About Graham Oppy

Further Comments on http://subversivethinking.blogspot.com.au/2012/12/reply-to-professor-graham-oppys.htmlI shall restrict myself to one small comment on what is a very long post that covers a great deal of ground very quickly.In my previous post, I wrote this: "Question: Is there a first cause in causal reality? If so, then, causal reality begins with that first cause. Moreover, it might seem right to say that causal reality begins to exist with that first cause. (Of course, … [Read more...]

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/secularoutpost/2012/12/22/161/

Part of a response to: http://subversivethinking.blogspot.com.au/2012/12/graham-oppy-on-successful-arguments.html  The argument we have been given -- the kalam cosmological syllogism -- is this:1-Whatever begins to exist has a cause (of its beginning to exist) 2-The universe began to exist 3-Therefore, the universe has a cause (of its beginning to exist) Two immediate questions to ask when we come to assess it: (a) What lies in the scope of the quantifier in (1)? (b) What exactly do … [Read more...]

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/secularoutpost/2012/12/20/166/

“The Argument from Reason” (2)

At 349, Reppert says: "We ought to draw the conclusion if we accept the premises of a valid argument".This is obviously wrong. Suppose, to take the worst case, that my beliefs contradict one another. If we are supposing classical logic -- as Reppert clearly is -- then, from my contradictory beliefs, using Reppert's principle, I ought to infer that every claim is true. But, even though there IS a valid argument from premises I accept to an absurd conclusion, I ought NOT to "draw" the absurd … [Read more...]

“The Argument from Reason”

A couple of comments on Reppert "The Argument from Reason" in Craig and Moreland (ed.) Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, 344-90. (I have a long list; I may post further comments later.)1. At 368, Reppert argues: If the reference of our terms is indeterminate, then this has the disastrous consequence that we cannot reason to conclusions.This is surely wrong. Reasoning can be purely formal. (If all flombs are bloops, and all bloops are shimbs, then all flombs are shimbs. The reasoning is … [Read more...]

Distrust & Anti-Atheist Prejudice

Interesting new paper from Gervais, Shariff and Norenzayan:http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~will/Gervais%20et%20al-%20Atheist%20Distrust.pdfThe experiments performed by Gervais et al. provide pretty convincing support for the thesis that anti-atheist prejudice manifests as distrust (rather than dislike, or disgust), and that it surfaces most strongly when the need for trust -- as opposed to say, likeability, or pleasantness -- is particularly salient. So, for example, prejudiced religious believers are … [Read more...]

God, Multi-verses, and Modal Realism

I have heard in various quarters recently the claim that Lewis' version of modal realism is (a) just a kind of multi-verse theory; and (b) intrinsically incompatible with theism. A partial discussion of this issue may be found in the pages of Philosophia Christi:Richard Davis 'God and Modal Concretism' Philosophia Christi 10, 1, 2008, 57-74Graham Oppy 'Reply to Richard Davis' Philosophia Christi 11, 2, 2009, 423-36Richard Davis 'Oppy and Modal Theistic Proofs' Philosophia Christi 11, 2, 2009, … [Read more...]

Moreland on Consciousness

Re: http://www.jpmoreland.com/2010/11/18/critique-of-graham-oppys-objection/There have been some further developments in this discussion. See:Graham Oppy "Critical Notice of J. P. Moreland's Consciousness and the Existence of God" European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3, 1, 2011, 193-212J. P. Moreland "Oppy on the Argument from Consciousness: A Rejoinder" European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3, 1, 2011, 213-226Graham Oppy "Consciousness in not Evidence for Theism" in C. Meister, J. … [Read more...]

Radio Think Atheist

Here is a link to a recent radio recording:http://www.blogtalkradio.com/thinkatheist/2011/11/14/episode-34-dr-graham-oppy-nov-13-2011It may be of interest to some people who read this blog. … [Read more...]


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