Faith-Promoting Rumor
Valerie Hudson Cassler’s recent defense of heterosexual-only marriage offers a heteronormative account of human relationships that pits (heterosexual) women against homosexuals, where “the possibility of human freedom and peace” hang in the balance.[1] However, Hudson’s article suffers from the typical problems of heteronormative feminism, which as been critiqued since the 1980’s in American feminist circles,[2] not only because it denies the label of “woman” to the lesbian, but also because it restricts the possibility of women’s freedom as lying exclusively in the realm of heterosexual, reproductive relationships.
I would like to examine Hudson’s claims on alternative feminist grounds, critiquing not only her implicit gender essentialism which imagines women’s freedom as only possible within reproductive relationships, but her impoverished view of “gender equality.” Further, I intend to examine Hudson’s statist view of marriage which conceives of state power over marriage having the explicit goal of encouraging marriages which it deems to be in its interest.
At the outset, let me say that I am immensely appreciative of Hudson’s work for engaging this topic in a scholarly manner and raising the level of discourse about same-sex marriage. One can appreciate Hudson’s implicit critique of LDS discourse such as that in the “Divine Institution of Marriage,” which bases its argument on the raising of children, an argument I have made as well. Not only has Hudson argued that same-sex couples should be allowed and given state sanction for providing care for their children, but also that “those who base their defense of heterosexual marriage on the basis of its easier and more natural procreative potential are off the mark.” Such arguments and clear thinking are necessary to take the conversation forward.
Hudson’s Feminism
Hudson laments that opponents of SSM concede too quickly that there are “no good, public, non-religious reasons for the state to privilege heterosexual monogamous marriage above any other type of relationship, including homosexual unions.” She intends to offer just such an argument by suggesting that,
“The gender arrangements privileged by the state determine its potential for democracy, peace, and gender equality. There is only one form of gender arrangement–companionate heterosexual monogamous marriage—that provides the sustainable foundation for these public goods. The state will be harmed if it fails to privilege the only gender arrangement that promotes such profound public benefits.”
The goal of peace and democracy hangs on the achievement of the intermediate goal of “gender equality.” Yet, it is precisely the confusion around what is meant by “gender equality,” both as a composite term as well as separate terms, that causes trouble for this argument.
As she lays the foundation of her argument, Hudson offers no distinction between “sex” and “gender,” eliding the two apparently interchangeably. She offers a definition of sexual difference: “Here, by sex we mean the innate ability to be a physical, biological father or mother as encoded in DNA of XX or XY components.” This definition is deceptive because it actually offers two different definitions, one with respect to DNA and another with respect to biological possibilities of producing offspring. This sleight of hand is significant because she will move back and forth between these two definitions as it suits her argument.
This slippage of these two definitions of “sex” between reproductive capabilities and DNA is significant. Inasmuch as many lack the reproductive capabilities of “male” and “female” despite having unambiguous DNA, external genitalia, and gonads, the ability to reproduce is an insufficient marker for sexual difference.[3] Nevertheless, Hudson repeatedly suggests that the most signficant interaction between the sexes is in the sphere of reproduction. Not only does a definition of sexual difference that relies on reproduction exclude children and the elderly as fully “sexed” human beings, as well as those with congenital reproductive defects, but also includes those who have been suffered disease or accident that has rendered them incapable of reproduction as no longer “male” and “female.” This exclusionary definition of maleness and femaleness simply falls short.
If, however, Hudson relies on DNA as the marker of sexual difference, reproduction and the realm of the reproductive economy lose the central space that she wants to put them for thinking about the interaction between the sexes.
In laying out her theory of human interaction, Hudson offers theories of “evolutionary biology” to account for human society. Working from this evolutionary perspective, which seeks biological and social explanations for contemporary social phenomena. She describes a kind “evolution marriage” which subjugates women, typical of pre-modern societies. Here, Hudson’s argument at the outset renders invisible homosexuality. In the evolutionary terms that she lays out, there is no etiology for homosexuality since she only conceives of the sexual economy as reproductive.
Hudson’s research relies on a set of new journalistic books that advances the thesis that societies with gender equality are more peaceful.[4] The books suffer from the characteristic inability of evolutionary theories to explain complex social phenomena by reducing human desires to the fight for survival and the desire to reproduce. Scientists and journalists who advance these theories generally pay little attention to the philosophical literature which has critiqued such views and offered much richer complexity to them, notably the psychoanalytic, sociological, and anthropological discourses that have developed since Darwin.
The various alternatives to the “malignant patriarchy” of “evolutionary marriage” offered consider only the reproductive economy, which Hudson conflates with the sexual economy. Homosexuality, as such, is still completely invisible inasmuch as it falls outside of Hudson’s evolutionary scope as well as the social engineering that she advocates. In none of the social arrangements that Hudson outlines is homosexuality taken as a given in society, let alone our society. In this analysis homosexuality is then presented as a threat to the heterosexual reproductive economy. Yet, this crucial point is never explained. Inasmuch as Hudson acknowledges that the ideal “gender equality” marriages are rarely met, in what way does the existence of other kinds of marriages constitute a zero-sum game, especially for those who reject the reproductive economy altogether?
The largest theoretical problem of this paper is that its notion of “equality” in opposite-sex relationships is thought to only occur in reproductive heterosexual relationships. The goal of “gender equality” advanced here is linked to “marriage” because of “male dominance and sexual irresponsibility toward females on the one hand, and female vulnerability because of reproduction on the other.” Here, “equality” is rendered exclusively in reproductive terms, though the contours of such equality are not fleshed out. No definition of “equality” is given with respect to non-reproductive interactions between males and females, such as in access to social, political, and economic power. By reducing gender relations to a reproductive economy, the call to gender equality advanced in this article fails to address the most pressing areas where women lack equality.
The equivocation on the term “gender equality” is problematic. At times, it is not clear what this means, when one knows it has been achieved, and how various levels of failure to achieve this ideal might actually affect society. For women, gender equality is variously conceived as: not being separated from men and pursuing joint projects (Arrangement B); not being forced to be “male” in the sense of relinquishing fully their obligations to their own children (Arrangement C); not being forced to care fully for their children without males (Arrangement D); and not living in “gender separation” (Arrangements E & F). As an alternative to these, Hudson offers an ideal of heterosexual marriage (“companionate heterosexual monogamous marriage”) wherein gender equality is obtained.
In these examples, gender equality is achieved on two conditions: 1) interaction between the sexes, including joint projects, specifically the 2) shared responsibility to raise children. This definition of “gender equality” is a step backward for feminists as it sets a rather low bar. For instance, these objectives for “gender equality” as conceived of by Hudson may be achieved without women’s access to vote, work, own property, and even freedom from violence. To define “gender equality” in these terms reinforces, rather than challenges, reproduction as the defining characteristic of male/female relationships.
The term that Hudson adopts to describe homosexual relationships is “gender apartheid.” This negatively charged accusation that homosexuals cannot or will not engaged in mixed-sex interactions underscores the restricted notions of meaningful and politically valuable relationships that Hudson imagines. This is because, she argues, the only significant kinds of mixed sex interactions are within marriages. This assumption is made precisely because her definition of gender equality excludes women’s ability to participate meaningfully in society outside of reproductive marriage, and therefore to interact as equals with males in other economies of power. As such, Hudson’s view of women restricts them to the realm of the heterosexual home as the only possible place where gender equality might occur, as opposed to the workplace, the political sphere, or even kinship relations besides husband-wife.
In her analysis of alternative arrangements of care, including the care for the elderly, same-sex parents, and other arrangements, Hudson offers the valuable praise for those who willingly take on this responsibility for others. Yet, this comes with a caveat:
“But no one would confuse the good that comes from a Care commitment with the good that comes from a companionate heterosexual monogamous marriage. There is simply no comparison. Prevalent companionate heterosexual monogamous marriages create the only possible ground for democracy, freedom, peace, and meaningful gender equality. There is no other route to these goods.”
This exclusive claim that such ideal marriages form the “only” possible ground for the goods she identifies is particularly bold, one that is repeatedly asserted.
However, this argument relies on the privileging of children born into such relationships, and jointly reared as troubling since gender equality has been defined specifically in terms of jointly providing care. “Freedom” only belongs to these kinds of families.
“In a sense, if persons reject procreation within companionate heterosexual monogamous marriage and instead embrace the forms of gender inequality and gender apartheid, then they are not free. For can one claim to love and value human life in the light of freedom, and reject procreation in a companionate heterosexual monogamous marriage context, which as we have seen is the ground of freedom?”
Here, the claims that those who do not have children either in heterosexual or homosexual relationships “are not free” reveals the circularity of the argument. Though Hudson has made the effort to separate out “care” from “reproduction” as a distinction, suggesting that the state has an interest in relationships of care, regardless of the status of the individual providing that care, here she collapses them again. She has defined freedom and equality as only possible within marriages, ignoring other economies of human interaction. Then she insists that this is the only economy in which freedom can exist and be produced.
Statism and Marriage
Hudson suggests that state interests serve as the deciding factor in authorizing particular kinds of relationships:
“The gender arrangements privileged by the state determine its potential for democracy, peace, and gender equality. There is only one form of gender arrangement–companionate heterosexual monogamous marriage—that provides the sustainable foundation for these public goods. The state will be harmed if it fails to privilege the only gender arrangement that promotes such profound public benefits.”
This view of marriage which denies that marriage is a right, but rather something which the state can grant or take away from individuals according to its own interests, puts the state as the most important unit in society, and individuals and families as only instrumental to it. Now, this is certainly a coherent position, but one that I think gets it backwards. The state is there to serve the interests of individuals and families.
In order establish state interest, Hudson repeatedly asserts the link between non-“gender equal” marriages and inherent violence, but never demonstrates this claim; the correlation/causation gap is never closed. There are numerous sweeping claims along these lines that are simply footnoted, without any specific empirical examples. Furthermore, there are exactly zero studies of the “peacefulness” and “freedom” in societies with a high degree of acceptance toward homosexuals.
Furthermore, given that the 20th century has been by far the most brutal, including among societies who adopted ideals of “companionate marriage” like the United States, the direct causal connection between a particular model of marriage and peaceful co-existence with Others, strikes me as a particularly tenuous claim. Especially since it is these very societies offered as examples of “peace” and “freedom” that have been most accepting toward homosexuals.
Hudson concludes this section,
“Thus, the state itself has a vested interest in the creation and promulgation of companionate heterosexual monogamous marriage (G arrangements)—and likewise has a vested interest in the proactive hindrance of evolutionary marriage and gender apartheid. It is only through the widespread existence of companionate heterosexual monogamous marriages that democracy, freedom, prosperity, and other goods such as state peacefulness can continue to have strong root and be sustainable.”
In this statist model, every failure to achieve this ideal marital relationship should be punishable by the state. The problem with a statist view of marriage is that it makes minority populations subject to the “interests” of the state. If, for example, the government decided that it was in its interest to adopt a eugenic program for marriage and reproduction, preventing certain segments of the population from marrying and reproducing because such relationships could not be construed to fit the state’s interest, this position leaves no philosophical or legal grounds on which to object to such a program.
Conclusion
Hudson’s analysis of the same-sex marriage situation is rooted in a theoretically deficient view of human freedom, especially women’s freedom and equality. Her view simultaneously conceives of the voluntary relationships that one enter into as subject to state approval, while investing these relationships with the burden of being the only possible locus where (heterosexual) women’s equality may be obtained. The problem with this view, especially for women, is that it restricts equality and freedom to the domestic, reproductive economy. By ignoring other economies of power, most notably the poltical and the economic, Hudson can only conceive of women’s freedom within the context of reproductive, heterosexual relationships. As such, she casts homosexuals as engaged in “gender apartheid” that threatens women’s equality. The problem, however, is that there is no argument for how homosexual relationships actively compete against heterosexual marriages in order to present this threat, let alone how such relationships adversely affect economies of power outside of reproduction. Further, the effects of her own “heterosexual apartheid” on the freedom of homosexuals is never evaluated. To pit (heterosexual) feminists against homosexuals in this way is neither politically wise, nor theoretically sound.
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[1.] V.H. Cassler, “’Some Things That Should Not Have Been Forgotten Were Lost’: The Pro-Feminist, Pro-Democracy, Pro-Peace Case for State Privileging of Companionate Heterosexual Monogamous Marriage” SquareTwo, Vol. 2 No. 1 (Spring 2009) http://squaretwo.org/Sq2ArticleCasslerMarriage.html
[2.] Such critiques culminate in Judith Butler, Gender trouble : feminism and the subversion of identity (New York: Routledge, 1990, repr. 1999).
[3.] Anne Fausto-Sterling, Sexing the body : gender politics and the construction of sexuality (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2000).
[4.] Richard Wrangham and Dale Peterson, Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins of Human Violence (New York: Mariner Books, 1996); Bradley Thayer, Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict (Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2004), Malcolm Potts and Thomas Hayden, Sex and War: How Biology Explains War and Terrorism and Offers a Path to a Safer World (Dallas, Texas: BenBella Books, 2008). These books
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