What calls itself the pro-life movement in the United States has a peculiarly narrow focus. Often, it will focus only on reversing Roe v. Wade and returning the issue to the state. Needless to say, as I argued yesterday, this is not a true pro-life position. It is a constitutional position, a nod toward subsidiarity, a positivist argument that is somewhat divorced from the natural law principle that innocent life must always enjoy legal protection. In other words, a pro-life position that looks no further than Roe v. Wade is not a true pro-life position.
The problems with this narrow approach come to light with the ultimate pre-occupation of the right on this issue- the ascension of Supreme Court justices who will over-rule Roe v. Wade. Or justices they think will make such a ruling; there is no certainty here, but much doubt and repeated disappointment. But set aside this uncertainty for a minute. The main problem with this single-minded obsession is that it pays no heed to anything else in the potential justice’s record or temperament that may lead to outcomes inconsistent with public morality or justice.
Consider Alberto Gonzales. He will certainly go down as one of the worst attorney generals in history. This is the man who did more than most to legitimize a regime of torture, dismissing the Geneva Conventions as “quaint”. This is the man who stood with Dick Cheney in the assertion of unchecked executive power. And yet, when word got out that Bush might appoint his old friend to the Supreme Court, he was effectively vetoed by right-wing activists– not for any of the above– but because of a ruling he joined on the Texas Supreme Court pertaining to a narrow parental notification case. This sunk him, and he was never considered. But the implication is clear: if the right had confidence he would vote to overturn Roe v. Wade, none of this would have mattered. And yet it does matter, for the Supreme Court casts it shadow across a broad spectrum of the public policy debate.
It seems to be that the same conscience formation that voters must undertake before entering the polling booth should also be done by those who influence the selection of judges. The same recognition that agreeing with one of the judge’s unacceptable positions is formal cooperation in evil, and that supporting him requires coming up with a good proportionate reason. I’m not saying it can’t be done- I am saying that people seem to hold judges to a different, looser, standard. There is no reason in moral theology why this should be the case.
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