigor or plausibility, we should be willing and able to engage the best possible arguments. So, sometimes this means we might have to provide them ourselves. This is because even though the believer may not know how to formulate a better articulation of his beliefs than our gestalt-shifting offering of what they entail, he will usually be unwilling to take a caricature as a decisive refutation of his positions.
But if we reach out and work with him and help him think through the best possible defenses of his position, we get his hopes up that maybe he can salvage his views and we impress him with how thoroughly we are able to think through his own position even though we do not accept it. When we can help him build a seemingly impressive defense for his own views and then take that apart, we demonstrate in a powerful way that we are not just attacking his views out of ignorance or shallow understanding. We show instead that we understand his position better than he does and still can systematically dismantle it because it is so weak. This is very psychologically powerful and has the benefit of being fair, gracious, and a model of ideal rationality. We should do this simply as an expression of our commitment to rationalism and our love of truth, even were it not so useful for persuasion.
If all we ever do is cast their views in ways that do not really capture the essence of what they really mean, believers can reflexively dismiss us as unserious or uncomprehending. When we show that we can engage the most sophisticated versions of their views and show that we can explore a dozen of the most seemingly promising avenues to cogently develop their own positions for them or with them, and yet still refute them point by point, we limit their ability to feel like they have rational options left we have not touched.
Again, as I have stressed before, when I say we should address the most sophisticated versions of believers’ positions, I do not mean that we should ignore fundamentalists’ views as beneath refutation for their lack of sophistication. We just should address the most sophisticated possibilities for interpreting and defending fundamentalists too as part of addressing their views systematically. With fundamentalists and non-fundamentalists alike our focus should be on gestalt shifts, positive alternative accounts of philosophy which answer their theologies, refutations according to reason and evidence, and considerations and refutations of their best hopes of defending their own positions against our refutations.