Wanchick’s moral argument

I probably should have posted this directly here rather than on my own blog, but I’ve offered up a critique of Wanchick’s moral argument in his Internet Infidels debate with Richard Carrier at The Lippard Blog. I believe that not only does Wanchick mainly proceed through the mere assertion of dubious premises, but that at one point he effectively argues for something that is almost moral subjectivism as a premise by which he attempts to derive the existence of God from the objectivity of moral order (i.e., a self-contradictory argument). Actually, it’s not quite subjectivism, as he would hold that all moral properties are objective properties of persons, but he does explicitly limit moral properties to persons, denying them to anything external to persons. I suspect that in light of this criticism he might revise his position to say that a person must always be involved (as actor or acted-upon) in order for moral properties to be involved.

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