My article with the above name will appear in an upcoming issue of The International Journal of Philosophy of Religion, and has just been made available online to anyone with access to an institution with a SpringerLink license. Here is the abstract taken from SpringerLink (http://www.springerlink.com/content/237w067637655738/):
The “serious error” to which the abstract refers is the claim, made on page 50 of Plantinga’s book, that “the probability of a contingent proposition on a necessary falsehood is 1”. Rather, the correct result for the probability of any proposition (contingency or otherwise) against a contradiction is “undefined”. My paper shows how this correction, combined with an assumption Plantinga seemed keen to make in his argument against Draper (viz. the noncontingency of theism), decisively undermines his two-point case against Draper’s evolutionary atheology.
While writing my paper I had not realized that the text just quoted meant that theism’s contingency was being granted in what followed (while I think it is a possible meaning, I did not then and frankly still do not think it is the obvious meaning). But given Plantinga’s clarification of what he meant, this hypothetical presumption defuses the argument of my second section, an argument which uses the assumption of theism’s noncontingency against Plantinga’s counterclaims, an argument which clearly won’t work if theism is being presumed contingent.