Kreeft’s Case for God – Part 2: Tossing Out Four More Arguments

KREEFT’S CREDIBILITY PROBLEM To focus in on the alleged flaws and failings of an arguer, as opposed to the alleged flaws and failings of his/her arguments is generally to be avoided, and can amount to the fallacy of ad hominem. However,  the CREDIBILITY of an arguer can affect the persuasive force of an argument, so credibility should not be completely ignored.  Part of the reason why I have chosen to focus on Peter Kreeft’s case for God, is that he is a… Read more

Kreeft’s Case for God – Part 1: Tossing Out Four Arguments

INTRODUCTION TO KREEFT’S CASE FOR GOD In this new series of blog posts, I plan to analyze and evaluate Peter Kreeft’s case for the existence of God. Peter Kreeft is a Catholic philosopher of religion and a Christian apologist.  He has published many books defending the Christian faith.  Kreeft co-authored Handbook of Christian Apologetics (hereafter: HCA) with Ronald Tacelli in 1994.   Kreeft presents a case for God in Chapter 3 of  HCA: “Twenty Arguments for the Existence of God”. Twenty… Read more

Geisler’s Five Ways – Part 19: The Whole Enchilada

In part 11 of this series of posts I reviewed the overall structure of Norman Geisler’s case for the existence of God, the case that he presented, along with coauthor Ronald Brooks, in When Skeptics Ask (hereafter: WSA).  In this present post, I will once again review the overall structure of Geisler’s case, and will summarize a number of key problems with Geisler’s case. ================ For a more detailed analysis and critique of Geisler’s case, or of a specific argument in his case,… Read more

A Problem for the Problem of Evil?

William Lane Craig once gave a talk entitled, “Top 10 Worst Objections to the Kalam Cosmological Argument.” Along the same lines, maybe someday I should a talk entitled, “Top 10 Worst Objections to the Argument from Evil.” But, for now, I want to focus on just one of the top ten objections, the idea that the argument from evil (for atheism) can be flipped on its head into an argument from evil (for theism). I’ve refuted this objection over and over again, which might… Read more

Matthew Facciani on Claiming Religion is a Mental Illness

Here. Read more

Atheistic Presuppositionalism

(1) God does not exist. (2) Therefore, God does not exist. Read more

Does anything really matter?

Does anything really matter? Some people say no. Such people are proponents of nihilism, the view according to which nothing matters. According to nihilists, there is no reason to care about anything whatsoever. Nihilists do not deny that people care about things, they claim only that there is no reason to care about anything. Other people say yes. Among the people who say yes, some claim that the only things that matter are the things that we care about and,… Read more

Can Brains Think?

Victor Reppert and I have been arguing for forty years. Our first debates took place when we were both students at Candler School of Theology, Emory University way back in the seventies. For a while, we even lived down the hall from each other in the same house. (Among other things, I learned that you do not play chess with Victor unless you do not mind losing.) Our exchanges have continued in public and in private ever since. While I… Read more

Confederates in the Closet

Note: This is off topic, but because of recent events in Charlottesville, Virginia and elsewhere I thought it might be of interest. I was born in Macon, Georgia in 1952, the fourth generation of the Parsons family to be born in Georgia.  My great-great grandfather Parsons was born in London, England, and in 1844 he settled in Georgia on land only recently stolen from the Creek Indians.  On the other side of the family, my roots in Georgia go back… Read more

What could God’s commands do for morality?

Consider the following version of divine command metaethics (DCM): Our moral obligations are constituted by divine commands. In particular, F is morally obligatory = God has commanded that we F F is morally wrong = God has commanded that we not F F is morally permissible = God has neither commanded that we F nor commanded that we not F. On this theory, God’s commands constitute moral obligations and thus, in the absence of divine commands, there are no moral… Read more

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