Recent discussions of mythicism here and elsewhere have shown a lack of understanding of the basic principles of historical study, including the so-called “criteria of authenticity” that scholars have developed as tools for sifting through the evidence.
The criteria in question are not “rules” which, when applied to texts, guarantee that material is historical with absolute certainty. They are guides indicating usual tendencies and trajectories in developing traditions. They are statements about what is normally the case, all other things being equal.
Thus, for instance, the criterion of embarrassment states that it is unlikely for a group to invent material depicting itself or especially its founder in a negative light. All other things being equal, stories which would have been embarrassing to the group are unlikely to have been invented. Someone approaching the figure of Jesus skeptically would be justified in thinking that such material has a good chance of be authentic.
This doesn’t mean that the criterion of embarrassment “proves” historicity, as though no Christian could ever possibly conceivably have invented something which depicts Jesus negatively. It means that it is unlikely that a Christian would do so. In the case of any given story or saying, even one that meets the criterion of embarrassment, it always remains possible in theory that it could have been invented. But what is required to show that it is likely to have been invented, in spite of the inherent unlikelihood of such embarrassing material being created, is for an argument to be made or evidence to be provided showing a likely – indeed a more likely – scenario in which such material might nevertheless have been invented.
The issue is not “proof” or “laws” but arguing probability based on available evidence.
Likewise with the principle or criterion that early material is more likely to be authentic than later material. Some mythicists seem to have misunderstood this to mean “If Paul doesn’t mention it, it isn’t historical.” How a principle could be so badly misunderstood is difficult to comprehend. Be that as it may, this principle doesn’t deny that later texts may contain authentic material and that earlier texts may contain things that were invented. Both seem quite obviously to be true, and not only in Biblical studies. The point is simply that, given the tendency of legends to appear, grow and develop, all other things being equal, earlier sources are more likely to preserve a more original form and material which was more faithfully-transmitted than later sources are.
This last point is of course complicated by the fact that a relatively late source may have used a very early source that is no longer extant, and thus provide much authentic material even in spite of its late date. This is why historical-critical investigations also look for signs that earlier sources have been used (one famous example being the sayings source known as “Q” which is thought to have been used by Matthew and Luke and to account for the material they share in common which they did not derive from Mark).
There are many other “criteria of authenticity” which have been developed, discussed, disputed, and utilized in sifting through the earliest sources about Jesus, which I have not mentioned here. Information about them, detailing their strengths and weaknesses, can be found in most volumes on the historical study of Jesus. Historians and scholars are well aware that all the criteria have issues and problems, and none of them is infallible.
The point that seems to keep getting missed by mythicists is that historical study is about probabilities. Mythicists who understand historical study will not be under the illusion that they can show that the mainstream view that there was a historical Jesus is wrong without any shadow of a doubt. This is not because historians are stubborn, but rather because historians understand what historical critical tools are and are not capable of. Such absolute certainties, whether positive or negative, are not the stuff that ancient history deals in, for the most part.
What mythicists can hope to do – and what they must do if they want to be taken seriously – is show why the improbable claims they make, such as that Christians invented material that reflected poorly on them, should nonetheless be accepted as more likely to reflect what actually happened. Thus far, in my experience relatively few mythicists seem to be aware that they need to offer such arguments, much less have formulated them.
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