A couple of weeks ago, I argued that there was a real distinction between “lacking a belief in any God or gods” on the one hand and “believing there is no God (or gods)” on the other hand. Primarily I saw the heart of the distinction as resting with the difference between on the one hand being an atheist because one has epistemological reasons for lacking belief (i.e., one thinks that there is insufficient evidence for a God or gods and, therefore, opts to disbelieve as a matter of principle) and on the other hand being an atheist because one has thinks one has positive metaphysical reasons for believing that there are no gods whatsoever.
If one thinks that there is not sufficient metaphysical reason to think there is or is not a particular kind of god or gods, then one is agnostic with respect to that type of god or gods. One can then choose by faith to nonetheless believe in that god or gods and be a religious person who admits to not actually having good reason to say he knows there is a God or gods but is opting to believe anyway. That would make for an agnostic theist. He does not think there is sufficient evidence for the existence of his god or gods and yet he believes. An agnostic who abstains from belief in a particular god or gods given what he judges to be the paucity of positive evidence for that god or gods, is an agnostic atheist with respect to the god or gods in question.
Similarly, there could be gnostic theists who make knowledge claims about any particular god or gods such that they exist (claiming, for example, “I know Yahweh exists based on evidence, not because of faith primarily” or “I know Zeus exists based on evidence, not because of faith primarily”) or be a gnostic atheist who makes knowledge claims that some particular god or gods do not exist (claiming, for example, “I know based on evidence that Yahweh does not exist” or “I know based on evidence that Zeus does not exist”.
As my examples hint, I think many people think like gnostic theists about some gods while being gnostic atheists about others. The gnostic Jewish theist about Yahweh is usually, I imagine, simultaneously an gnostic atheist about Zeus (and probably an gnostic atheist about Vishnu and Jesus, etc., though she may be an agnostic atheist about living religions, for example).
Strong, passionate, activist adherence to this principle of epistemology and/or ethics can all take place without any dogmatic commitment
Really? You argue (in my opinion) correctly that agnostic unbelief comes from an epistemological commitment to the principle of sufficient reason. First of all, if this commitment were merely ethical I believe it would undermine the unbelieving stance as a matter of opinion or preference: the unbeliever would have as her only resort arguing that not believing as a matter of faith to be “best” for the believer, a bare claim she better not make if she wishes to avoid being charged as an ethical dogmatist.
The problem I have with an epistemological justification for agnostic atheism is that it is not clear that the principle of sufficient reason can be properly applied outside the rather narrow realm of natural philosophy. That is, I don’t see how it can be argued without entering into the realm of ethics (and again, opening oneself to accusations of dogmatism) that rationalism should be properly exercised in all aspects of one’s life, thought and belief and not just to observation and theories about the material world.
Either way, I think that the choice is logically (daresay, rationally, inasmuch it is rational to conclude that is permissible to be irrational) free for both kinds of agnostics, as neither commitment (to faith or to reason) impinges on the other’s.
And then he quoted another portion of a line from the text and added further comment:
all without being guilty of adhering by faith to any dogmatic metaphysical attitudes or commitments of their own
Again, if this were true such a rationalist would refrain from applying epistemological heuristics as if they were universals, lest he commit in principle, dogmatically, to a particular brand of metaphysics.
I do not fully understand this objection. I do not think that either epistemic or ethical norms are indeed matters of preference. I do not think that the agnostic unbeliever should believe or not as a matter of taste or unjustifiable feeling. The agnostic unbeliever, in order to have a justified position at least, should have a reason to either believe, disbelieve, or abstain from belief, or she should do none of the above. Obviously, she must do one of the above, she must either believe, disbelieve, or abstain from believing (either permanently or temporarily).
As soon as one understands a yes or no propositional question, she either must answer affirmatively, negatively, or implicitly or explicitly refuse or delay to answer it. But, in any of the above cases, an action must occur. It might happen entirely passively or subconsciously and never raise to a deliberate action from principled intention, but nevertheless, a choice must be made. Either affirm or deny, affirm partially and/or deny partially, refuse or delay to affirm or deny. And one can do all of this either outwardly or inwardly, consciously or subconsciously, but something must be done.
And as far as I’m concerned where there are choices for rational beings there are norms of reason which operate either implicitly or explicitly, either consciously or subconsciously. And for whatever we do, regardless of whether we did it deliberately or without thinking much about it, we can assess in rational terms whether or not it was the most rational choice for any number of reasons.
Obviously, “rational” has numerous senses. It is strictly speaking rational to act in a formally consistent way. Reason operates on formal consistencies and there is something that strikes us as obviously irrational in acting in self-contradictory ways. For example, if we decided to give the second place finishers in contests higher honors than the first place finishers this would be puzzling and irrational. The formal logic of a contest requires that winning be defined in terms of the best performance on the terms of the contest. And it is only logical that the prizes that correlate to victory be given to those who actually won. Formally it would be silly and irrational to hold contests in which the second or fifth place winner was honored more greatly than the first place winner.
But formal consistency in one’s actions, which of course is indispensable for both rational and moral agency on Kant’s conception, is not the only thing with which our reason concerns itself. We use reason instrumentally as a means towards fulfilling needs and desires. It is only rational that if I need x to fulfill my needs and that I need to do y to get x that I do y and get x. And even if I only desire x, if I do not have any overriding reason not to get it, I should still do y if that is what it takes to fulfill my desire and I have no overriding reason not to.
I think we can take this as axiomatic, or at least as derivable transcendentally. Say, for example, A requires x is in order to be. Then A’s interest in x goes well beyond a mere preference and becomes a matter of existential interest. A will not be A if there is no x. In this way x is objectively vital to A, objectively good as a means to A’s very being. To refuse x is to refuse to be. This kind of stake makes x an objective good for being A, since it plays a constitutive necessary role in there being any A at all. Just as it is objectively good, in the sense of useful, to add chocolate to milk if your end is to make chocolate milk and objectively bad, or counterproductive to add turpentine to milk if you want to make chocolate milk, so anything which contributes to our being what we are at all is objectively good for us insofar as we are that very kind of being.
So, we have reasons to act in accordance with our needs distinct from our reasons to act in accordance with formal principles, and this is the perceptive point of topfancy’s objection. I need to stay alive in order to be me. If I were a figure skating judge at a competition and my life were absolutely threatened lest I unfairly award the second best performer in the competition the highest score rather than the clear best performer, then I would recognize that it was both formally irrational to declare the second best person on the ice the winner and yet also realize that it was existentially irrational to put this concern for the formal consistency and practical integrity of games over attention to the preconditions of my very survival.
So, when I give the second best skater the highest score over his clearly better rival, everyone is justly outraged because what I did was formally irrational and unjustifiable as far as they know. But when it comes out that my life was in jeopardy, my choice was clearly the only existentially valid and rational choice and everyone except the hardest line rationalists thinks I did what anyone should do in that situation. (Of course, there are times when we think the right thing to do, which anyone should do, is actually to submit oneself to either likely or certain death and those cases create their own existential paradoxes, which I wrestle with in my post, “Maximal Self-Realization In Self-Obliteration: The Existential Paradox of Heroic Self-Sacrifice”.)
Returning to the question at hand, we have reached what I understand to be topfancy’s problem. Why should ethics favor strict adherence to the principle of sufficient reason in all matters in life? The principle of sufficient reason is a type of rational formalism. Why should it extend beyond formal philosophy into matters of existential concern like how I live my life? We would likely think that someone who insisted that the formal rationality and integrity of skating competitions was more important than the lives of judges was adhering to a principle of rationalism dogmatically, insisting that it was a good thing even if innocents avoidably died and no greater good was served. It strikes me as dogmatic to be a rationalist in that scenario and to insist that adherence to formal rational principles come before concern for existential needs.
It even seems dogmatic to say that adherence to rational formalism in action should always come before happiness. Imagine I am a parent of two twin children and despite being very alike in most respects, one just has a greater knack for games than the other and is always beating the other child such that it is beginning to wreck the “loser twin’s” self-confidence entirely. What if in this scenario I were to ask the “winner twin” to throw a game and boost the “loser twin’s” self-esteem? What if the “winner twin” does this and everyone’s happier. The “winner twin” learns how to put others before himself and to take joy in the happiness of his brother and “loser twin” say gains confidence that helps him break a mental block and actually perform better because he now thinks he can win? What if everything works out that everyone is happier in the long run. It could go of course that loser twin now fails to grow because he is not actually challenged to actually win, but let’s say for argument’s sake this doesn’t happen but instead they we all live happier ever after?
You might argue that there is a principle that should still be upheld that the best player win and the worst one lose and that that’s more important than happiness. You might even have a good argument for that case. But you might also hold onto it more dogmatically than you should.
So if I affirm (as I do) that it is a moral necessity that we never believe anything more than our evidence warrants and that if we think we have insufficient evidence to establish a possible god’s existence that we have an ethical obligation to be agnostic default atheists and an ethical obligation not to opt to believe beyond what evidence warrants and so adopt faith beliefs by faith; how am I not a dogmatist? How am I not like the rational formalist who would insist people die or children live lives of misery rather than allow a single violation of rationalistic principle? What if there are other existential concerns more important than adherence to formalism?
My rough answer to this starts by conceding that, indeed, if existentially it were consistently profoundly to our benefit to act in formally inconsistent ways (either in general or even just with respect to faith beliefs), then we should not as a general principle be formalists or we should not eschew faith beliefs on principle. I will even concede that in different eras past or future it may be conceivable that our existential interests were or would be better served with particular formally untenable practices that were existential necessities.
For example, were there a people who were truly as amoral and barbarous as many theists claim that atheism or uncivilized humanity would necessitate and were this people only capable of being ruled through irrational beliefs and myths, and that was the only way to achieve any overall gains in their abilities to actualize themselves as humans in other ways, then I would sadly concede that it would be better to achieve whatever noble gains were possible through the recourse to the noble lie.
There are also serious problems for ethics and politics when people adopt their beliefs without strict principles about apportioning belief to evidence. This is because the idiosyncratic codes they might find work for them and their own thriving conflict would actually hinder others’ thriving. It is one thing to, non-faithfully, say, I find this set of codes just suits my life well and brings it success even though I cannot fully justify why.
I have no problem with that personalized approach to ethics. But when your idiosyncratic way of doing things gets legislated either legally through formal laws or even only socially through informal religious codes it risks doing more harm to others than good. If there are ways of rationally approaching one’s judgments more cautiously and less dogmatically, these are likely to serve everyone’s existential thriving best. If as a matter of principle we take all beliefs and actions to require formal care for apportioning belief to evidence, then everyone knows nothing will be demanded of them without evidence or logic based reasons being offered as to why they should accept any particular beliefs or perform any particular actions. This strikes me as only fair.
Exceptions might be made to this formal rigor in matters of complete indifference to any one else’s life. But religious faith beliefs, at least in most forms of Christianity and Islam and conservative forms of Judaism (to stick with the monotheisms for now), are problematic because they encourage entire institutions which are too often more concerned with defending tradition over reasoning without prejudice and with moving ethical thought into the realm of the dogmatic and out of the realm of the rational. Religious faith beliefs wind up affecting people’s children’s reason, encouraging habits of superstition, wishful thinking, and poor probability skills. Religious faith beliefs harden so that they move beyond a provisional affirmation of something uncertain until new evidence comes along to becoming a commitment to the belief itself to the point of hostility towards all new evidence. Religious faith beliefs tie people in with arbitrary and unnecessary institutional alliances and irresolvable divisions along lines unsettleable by reason.
Religion does not, of course, only lead to war and conflict and intractable disagreement, but when religions conflict the presence of absolute commitments to hopelessly inadequately supported beliefs is their special problem. Faith is why religious conflicts in principle and for principled reasons irresolvable for as long as religious people adhere to the very principle of faithful adherence to insufficiently supported beliefs. Only less faith and more doubt and openness to rethinking can solve such disputes. Faith is inherently an obstacle to human reason and cooperation because it allows some of us to believe things separately from reasons accessible and defensible to all of us. It is a recipe for incommensurable beliefs. Holding all of us to meet the same evidence requirements when advancing a position to each other and to apportion our beliefs to those requirements when adopting beliefs in general, is how we create the conditions in which agreement is at least in principle possible.
There is more I could say, but in the meantime;
For more on faith, read any or all posts in my “Disambiguating Faith” series (listed below) which strike you as interesting or whose titles indicate they might answer your own questions, concerns, or objections having read the post above. It is unnecessary to read all the posts below to understand any given one. They are written to each stand on their own but also contribute to a long sustained argument if read all together.