Moral principle, which is essentially recognized by all normal people (although on different grounds and with different degrees of precision), affirms that human dignity must be respected in each person, and that, therefore, it is not possible to make anyone whatsoever only a means or an instrument for anyone’s use. But in the theory of deterrence, the punished criminal is ultimately considered to all intents and purposes as only a means of instilling fear in others for the sake of the preservation of public security. In fact, if the criminal’s own good also entered into the purpose of criminal law — keeping him from committing a crime by the fear of threat of punishment — then once it is already committed, this motive falls away on its own. And from this point of view, the criminal who is punished is left only as a means for the deterrence of others, that is, for a purpose extraneous to himself, which now directly contradicts an absolute moral requirement. From this aspect, deterrent punishment would be permissible only as a threat; but a threat never acted upon loses all meaning. Thus the principle of deterrent punishment could be morally permissible only under conditions of its uselessness, and it can be materially useful only under condition of its immoral application.
In fact, the cutting edge of the theory of deterrence has been completely blunted. The theory should be considered as having laid down its arms from the time that physical torture punishments and qualified death sentences were abolished in all civilized and semicivilized countries. It is clear that if the task of punishment consists in the instilling of fear and horror in individuals who are liable to commit crimes, then the brutal means themselves would also be valid and expedient. Why do the advocates of deterrence reject what from their point of view should be recognized as the very best thing? It must be assumed that it is because these measures, superlative as regards to deterrence, are, however, recognized as impermissible, as immoral and contrary to the requirements of compassion and love of fellowmen. But in such an event, deterrence now stops being the determining or decisive principle of punishment. It’s one of two things: either the chief meaning of punishment is deterrence, and then agonizing punishments must be allowed as measures which most correspond to this meaning, as being those which chiefly produce fear; or the character of punishment, above and beyond practical utility, should conform with moral principle, which decides what is permitted and what is not permitted, and then it is necessary to reject the principle of deterrence itself completely as an essentially immoral motive, or impermissible from a moral point of view.
–Vladimir Soloviev, Politics, Law & Morality: Essays by V. Soloviev. trans. Vladimir Wozniuk (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 170.
* I am using the transliteration of his name used for this book, though I prefer to use Solovyov when I write on him.
Ad-Free & Subscriber Log-In