At Flickers of Freedom Bruce N. Waller, a compatibilist and the author of Against Moral Responsibility, distinguishes two approaches to conceptualizing compatibilist free will: reason-responsive theories, which “account for free will in terms of an agent’s responsiveness to an adequate spectrum of reasons”, and mesh theories, which “account for free will in terms of a harmoniously functioning mesh of psychic subsystems collectively generating action”. He then gives arguments in favor of his reason-responsive theory.
Daniel Mullin’s Unemployed Philosophers Blog is an excellent resource for philosophers pursuing careers outside of academia. He recently interviewed me for his podcast. In the interview I talked about how I built a relatively well-read and paying blog, my ideas for how philosophical counselors can meet the needs of people recovering from religion, and my small group interactive online video classes for non-matriculated students which anyone can join. For my first semester running these entirely independent classes I had 11 students commit to the full semester. I am now signing up summer students, using this survey to determine what courses students want and what time slots fit their schedules.
Clayton Littlejohn at Think Tonk discusses Donald Davidson’s view that between the sentences “The short circuit caused the fire” and “Because there was a short circuit, there was a fire” there is a difference in logical form. Littlejohn takes away from this the idea that “we should think of causal relations as holding between events and causal explanatory relations as holding between something else entirely” and queries this proposition.
At M-Phi, a blog dedicated to mathematical philosophy, in a post called “Fermat, set theory, and arithmetic”, guest blogger Colin McLarty, explains his current work on the foundations of mathematics in just 1000 words. McLarty is Truman P. Handy Professor of Intellectual Philosophy and professor of Mathematics at Case Western Reserve University.
At The Splintered Mind, Eric Schwitzgebel wonders whether he has been harmed by philosophy after he spends a day lost in radical skeptical worries that he has a Boltzmann brain or, perhaps, is living in a simulation.