Two Types of Divinity and the Epistle to Diognetus

The ancient historian Herodotus (ca. 484-425 BCE) observed two types of worship Heracles, as an Olympian god and as a deified mortal: “And further: those Greeks, I think, are most in the right, who have established and practice two worships of Heracles, sacrificing to one Heracles as to an immortal [athanatō], and calling him the Olympian, but to the other bringing offerings as to a dead hero [hērōi enagizousi]” (Hist. 2.44). Diodorus Siculus (ca. 90-30 BCE) referred to this bipartite classification of deities: “As regards the gods, men of ancient times have handed down to later generations two different conceptions: Certain of the gods, they say, are eternal and imperishable … for each of these genesis and duration are from everlasting to everlasting. But the other gods, we are told, were terrestrial beings who attained to immortal honors and fame because of their benefactions to mankind, such as Heracles, Dionysus, Aristaeus, and the other who were like them” (Lib. 6.1.2). The Roman orator Quintilian (ca. 35-100 CE) declared that, “Some [gods] … may be praised because they were born immortal, others because they won immortality by their valour, a theme which the piety of our sovereign [emperor Domitian] has made the glory of these present times” (Inst. Or. 3.7.9). Quintilian divides gods into those born that way or exist that way (perhaps the Olympian gods) and those who have been deified on account of their amazing exploits like Roman emperors since Julius Caesar. Plutarch (ca. 46-119 CE) contrasted the god Apollos from deified mortals: “My native tradition removes this god [Apollos] from among those deities who were changed from mortals into immortals, like Heracles and Dionysus, whose virtues enabled them to cast off mortality and suffering; but he is one of those deities who are unbegotten and eternal [agennētōn kai aidiōn]” (Pel. 16.5).

This distinction between two types of deities was not simply for elites immersed in platonic thought, it cut across Mediterranean religions, and was expressed in Greek, Roman, and Jewish modes. Importantly, the difference between these two types of divinity is one of kind, not merely degree, it is a difference of intrinsic and extrinsic divinity. For an analogy we might compare it to the two types of peerages in the United Kingdom, where one can be a “Lord” by descent or be a “Lord” by appointment. Both Lords are real and true, even if they obtain and exercise their lordship in a different ways, with different relationships to their peers and people.

In the Epistle to Diognetus (ca. 150-200 CE) we have a prime example of these two classifications of absolute and relative divinity being used side-by-side.

First, in discoursing on the sending of divine son, the author says that the omnipotent Creator did not establish truth and holiness among humans by sending “some subordinate, or angel, or ruler or one of those who manage earthly matters, or those entrusted with the administration of things in heaven, but the Designer and Creator of the universe” sent the one “by whom he created the heavens, by whom enclosed the sea within its proper bounds, whose mysteries all the elements faithfully observe, from whom the sun has received the measure of the daily courses to keep, from whom the moon obeys as he commands it to shine by night, whom the stars obey as they follow the course of the moon, by whom all things have been ordered and determined and placed in subjection, including the heavens and the things in the heavens, the earth and the things in the earth, the sea and the things in the sea, fire, air abyss, the things in the heights, the things in the depths, the things in between – this one he sent to them! But perhaps he sent him as one might suppose to rule by tyranny, fear, and terror? Certainly not! On the contrary, he sent him in gentleness and meekness, as a king might send his son who is a king; he sent him as God; he sent him as a human to humans [alla en epieikeia kai prautēti ōs basileus pempōn huion basilea empempsen, ōs theon epempsen, ōs anthrōpon pros anthrōpon epempsen]” (Ep. Diogn. 7.2-4). This statement is perhaps the most densely packed precursor to Nicene Christology in all Christian literature pre-325 CE. It refers to: God’s incomparability; the Son is not an intermediary nor part of creation, but he is the divine instrument for creation; he comes “as” God and “as” human, which sounds very much like creedal formulas of Jesus’s dual consubstantiality in deity and humanity, i.e. vere deus et vere homo.

Second, a relative sense of divinity is created by benefaction given to the less fortunate. The author exhorts his audience to the imitation of God: “No one is able to imitate God in these matters [goodness]; on the contrary, these things are alien to his [a normal person’s] greatness. But one who takes up a neighbor’s burden, one who wishes to benefit someone who is worse off in something in which one is oneself better off, one who provides to those in need things that one has received from God, and thus becomes a god [theos ginetai] to those who received them – this one is an imitator of God” (Ep. Diog. 10.5-6). Here goodness to one’s neighbor is not only an imitation of God but also means, relatively or analogically, becoming a God to him or her in that the human benefactor has divine-like benevolence.

In Diognetus, God is uniquely Almighty and the son is sent to humans, not as a lesser subordinate being, he comes “as” God and “as” a human being, language which speaks to dual divine and human natures. At the same time, acts of benefaction to one’s own neighbor are an imitation of God’s goodness and make the benefactor a god, relatively speaking, to the supplicant.