Part III Part IV
Part V Part VI
Part VII Part VIII
Oaths, of whatever sort, bring many questions for Christians to ponder. Should we even make them? Some believe that we should not, using Christ’s injunction as proof: “But I say to you, Do not swear at all, either by heaven, for it is the throne of God, or by the earth, for it is his footstool, or by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the great King. And do not swear by your head, for you cannot make one hair white or black. Let what you say be simply ‘Yes’ or ‘No’; anything more than this comes from evil” (Matt 5:34-37). Lombard thinks there is something to this, that one should not make oaths lightly, and that was what Christ wanted to impart. They should not be made unless out of grave need. “For to swear voluntarily and without necessity, or to swear a falsehood, is a great sin.“[1] Lombard lists three situations where he believes such necessity could be found: when one has to provide evidence to protect oneself from false accusations, when one is providing helpful information, or when one is entering a peace treaty. In each case, the oath is intended to reinforce the good will between the one who is making the oath and the one who hears. And in each situation, if an oath is asked for and not given, the speaker’s statements would be doubted; if the matter is serious, the kinds of danger involved with such doubt is easily discerned (wars have come out of such doubt). But, Lombard points out, it would be better if we did not swear, and if we can convince others without it, then we should do so; the need to swear indicates a fragile situation caused by evil, the kind of which we pray to be delivered from.[2]
But, looking back to what Jesus said, one can ask, how are we to make an oath, if and when it is deeded necessary? Can we swear by God or by one of God’s creations? Is there one which is better, more binding, than another? And what exactly are we, as Christians, to make of oaths sworn to false gods?
Lombard suggests that one could, in theory, swear by a creature, if one understands that it is a creature, and in their oath, they are not giving it more authority and dignity than it actually has. That is, if one swears by a created thing, one is giving it honor, and it is possible that in doing so, one is giving it more honor than it deserves. The danger, for example, of swearing by angels would be to elevate the angels too much, and to treat them as gods. In this way, Lombard suggests the ordinary Jew was told not to swear, and if they swore, the oath should be made to God, and no one else.[3] But, we find honorable people, like Joseph, swearing by that which is not God. Because they did not raise the dignity of that which was being sworn to as being equal to God, there was no fault in their action.[4]
Since he thought that the temptation might be too great to elevate the one who is being sworn by to godhood, or because an oath made to a creature could be that much more easily broken, Lombard suggests Jesus told us not to swear by any creature whatsoever.[5] But does this really answer the question? It would appear as if Lombard is of two minds here. His main explanation for why an oath should not be taken to anything other than God is because of the confusion that might result. Yet, he wants us to believe that Joseph (and many others like him in Scripture) did not sin when they made such oaths. Is he making Joseph too sinless? After all, the other sins of the Patriarchs are there for us to see, so why would this not be one? Would not a better solution here be the same one which is given for the veneration of the saints? If one understands that, by calling upon a creature, one is also calling upon the authority of the Creator through the creature, then it would seem permissible to swear upon them, because the ultimate, if indirect, guarantor is God. Why should we assume that one is going to automatically elevate the object of our oath to godhood, when know not to the saints to godhood when we honor them?
Indeed, it seems that the Master of the Sentences has this in mind when he answers the question, what kind of oath has greater authority, one sworn by God alone, or one sworn by a creature? The one which directly invokes God is of greater because anything else is only receiving authority given to it by God.[6] That means, God is still being invoked, but only indirectly so, by oaths sworn upon some creature. Thus Lombard asserts, “And so to swear by any creature is this: namely to produce its Creator as a witness.”[7] Lombard also suggests that, in making such an oath, one is possibly rendering that which is sworn by to God’s justice, and God is still acting as the guarantor; the implication is that if such an oath is broken, God is free to render his justice upon that which was sworn over (if he pleases to do so).[8]
Next, Lombard addresses the question – how are we to understand those who swear to a false god, demon, or idol? Obviously, unlike swearing by the authority of the Pharaoh, or over the lives of one’s children, these false gods have no authority nor can they be given over to God as a pledge. Lombard responds through a lengthy quote from Augustine: “In this matter I beg you to consider whether, in the event of a man failing to keep his word after having pledged himself by such an oath, you would not regard him as guilty of a twofold sin. For if he kept the engagement which he had confirmed by this oath, he would be pronounced guilty in this only, that he swore by such deities; but no one would justly blame him for keeping his engagement. But in the case supposed, seeing that he both swore by those whom he should not worship, and did, notwithstanding his promise, what he should not have done, he was guilty of two sins: whence it is obvious that in using, not for an evil work, but for some good and lawful end, the service of a man whose fidelity is known to have been confirmed by an oath in the name of false gods, one participates, not in the sin of swearing by the false gods, but in the good faith with which he keeps his promise. The faith which I here speak of as kept is not that on account of which those who are baptized in Christ are called faithful: that is entirely different and far removed from the faith desiderated in regard to the arrangements and compacts of men. Nevertheless it is, beyond all doubt, worse to swear falsely by the true God than to swear truly by the false gods; for the greater the holiness of that by which we swear, the greater is the sin of perjury.”[9]
There are many ideas which have been addressed here, and we should look at them in turn. Augustine points out that a person would face two kinds of sins if they swear to a false god and later break their oath. One sin would be the breaking of the oath itself. The second would be the worship of a false god, giving adoration, which should be given to God alone, to someone or something else (whether or not it exists). Even though the entity being sworn to and treated as if a god is not one, Augustine makes it clear that the oath is still valid. Interestingly enough, he says that it is better to swear by a false god and to keep that oath than to swear by God and break it. The good of the oath itself, while it does not justify the evil of idolatry, nonetheless is praiseworthy, even as the good intention involved in a lie which helps someone is praiseworthy, even if the lie itself is not. It is for this reason why, later in the passage, Augustine contends that one can make an oath one who would swear by a false god. The good of the oath itself, especially because it provides for good social order, justifies that oath, even if the other involved with the oath sins in the process of making that oath. In a passage not quoted by Lombard, Augustine indicates the necessity of oath-making for the social order justifies the action, even though one could say by making them, a Christian is helping a pagan to sin: “The question whether we ought to take advantage of the concord which is established between other parties by their exchange of oaths is entirely different. If we answer this in the negative, I know not whether we could find any place on earth in which we could live. For not only on the frontier, but throughout all the provinces, the security of peace rests on the oaths of barbarians.”[10] For Augustine, Scripture shows this to be the case, where we find examples of believers in the true God making such pacts with non-believers: “In answering this question, we may accept as decisive those examples which you yourself quoted of Laban and of Abimelech (if Abimelech did swear by his gods, as Laban swore by the god of Nahor). This is, as I have said, another question, and one which would perchance perplex me, were it not for those examples of Isaac and Jacob, to which, for anything I know, others might be added.”[11] What this indicates is that cooperation with a sinner engaging in a specific sin does not mean one is necessarily guilty of that sin as well.[12]
Footnotes
[1] Peter Lombard, Sentences. Book III, dist XXXIX, c4. It is without surprise that he cites Augustine as an authority here, such as when he says, “And therefore let him who understands that swearing is to be reckoned not among things that are good, but among things that are necessary, refrain as far as he can from indulging in it, unless by necessity, when he sees men slow to believe what it is useful for them to believe, except they be assured by an oath,” St. Augustine, The Sermon of the Mount, in NPNF1(6), bk1 c17.
[2] Once again, Lombard quotes Augustine here. “Let your speech be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay; this is good and what is to be desired. For whatsoever is more than these comes of evil; i.e., if you are compelled to swear, know that it comes of a necessity arising from the infirmity of those whom you are trying to persuade of something; which infirmity is certainly an evil, from which we daily pray to be delivered, when we say, Deliver us from evil. Hence He has not said, Whatsoever is more than these is evil; for you are not doing what is evil when you make a good use of an oath, which, although not in itself good, is yet necessary in order to persuade another that you are trying to move him for some useful end; but it comes of evil on his part by whose infirmity you are compelled to swear,” ibid. This once again shows us that situations can require us to do that which would ordinarily be wrong to do, and, when put into them, that necessity can be said to be the exception which proves the rule. But we should strive not to be put into such situations, and indeed, that is what Augustine suggests is meant, at least in part, when we pray, “Deliver us from evil.”
[3] Lombard’s authority here, interestingly enough, is St Jerome: In Matthaeum 5.
[4]Here, Lombard is referencing a story from Genesis, where Joseph makes an oath in the name of the Pharaoh: “By this you shall be tested: by the life of Pharaoh, you shall not go from this place unless your youngest brother comes here. Send one of you, and let him bring your brother, while you remain in prison, that your words may be tested, whether there is truth in you; or else, by the life of Pharaoh, surely you are spies” (Gen. 42:15-16).
[5] “But Christ forbade swearing by creatures, lest there should be believed to be something divine in them for the sake of which reverence would be owed to them; or perhaps, lest in swearing a falsehood by them, men should believe that they were not bound by their oath,” Peter Lombard, Sentences. Book III, dist XXXIX, c5.
[6] Cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences. Book III, dist XXXIX, c6.
[7] Peter Lombard, Sentences. Book III, dist XXXIX, c7.
[8] Ibid. Here, Lombard via Augustine (Sermo 180) gives the example of swearing by one’s children, saying that if one makes such an oath, their children are given over as a pledge and the consequences of breaking their oath would involve their children. But we should ponder, what do we expect would happen if such an oath is broken? While we can understand a state accepting such an oath, and taking the children away from the parents, we should not expect God to harm children because some reckless parents made an oath over them. In this case, perhaps not all pledges we give will be validated by God, but neither does it seem all oaths would require such validation.
[9] St. Augustine, Letter 47 in NPNF1(1), n2.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid. See Gen. 31:51- 54 and Gen. 20:22-32 to find Augustine’s examples.
[12] One wonders of the implications this idea would have in regards to other situations, such as voting in a democratic election. Is not the action of a voter, outside of the election, of greater consequence than the vote itself? Should one not accept that a vote will not be for an ideal candidate, but a real, concrete candidate, who would therefore be imperfect, even a sinner? One does not confirm them in their sins when one votes for them, just as one does not confirm a pagan in their idolatry when one makes a pact with them. The sins of the Christian voter outside of the election, in their daily life, when it goes against the good they want to establish from their vote, is of far more consequence to that person than the sins a politician will make while in the process of establishing the agreed upon good. Obviously there are differences, and these must be drawn out: the agreement made between a politician and the voter is of a general kind, and the politician will not be able to know which aspects of their platform a particular voter will contend against. But does this not mean there is more separation between a voter and a politician than between a Christian and a pagan making an oath together when they swear by the authority of their gods? And yet the second, as Augustine points out, is permissible. But this is not to say there is no corruption, no guilt, involved in either case, for there is a kind of cooperation with evil going on, but the cooperation is indirect and material, not direct and formal.
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